Problems of Communism

MARCH-APRIL 1984



JAPAN & USSR
Tetsuya Kataoka

Chernenko Succeeds
Marc D. Zlotnik

Notes & Views

Soviet General Staff
Kenneth Currie

CP Checklist
Richard F. Staar

Communist Fronts
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Book Reviews
Mark Falcoff
William Hood

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MARCH-APRIL 1984 VOL XXXIII

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Cover: A Japanese fisherman on the beach near the Hokkaido village of Sarufutsu holds a piece of debris from Korean Air Lines Flight 007, shot down by Soviet fighters on September 1, 1983, near Sakhalin Island. Photo by Matsumoto/SYGMA.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Japan's Northern Threat
Tetsuya Kataoka

Japanese perception of a Soviet threat has changed considerably in recent years. Some analysts see this as a reaction to Moscow's increased naval activity around Japan, fortification of the disputed Northern Territories, and downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. But Japanese perceptions have been influenced not so much by Soviet behavior in the Pacific, argues the author, as by developments in Washington.

Chernenko Succeeds
Marc D. Zlotnik

The selection of Konstantin Chernenko to succeed Yuriy Andropov as general secretary of the CPSU proceeded amidst unusual signs of division in the Soviet leadership between the Brezhnev coterie and those promoted by Andropov. This points toward a transitional and weak rule. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be excluded that Chernenko will surmount this division and work with both factions to make important changes.

* * *

Notes & Views

Soviet General Staff's New Role
Kenneth Currie

Contrary to traditional Western analysis, the Soviet General Staff has emerged as the dominant voice in Soviet military affairs. Today, under Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, it exerts great influence over Soviet military doctrine, including policy on arms control; exercises functional control over the entire defense ministry; and probably sets the agenda for Defense Council deliberations. Although the party clearly retains ultimate authority, the General Staff appears solidly entrenched in its expanded role.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1983
Richard F. Staar

This list, published in cooperation with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1984), gives information on the major communist parties recognized by Moscow, and on the "vanguard revolutionary democratic" parties—viewed by Moscow as having considerable potential for becoming communist parties. Data provided include the mid-1983 population estimate for the geographic entity, estimated or claimed party membership, the key party leader, any major party gathering during 1983, the party's orientation among communist movements, its legal status, and its showing in the most recent national elections.

Notes and Reviews (over)

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Communist International Fronts in 1983
Wallace Spaulding

This item, published in cooperation with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, updates information on Moscow's major international communist front organizations for 1983 and provides an extensive listing of officials in these organizations, as well as front publications and activities. Particular attention is paid to Moscow's efforts to infuence the "peace movement."

* * *

Essay-reviews

Struggle for Central America
Mark Falcoff

Indigenous conflict and intervention by both superpowers have kept Central America at the flash point ever since the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua in 1979. Recent writing on the area, while sometimes biased and often overtaken by events, points to the regional dilemma of seeking alternatives to both right-wing and left-wing extremism.

Unlikely Conspiracy
William Hood

Circumstantial evidence appears to link Bulgarian intelligence—and perhaps indirectly the Soviet KGB—with the attempt to assassinate the Pope in May 1981. Upon closer examination, though, the unprofessional nature of that bungled attempt casts doubt upon this theory.

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Japan's Northern Threat

By Tetsuya Kataoka

The tragedy of Korean Air Line's Flight 007 and the subsequent deterioration of US-Soviet relations have ushered in another season of rediscovering the Soviet threat and the need to cope with it. As expected, the American media—accompanying President Ronald Reagan on his visit to Japan in November 1983—played up the demand for an accelerated defense buildup in Japan, where this effort had stalled. In unison the American media wondered aloud: "Do not the Japanese feel threatened by the Soviet Union?" Unfortunately, the question assumes a Japan-USSR bilateral framework from which Washington is missing. In this article, I shall try to explain Japan's defense policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in terms of the Washington factor.

Japan's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union is of necessity closely linked to the American definition of the Soviet threat and to American policy toward Moscow. This follows from the Japan–United States alliance, which is based in large part on a security treaty the two nations enacted in 1952 and modified in 1960. In no area of Japan's foreign policy does the security factor weigh as heavily as it does in its policy toward the Soviet Union, and Japan depends for its security on the US guarantee. One might go even further. Japan and the United States have developed very complex, multifaceted ties alongside the security relationship, and it is the whole of these ties that affects Japan's Soviet policy. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimusho) states that the US-Japanese relationship is the "cornerstone" of Japan's foreign policy, the statement should be taken at full value.

This is not to say, however, that Washington controls Japan or that Japan is subservient to Washington. The bilateral ties that bind the two countries have come to be interdependent and based on anticipated reactions. In fact, beneath the bland and placid surface, Japan has been quietly gaining considerable influence in its relationship with Washington. Most important of all, the chemistry of Japan's attitude and outlook on foreign policy has changed measurably since the second half of the 1970's.

Pacifism and the Defense of Japan

It has long been customary, indeed orthodox, to explain Japan's defense policy—whose object is the Soviet Union—as a derivative of the pacifist-neutralist sentiment that is said to have dominated Japan's politics since the end of World War II.[1] A child of Japan's defeat in war and a US occupation policy that sought to perpetuate some of the impact of defeat, pacifism-neutralism is still a respectable, if declining, ideology

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[1]The definitive study in the English language of postwar Japanese pacifism at its zenith in 1960 is George R. Packard, III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1966. I suspect that future studies based on declassified archival material will not make Packard's study obsolete. However, because in this study pacifism on the left was juxtaposed against the pro-American conservatives, conservative pacifism—by far the most important in the long run—is not treated in Packard's account. On the origins of conservative pacifism (which is to the left of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro in the Liberal Democratic Party), see John W. Dower, *Empire and Its Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979; and Michael M. Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Settlement*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983. For the American view of Hatoyama Ichiro, Kishi Nobusuke, and Nakasone—all defined here as nationalists—see Ivan I. Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-war Trends*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1960. For an interesting overview of American attitudes on conservative pacifism, see Mike M. Mochizuki and Richard J. Samuels, "Japanese Security Requires No Choice Between Evils," *The New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1982.

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

An October 25, 1983, photo of the long (by then in its eighth week) search for the wreckage of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 shot down by Soviet fighters. Pictured maneuvering in the sea north of Moneron Island are: in the foreground, a Soviet search ship; behind it, the US frigate Meyerkord *(1058); and in the background, a Soviet missile frigate.*

—Kyodo/UPI.

in Japanese politics. But it has gone through profound transformations over the years. While it has always been the ideology of and policy rationale for the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP),[2] pacifism clearly commanded the support of a majority of Japanese in its heyday in the 1950's and early 1960's and in this way insinuated itself into the policies of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) governing majority. At its peak, the force of pacifism came from the fact that it was the only medium for the expression of Japanese nationalism against the United States, which refused to leave Japan after granting "independence" at the San Francisco peace conference in September 1951 and which, moreover, actively sought to enlist Japan in the cold war in open violation of the pacifist covenant it had earlier written into the Japanese Constitution (Article 9). Thus, the pacifists were able to satisfy both their genuine antiwar sentiment as well as their resentment over the loss of Japan's autonomy.

Pacifism today rests on three props: the Japanese constitution, the security treaty with the United States, and the thesis that Japan's rearmament (defined as "militarism") will threaten its "Asian neighbors," a term which has evolved over the years to refer to the United States.[3] This thesis recently replaced a previous one that the United States would "involve" Japan in an unwanted war. In my judgment this signifies two things. On the one hand, Japanese pacifism—minus nationalism—has so atrophied that it has had to enlist "Asian neighbors" against "Japanese militarism" to sustain its credibility. (Note also the disappearance of "American imperialism" as the enemy.) On the other hand, the pacifists have finally come to terms, if only implicitly, with the fact that their very existence hinges

[2]It is interesting to note that the JSP recently modified its official stand on the legality and existence of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). At the party's two-day convention, held on February 27 and 28 of this year, the JSP's "action program" declared the SDF "unconstitutional" but lawful, since these forces "exist according to laws." This move was interpreted in Japan as an effort on the part of the JSP's new leader, Ishibashi Masashi, to impress the Japanese public with the image of the "new Socialist Party." See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), Feb. 28, 1984, p. C/3. For an analysis of the JSP's new effort to gain popularity, see Mike Tharp, "Getting Back in Touch," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hongkong—hereafter *FEER*), Mar. 1, 1984, pp. 32–33.

[3]Note the following remark of Senator Carl Levin of Michigan in a debate accompanying the extraordinary Senate resolution of 1981 calling on Japan to redouble its defense efforts: "This resolution respects the historical sensitivities of those in Asia who fear a resurgence of Japanese militarism. *Our own memories* of World War II remain strong. It is for these reasons that the resolution emphasizes that we are calling on Japan to significantly improve its capabilities only for self-defense and only for deploying weapons and forces which are clearly defensive in nature." See US Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, *Concurrent Resolution: Expressing the Sense of the Congress with Regard to the Mutual Security Efforts of the United States and Japan*, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., Dec. 21, 1981. Emphasis added.

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on the security treaty with the United States. But the security treaty has always cut both ways: it has been an incubator of pacifism as well as an engine of Japan's military expansion. Thus, in order to maintain the status quo in Japan's foreign policy and to avoid external pressures to increase defense spending, the pacifists began to blackmail the "Asian neighbors" with the bogey of Japanese militarism.

The main thrust of pacifism today is neither antiwar nor anti-American but simply status quo. And the major force behind it is neither the Communists nor the Socialists but the major media, in particular two of Japan's biggest and most prestigious dailies, the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Mainichi Shimbun*, which take the liberal, center-left position on domestic issues. The pacifist opposition in the Diet has all but lost its clout. Pacifist legislators still go through their familiar routines—denouncing defense increases and warning of the dangers of rearmament—but the decline in recent years of electoral support for the socialist party,[4] the mainstay of the opposition, has made the JSP unfit for the role of standard bearer. By contrast, the important role played by these newspapers in perpetuating pacifist sentiments was demonstrated in the uproars caused by former US Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer's remarks in May 1981 concerning US nuclear weapons in Japan and by the recent textbook controversy.[5]

As pacifism lost its former élan and emotional sting, it came to dovetail rather nicely with the policies of the LDP's center, which came to be known as the Yoshida school. Its founder, Yoshida Shigeru, had the prime ministership thrust on him a few months after Japan's surrender, as he was deemed the only one capable of coping with the US occupation authority at the height of its punitive attitude toward Japan.[6] Yoshida understood that General Douglas A. MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), exercised absolutely untrammeled power, and that the only restraint on his authority was an internal one derived from one of the occupation's primary goals, which was to democratize Japan. Yoshida saw that Japan's peace with the United States rested not on sullen submission but on being "a good loser," as he put it, and he proclaimed democracy to be his goal, too.[7] But, alas, he had no choice, as everyone knew, and he is not known ever to have quarreled openly with SCAP.

When MacArthur said that the constitution precluded Japan's right to self-defense, Yoshida defended that. When MacArthur said later that the constitution permitted self-defense, Yoshida defended that, too. The only autonomy from American power

Japanese Premier Yoshida Shigeru signs a Japanese-American security pact in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. Looking on, from left to right, are Senator Alexander Wiley, ranking Republican of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; John Foster Dulles, American negotiator of the pact; US Secretary of State Dean Acheson; and Republican Senator Styles Bridges, also of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

—US Army photo.

[4] In the most recent general election to the lower house of the Diet, held on Dec. 18, 1983, the JSP did gain 11 seats, bringing its total to 112 in the 511-seat house. But this gain resulted from vote swapping between the JSP and other opposition parties, and the net party vote for the JSP declined once again. The LDP now holds 267 seats, a comfortable majority, by enlisting 17 conservative members of parliament in a coalition. The big winners (in percentage gain) were two of the smaller opposition parties, the Komeito ("clean government" party) and the Democratic Socialist Party. The Japan Communist Party lost three seats. For a comprehensive list of the voting results, see *FBIS-APA*, Dec. 19, 1983, pp. C/1–2. For an analysis of the election, see Hikaru Kerns, "Nakasone's Humiliation," *FEER*, Dec. 29, 1983, pp. 10–12.

[5] In May 1981, Reischauer revealed that US military vessels and aircraft were making "transit" through Japan without disarming nuclear weapons aboard. The resulting uproar forced the Japanese and US governments once again to reaffirm their pious pledge that Japan is nuclear-free. In the summer of 1982, Japanese media had a field day playing up a story, mostly a fabrication, that the Ministry of Education was whitewashing Japan's war crimes in textbooks. Since all but one newspaper later owned up to the mistake in reporting, the incident came to take on the character of blackmail: if the current American administration continued to pressure Japan to rearm, the United States would be threatened.

[6] See, e.g., Dower, op. cit., pp. 273–303.

[7] Yoshida Shigeru, *Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*, London, Heinemann, 1961, pp. 58–59.

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that Yoshida asked for was on MacArthur's terms: he turned the constitutional tables, as it were, on US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and refused any but a bare minimum of rearmament for Japan in spite of the "hot" cold war that was raging in Korea. Yoshida further defended his decision on the ground that rearmament was economically undesirable. Here then was the genesis of conservative pacifism, which oversaw Japan's passive cooperation with America and the massive development of Japan's economy.

The Nationalists' Challenge

The Yoshida line strikes its critics on both the right and left as nebulous, opportunistic, and narrowly self-interested. It offends no one; it does no wrong. It is, in fact, fabulously successful in economic management. But it holds Japan in international limbo by its silence, ambiguity, and passivity. Such discontent with Japan's conduct has been mounting since the nationalists situated themselves on the LDP's right in the second half of the 1970's. These critics hark back to the tradition of the LDP's nationalist prime ministerships of Hatoyama Ichiro (1955–56) and Kishi Nobusuke (1957–60)—a tradition that is critical of Yoshida's "subservience" to the occupation authority, demands greater autonomy from or equality with the United States, insists on national pride based on conservation of traditional values, and is inclined to take a hard-line stand against communism and for national security. Prime Minister Kishi's gambling of his political career to give Japan—over pacifist opposition—the security treaty now in force epitomizes the nationalists' attitude. In their firm and unabashed commitment to liberty, combined with greater willingness to choose Japan's own means to safeguard it, they can be said to harbor a Gaullist impulse.[8]

Like their mentor before them, Yoshida's followers see some value in the constitution *as a means* of keeping at arm's length Washington's pressure for a defense buildup. But they are not opposed to an arms buildup if it can be done incrementally—that is, if the pacifist opposition can be kept within manageable limits. All in all, the Yoshida school seems to act as if the constitution has no intrinsic value but is merely useful or annoying depending on the circumstances.

The nationalists, of whom Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro is the champion, find this attitude reprehensible. To them, revision of the constitution is a matter of national honor *and* security. If Japan must have an army and a navy to defend itself—as indeed it must, argue the nationalists—then the nationalists want Japan to own up to the existence of these forces, give them wide public support, and place them under strict political control rather than pretend that they do not exist by calling them "self-defense forces" and treating them as an "orphan" in the bureaucracies.

On the specific defense policies of the moment there is hardly any division in the conservative ranks; they all claim to support—albeit with different degrees of emphasis—the kind of program to which Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko had committed Japan in the joint communiqué with President Reagan issued at the conclusion of his trip to the United States in May 1981, and which is outlined below.[9] That program points to the German model of alliance for Japan—in contrast to the French or British model, whereby each has "independent" nuclear forces that are nonetheless "coupled" to US strategic forces, that some nationalists posit as their ultimate goal. Conservatives of the Yoshida school pay lip service to the German model but in practice refuse to go beyond the status quo, citing fiscal constraints as the major reason. (The Yoshida school maintains that, legally, the constitutional status quo does not stand in the way of a further arms buildup.) But fiscal constraints cannot be removed unless Japanese legislators vote for either a tax increase or a cut in welfare entitlements. Such a vote in the name of national defense would amount to a small revolution in Japan. This is why the nationalists insist that revision of the constitution is indispensable for national defense.

Soviet Threat Perceived

Throughout the postwar years, the Japanese have been remarkably free of sentimentalism in their feelings toward the Soviet Union. The pacifism on the center to center-left—the LDP coalition and the major newspapers—is a carefully cultivated posture that is directed not at the USSR but at the United States. Thus, those who ignore the Washington factor in Japan-Soviet relations are apt to be impressed by the

[8]For an interesting discussion of this topic, see Isaac Shapiro, "The Risen Sun: Japanese Gaullism?" *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Winter 1980–81, pp. 62–81.

[9]See "Text of Communiqué on Reagan-Suzuki Discussions," *The New York Times*, May 9, 1981. For a brief analysis of the Suzuki-Reagan communiqué, see Toshio George Tsukahira, "Foreign Relations," in *Japan: A Country Study*, 4th Ed., ed. by Frederica M. Bunge, Washington, DC, The American University, 1983. For a discussion of American nuclear policy in Europe and the different European responses to it, see, e.g., Christoph Bertram, "Implications of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Winter 1981–82, pp. 305–26; and Stanley Hoffmann, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreasons," ibid., pp. 327–46.

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Japanese Premier Nakasone Yasuhiro with US President Ronald Reagan at the White House in January 1983.

—Atlan/SYGMA.

finding that the Japanese perception of the Soviet threat increased sharply in 1978–80 and declined thereafter. Many observers thought this correlated with increased Soviet naval activity around Japan as well as with Soviet fortification of the disputed Northern Territories, to which both nations lay claim.[10] But they would be better advised to look elsewhere. Indeed, in my opinion, Japan's perception of the Soviet threat has been influenced not so much by Soviet behavior in the Pacific as it has by certain developments in US domestic and foreign policies of the past decade: the emasculation of the American presidency immediately after Richard Nixon's resignation; the withdrawal of American troops from Saigon in 1975; the stir caused by the scandal dubbed "Koreagate" in the US media; the crisis precipitated by an unfavorable US-Japanese balance of payments and the denunciation of Japan's "free ride" in defense (resulting in the demand that Japan become one of the world's "locomotives"[11]); and the United States's unilateral decisions to reduce US ground troops in South Korea and to terminate the US-Taiwan defense pact.[12]

On matters of national security, members of the ruling party are all agreed that they cannot but fall back on the fundamental geopolitical maxim that guided the founders of Meiji Japan (1868–1912). If Japan is to face an enemy on the Asian continent, according to the maxim, it must secure the friendship of the power that controls the Pacific. If, on the other hand, Japan must war against a Pacific power, it must secure the ironclad friendship of the powers on the Asian continent. Japan's defeat in World War II, one could argue, followed from the fact that in trying to secure for itself a continental rear after the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921, it ended up antagonizing both Pacific and continental powers. In today's world, the implications of the maxim are obvious.

With the exception of the Pacific War, in the past all threats to Japan came by way of Korea. Today, it remains a major avenue by which the continental powers can threaten Japan. In contrast, the significance of the north—comprising Siberia, the Maritime Provinces, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands—has until recently been somewhat ambiguous. But the massive Soviet military buildup in the Far East and the fortification of the Northern Territories in the second half of the1970's have made the north the primary focus of Japan's defense posture. Such a posture, of course, is predicated on the assumption that the US Army's Second Division will stay in South Korea and that US marine and naval units, though earmarked for duty in the Indian Ocean, will remain in or around Japan. Thus, it is the continued US presence in the region that shapes Japan's defense policy and informs Japanese perceptions of the Soviet threat, much in the same way that European security considerations are shaped by the American presence in NATO.

But there are certain objective factors that distinguish Japan from NATO's Central European front in terms of vulnerability to the Soviet threat. For one thing, Siberia and the Maritime Provinces separate Japan from metropolitan Russia; for another, Japan has never threatened the Russian heartland as European powers have. Therefore, taken by itself, Japan is presumed to rank lower than the Central European front

[10]See, e.g., John Lewis, "The Soviets Show a Mailed Hand," *FEER*, Apr. 14, 1978; and Allen S. Whiting, *Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise?* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1981.

[11]Because it was one of the first nations to recover from the first oil shock of 1973–74, Japan began to run up a large trade surplus by the time the Carter Administration was inaugurated. President Carter sought a reflation of the world economy through increased government spending in the United States, Japan, and West Germany—dubbed the "three locomotives of the world"—and Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo consented to the scheme at the London summit of industrial nations.

[12]Partial withdrawal of US troops from South Korea was on candidate Jimmy Carter's campaign platform, and immediately upon his inauguration, he implemented this policy without consulting Tokyo. For an analysis of President Carter's plans for troop withdrawals, and subsequent revisions, see Tae-Hwan Kwak, "U.S.-Korea Security Relations," in Tae-Hwan Kwak, et al., Eds., *U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882–1982*, Seoul, Kyungnam University Press, 1982 (distributed outside East Asia by Westview Press, Boulder, CO), pp. 230–36.

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in Soviet security priorities. Japan would forfeit this low-risk condition, however, in the event of a global conflict involving the two superpowers. Even then, however, the presence of a China *not* aligned with Moscow constitutes a deterrent in Soviet calculations. Although China is no match for the Soviets in a frontal, one-on-one conflict, its relatively obsolete weapons could turn into a formidable factor if the Soviet Union were to exhaust itself in a major conflict with the United States in East Asia. What is necessary for Japanese security, therefore, is that Chinese intentions in the event of a major East Asian war remain incalculable to Moscow.

In addition, Japan is separated by a body of water from the Soviet bases in the Far East. Any direct assault on Japan therefore presupposes first assembling an invasion fleet. Japan's ability in electronic surveillance and other intelligence gathering is improving, as was shown in the recent Korean Air Line incident, and it is presumed that a minimum grace period of perhaps a few weeks to a month will elapse between the time ominous moves are detected and an actual invasion commences.

If it is an isolated attack from the north, it can be easily repulsed by the joint efforts of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, several or all of the six carrier groups under the US Pacific Command, and, if necessary, a redeployment of the US army division stationed in South Korea. Hence, such a contingency is thought unlikely to arise. The most credible scenario for a Soviet attack on Japan presupposes a military collision between the two superpowers. The possibility of deliberate Soviet provocation, however, is discounted in Japan even among the hawks. Notwithstanding the outward innocence of the Japanese—manifested in their adherence to the Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmament (by which Japan pledged "not to possess, manufacture, or introduce" nuclear weapons)—they have dealt with the Soviet Union in a context of Realpolitik and have never had much illusion about it. Today, the Japanese see a rough "parity" between the strategic power of the United States and that of the

A Korean and an American pilot confer prior to the joint "Team Spirit 82" exercises in South Korea.

—US Department of Defense.

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Soviet Union; America's fear of a Soviet preemptive strategic strike, therefore, seems to many Japanese like a projection of a Pearl Harbor–like phobia.

This leaves a superpower conflict through accident as the most likely possibility. That is what concerns the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). But, in my opinion, a majority in Japan has more or less convinced itself that such a conflict will be deterred. Although the possibility that nuclear parity might increase the likelihood of subnuclear, or conventional, conflict is not denied, it is implicitly discounted. At least this is how I interpret the change in the Japanese perception of the Soviet threat since the Reagan Administration reaffirmed the US commitment to South Korea.[13]

The JDA's first principle in coping with a superpower conflict is to not be the weakest link in the Western armor. In a global conflict, which is generally expected to be triggered in non-Asian theaters, Japan's strategically important geopolitical position will make it a target of Soviet attack. According to some Japanese defense officials, in such a conflict the Soviets would take at least a part of Japan simply because it sits astride a strategic choke point. The government itself has refrained from making such a statement on Soviet intent, which accounts for Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi's remark in 1980 that the Soviet Union is a "potential" threat.[14] Indeed, while the Japanese government does not talk openly of a Soviet threat, a similar message is conveyed to the public through its campaign to keep the Northern Territories issue alive, a campaign that was initiated during the Suzuki prime ministership in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Those who counsel Japanese leaders to avoid taking a clear-cut stance on East-West issues lest this provoke the Soviets allege that Japan's signing of the antihegemony clause in the peace treaty with Beijing in 1978[15] lent credence to talk of a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing axis against Moscow and led to the signing of the Moscow-Hanoi alliance of 1978.[16] As it was, the Fukuda cabinet had had second thoughts about such a clause because of the strong nationalist opposition to it at home. But part of this opposition stemmed not from any qualms about the Soviet threat, but rather from a pro-Taiwan and anti-Beijing sentiment among many nationalists.

Japan's Role in Asian Security

Strategically, Japan occupies a unique position in Northeast Asia. More than any other nation in the region it has the potential to control the three straits through which the Soviet navy must exit from the Sea of Japan to the open sea in the event of a major conflict with the United States. In this way Japan resembles Norway. Of the three straits—Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya—Tsushima is sandwiched between Japan, South Korea, and Okinawa (and the US bases there); and Soya freezes over in winter. Therefore, one may assume that the Soviet Union is primarily eyeing Tsugaru strait for use in case of an emergency.

Much has been said about the tactic of mining the three straits around Japan in order to bottle up the Soviet navy in the Sea of Japan. The critical question here is under what circumstances Japan will draw this "heirloom sword," as the saying goes in Japan. The government's policy, backed by an overwhelming consensus (including the nationalists),[17] is that Japan will not resort to this tactic unless it is attacked first. The Pentagon, it seems to many Japanese, would like Japan to respond to a lesser provocation or even perhaps initiate the mining of the straits in anticipation of an invasion. Soviet provocation could, for instance, be to raid Japan's commerce on the high seas. Or they could attack the US Seventh Fleet *outside* the area covered by the security treaty, taking care not to disrupt or damage Japan's commerce. Or Moscow could bargain with Japan—seeking the right of free passage through the straits in exchange for respecting Japan's neutrality.

Then Japan will be in a serious quandary. Part of the Soviet fleet is earmarked for the mission of strategic retaliation against the United States in an all-out

[13]One of President Reagan's first diplomatic acts in office was to invite President Chun Tu-Hwan of the Republic of Korea to the White House to demonstrate that the Carter policy of retreat had been reversed. See, ibid., p. 236.

[14]See Kimura Hiroshi, "The Impact of the Afghanistan Invasion on Japanese-Soviet Relations," in Roger E. Kanet, Ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy and East-West Relations*, New York, Pergamon Press, 1982, p. 264.

[15]For a brief description of the circumstances surrounding the signing of the antihegemony clause and the various reactions to it, see Robert A. Scalapino, "China and Northeast Asia," in Richard H. Solomon, Ed., *The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981, pp. 198–200; and J. David Armstrong, "The Soviet Union and the United States," in Gerald Segal, Ed., *The Soviet Union in East Asia: Predicaments of Power*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983, pp. 42–44.

[16]J. David Armstrong, for one, notes this possibility. See loc. cit., pp. 43–44.

[17]The government's policy was put forth quite forcefully by Defense Agency Chief Tanikawa Kazuo in February 1983 when he stressed that "We plan to block up the straits only when our country is attacked." Tanikawa's statement drew a rebuttal from Nakasone, who suggested that the government might accept a US request. Tanikawa later retracted his statement. For an account of this affair, see *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 22, 1983, pp. C/4–5. Two weeks later, the Japanese government issued a statement that it would reject "as a matter of principle" any independent effort by the United States to blockade any or all of the straits unless there were an imminent threat to Japan's security. See *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 4, 1983, p. C/1.

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war, and Japan cannot be expected to abort that mission in response to an ambiguous threat and hope to get away with it. Thus, while the mining tactic may be a potent lever against the Soviet Union, it may as well become a counterlever for splitting the Japan-US alliance. Nonetheless, preparations are going forward in the hope that uncertainty about Japan's resort to the "sword" will in itself constitute a deterrent.[18]

Although Soviet motives for the fortification of the Northern Territories are somewhat obscure, there is no doubt that the Soviet buildup there threatens the opposite shore in Hokkaido. In the context of a global war, Japan must be prepared to meet, at minimum, a Soviet attempt to occupy all or part of Hokkaido.[19] In such an eventuality, Japan would seek to repulse the invaders with American help. But such a conflict can be expected to stop short of the point where the losing superpower would resort to a nuclear gamble to avert total defeat. What concerns Japanese planners most is where the cease-fire demarcation line would be drawn to ratify a modus vivendi between Washington and Moscow. Naturally, once Japan were attacked and engulfed in a world conflict, everything—including the constitution—would bow to the needs of survival, and given an adequate lead time, the Japanese may even show a good account of themselves. Their goal will have to be to insure that Japan's territorial integrity will not be sacrificed to the interests of the superpowers as they redraw their respective spheres of influence.

Since the adoption of the *Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation* in 1978, joint defense planning as well as joint exercises have been vigorously carried out. Out of these joint ventures emerged a consensus among US and Japanese defense planners that in order to meet the contingency outlined above, Japan's frontline equipment, particularly its sea and air capabilities, need to be a little less than double what they are today.

Take the calculus in air power balance, for instance. At present, the Soviets deploy 2,100 opera-

[18]According to Prime Minister Suzuki while still in office, Japan planned to develop a capability to defend the sea lanes some 1,000 nautical miles to the east and south of Japan. See, e.g., Stephen J. Solarz, "America and Japan: A Search for Balance," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1982–83, p. 80.

[19]Coincidentally, Japan completed the *Shinkansen* ("bullet train") tunnel connecting Honshu and Hokkaido islands (i.e., under Tsugaru Strait) in 1982.

US soldiers debarking from Japanese Self-Defense Force helicopters during joint maneuvers on Hokkaido Island in October 1983.

—The Yomiuri Shimbun.

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tional aircraft in the Far East.[20] Assuming that half this number is reserved for use against China, that leaves roughly 1,050 deployed against Japan. Currently, Japan has some 300 military aircraft, which will increase to 400 or so when the present buildup plan is completed. Adding to that number the 150 US Fifth Air Force aircraft deployed in Japan yields a total allied force of 550. If Japan were to double its buildup target to 800, allied air power would reach approximately 950 aircraft. Given the superior performance rating of allied aircraft, a shade less than 900 is thought to be a match for the 1,050 deployed by the Soviets. Such calculations enhance the feeling within the US defense establishment that Japan should double its arms expenditure to 2 percent of GNP.

The China Factor

China continues to be a very important strategic factor in Japan's dealings with the Soviet Union. The major reason for this has been noted above. Japan was flustered in 1982 when Sino-Soviet contacts suspected of being a prelude to a rapprochement became visible,[21] and the Chinese Communist Party's 12th Congress seemed to adopt a stance critical of China's excessive dependence on both the United States *and* Japan.[22] It seems in retrospect that these contacts served in part as a feint to make a diplomatic point with Washington: China wanted to exert pressure on the Reagan Administration to make it adhere to the framework of the Shanghai Communiqué on the Taiwan question, which proclaimed the "reunification" issue an internal Chinese problem so long as it is handled without violence.

It does not appear that Moscow is able or willing to oblige the Chinese conditions for détente—a cutback of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border to the level maintained during the Khrushchev era, withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Mongolia, an end to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, and the end of Soviet aid to Vietnam. Nor does it seem that China really sets much store by rapprochement with Moscow. The

US President Jimmy Carter and Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng hold discussions in Tokyo on July 10, 1980, while in Japan for the memorial service for the late Japanese Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi.

—Wide World.

one sign that assured Tokyo of this was China's willingness to cut back its defense budget in recent years, a move that seemed to reaffirm the Chinese leadership's commitment to its "four modernizations" program. This alone constitutes an adequate reason for China wanting to relax tensions with the Soviet Union. Japan is in agreement with the present reading of Chinese intentions in Washington, namely, that China is settling down to a natural and optimal stance of "equidistance" between the two superpowers, though tilting slightly toward Washington and Tokyo because this stance maximizes Chinese influence with all parties involved.[23] By making its contacts with China useful to Beijing, Japan hopes to keep open an alternative to Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

Japan also looks to China to help ease tensions in the region, in particular the hostility between North and South Korea. The Chinese leadership has responded by giving assurances that it is exerting a restraining influence on Kim Il-song's ambitions to unify the Korean peninsula militarily.[24] While Japanese officials encourage this effort, they are not convinced that China has adequate leverage to alter Kim's plans. Still, the Japanese are hopeful that a military confrontation between the two Koreas can be avoided. Japan is reasonably certain that without the material and political backing of at least one external power Pyongyang can-

[20]See Japan Defense Agency, *Defense White Paper, 1983*, Tokyo, Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 76.

[21]For a comprehensive analysis of Sino-Soviet interaction at this time, see William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Rapprochement," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1983, pp. 22–24.

[22]In his September 4 report to the 12th Party Congress, Hu Yaobang forcefully proclaimed the "independent" nature of China's foreign policy. Hu also noted that while much progress had been made in Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations, there were still some problems that had to be worked out. See *Beijing Review*, Sept. 13, 1982, pp. 29–31.

[23]See, e.g., Griffith, loc. cit., p. 26.

[24]Hu Yaobang gave assurances of this on his trip to Japan in late November 1983. See *FBIS-APA*, Nov. 25, 1983, pp. C/1–2; and Mike Tharp, "Hu's Capitalist Debut," in *FEER*, Dec. 8, 1983, pp. 14–15.

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not realize its irredentist designs. At present, it seems that neither China nor the Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, desires to alter the status quo in Korea. One of China's top priorities is reunification with Taiwan; thus it seems unlikely that Chinese leaders would jeopardize this chance by risking a military confrontation with the United States over Korea. For its part, Moscow is presumably aware that another Korean conflict would very likely drastically alter Japan's military posture, a prospect that no doubt alarms those in the Kremlin. On the other hand, Japan is aware that its most favored solution for Korea—cross-recognition of the North and the South by all four external powers—has been rejected by both Beijing and Moscow.[25] Moreover, tension on the peninsula remains high, and the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul connection—in which Tokyo shoulders a substantial fiscal share of Korean defense—will have to be strengthened.

Despite North Korean accusations that Japan is interested in keeping the peninsula divided, the Japanese people have deep sympathy for their neighbors' aspiration to be reunited, provided this can be done peacefully. Therefore, Tokyo was receptive to the latest North Korean reunification proposal for a three-party discussion involving North and South Korea and the United States. But the Japanese government shares the deep skepticism in Seoul and Washington over Pyongyang's motive behind the move. This is because the proposal was originally conveyed to Beijing on October 8, 1983, the day before the assassination of 17 South Korean leaders in Rangoon, Burma. China supports Pyongyang's proposal and welcomes Washington as an intermediary, although Beijing has thus far studiously avoided becoming directly involved.[26] Soviet reaction, on the other hand, has been cool, with TASS merely reporting without comment on the proposal.[27]

The actual proposal contained little that was new and merely reiterated North Korea's long-standing demands for reunification: replacement of the current armistice agreement by a peace treaty, signed also by the United States; withdrawal of American troops from the peninsula; mutual reduction of force levels in both the North and South; creation of a North-South confederation; and convening of a national congress. On February 10 of this year, South Korean Prime Minister Chin Ui-chong formally rejected the proposal and stressed the need for a "meeting between the highest authorities of the South and North."[28] Several days later, the South Korean foreign minister suggested holding four-way (adding China) or six-way talks (including the USSR and Japan as well) as the "second-best policy."[29] Pyongyang subsequently rejected this counterproposal.

All this comes at a time when an aging Kim Il-song is expected to pass on his power in an un-Marxist fashion to his son, Kim Chong-il, who is rumored to have engineered the Rangoon bombing incident.[30] In addition, the deterioration of the North Korean economy seems to have touched off a rather extensive reform movement. While South Korea resounds with success (in its economy, in attracting the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympic Games, in securing a substantial loan from Japan, and in gaining recognition among the so-called nonaligned nations), the North is becoming both more dependent on outside economic aid and further isolated from the international community. (Burma, Costa Rica, and Western Samoa have recently severed relations with North Korea because of the bombing incident.)[31]

Korean reunification figured prominently on the agenda of Sino-Japanese talks when General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang visited Japan for eight days in late November 1983. Hu and Prime Minister Nakasone agreed to work diligently to promote peace and stability on the peninsula and even opened a new diplomatic channel specifically designed to advance this cause. Hu also assured Nakasone that China did not regard Japan's defense buildup with alarm, since Chinese leaders were convinced that Japan would never again invade its neighbor.[32] At present, there is no major issue pending between Tokyo and Beijing, and the General Secretary's visit was mostly ceremonial in nature. Nonetheless, in the view of many analysts, Hu's journey was both a personal and diplomatic triumph.[33] (Prime Minister Nakasone returned the courtesy, visiting China in late March of this year.)

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[25] See, e.g., Scalapino, loc. cit., pp. 184–93.

[26] The Chinese press has given North Korea's proposal considerable coverage, often quoting at length from official Pyongyang releases. A close reading of Beijing's statements, however, suggests a cautious Chinese approach. See the numerous articles on the proposal in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Feb. 15 through mid-March, in particular, the very brief account of the talks given by the PRC foreign ministry's spokesman at a news conference on Feb. 15 (*FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 6, 1984, p. D/2).

[27] See the accounts of Jan. 12, 1984, TASS transmissions of items carried in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* of that day, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Jan. 12, 1984, p. C/2.

[28] See *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 15, 1984, p. E/1.

[29] Ibid., p. E/2.

[30] See, e.g., "Passionate Conviction," in *FEER*, Oct. 27, 1983, pp. 16–17.

[31] See, e.g., John McBeth, "The Verdict Is Guilty," *FEER*, Nov. 17, 1983, pp. 18–19.

[32] See *FBIS-APA*, Nov. 25, 1983, pp. C/1–2.

[33] See, e.g., the account in *FEER*, Dec. 8, 1983, pp. 15–16.

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The Japanese were also heartened somewhat by Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States in January 1984. Most important from the Japanese perspective, Zhao's trip seemed to signify a restoration of a modus vivendi, or the two nations' agreement to disagree, on the Taiwan question, which had earlier been the source of considerable tension in Sino-American relations. Although the Japanese are split on the Taiwan issue—with the nationalist minority led by former Prime Minister Kishi strongly in favor of Taipei—the relaxation of tension over this issue was welcomed in Tokyo. Indeed, together the Hu and Zhao visits were seen in Japan as a sign of growing stability in China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and the pragmatic modernizers.

One must note in passing, however, that Japan's attitude toward China has undergone a subtle change recently. Up until the end of the 1970's, the Japanese were burdened with a sense of guilt toward the Chinese people which, when combined with pro-Beijing and pacifist sentiments, tended to restrict Japan's options toward China. But that tender feeling toward China has been worn out somewhat by so much Chinese gamesmanship. The last straw for many Japanese came in 1980 when Beijing announced its plans to cancel some of the joint ventures that had attracted considerable Japanese investment (e.g., the Baoshan steel complex) and asked Prime Minister Ohira to refinance the remainder of China's debt to Japan on Chinese terms.[34] Thus, many Japanese now feel that China has literally used up much of its credit with Japan. It is important to note also that Japan's pan-Asian sentiments toward China have been based in part on the assumption that China would not constitute a direct military threat to Japan for some time, an assumption that has been reinforced as more and more Japanese have acquired direct experience with China through participation in various technical cooperation projects.

Soviet-Japanese Rapprochement?

Of the four powers that abut one another in East Asia, Japan has been the least maneuverable and most susceptible to external influences, especially those emanating from Washington and Beijing. This has been due in the first instance to the function of the US-Japanese tie and Japan's sense of guilt toward China. But there have been other external impediments to Japanese initiatives and options, and Soviet foreign policy is the foremost factor. In 1971, in the wake of Henry Kissinger's surprise visit to Beijing and the announcement that President Nixon would soon follow, the Soviet Union made an unusually solicitous offer to reopen negotiations on the disputed territories, hoping to detach Japan from the crutch of the American alliance and to prevent a Sino-Japanese rapprochement that they were sure would occur otherwise. But the Soviets were never as skilled and flexible as the Chinese in wooing Japan, a point demonstrated conclusively by comparing China's handling of the Senkaku Island and Northern Territories issues with the Soviet Union's handling of the Northern Territories dispute.

A major stumbling block to the complete normalization of Japan-Soviet relations has been the dispute over the Northern Territories—Habomai and Shikotan islands, which were part of Hokkaido Prefecture; and Etorofu and Kunashiri in the southern Kuriles—all occupied by the Soviet Union since 1945 but also

Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro addresses a National Meeting Demanding the Return to Japan of the Northern Territories, held at Tokyo's Kudan Kaikan Hall on February 7, 1984.

—The Yomiuri Shimbun.

[34]For a brief discussion of the Sino-Japanese joint venture on the Baoshan steel complex, see Scalapino, loc. cit., pp. 195–97.

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claimed by Japan. Under the terms of the Peace Agreement concluded in 1956 between the two governments,[35] the Soviet Union promised to return the Habomai and Shikotan islands upon the signing of a formal peace treaty with Japan. However, in reaction to the extension and revision of the Japan–United States security treaty in 1960, Moscow demanded the removal of all foreign troops from Japan as a condition for the return of the two islands. Then, on an unusual visit to Tokyo in 1971, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko seemed willing to reopen the territorial issue when he stated that the controversy was "not settled." He was obviously trying to steer Japan away from China.

Japan vowed to take an "equidistant" position between China and the Soviet Union, though it tilted—with American concurrence—toward Beijing. In 1978, however, after six years of negotiations, Japan agreed to sign the Sino-Japanese peace treaty.[36] Simultaneously with the conclusion of the treaty, the Soviet Union deployed the equivalent of one understrength division to the Northern Territories and asserted that the territorial issue no longer existed.

There is unanimous agreement across the entire political spectrum in Japan that the four islands are inherently Japanese territory (the JCP even includes the northern Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in its claim), and that Soviet fortification and intimidation virtually preclude a settlement of the territorial issue and therewith the signing of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty. At present, there prevails in Japan a sense of resignation that the deadlock will persist until the Soviets are forced to adopt a more flexible attitude, perhaps in response to some major shift in strategy such as occurred in 1945 or 1971.

In the LDP, it has been the nationalists who have traditionally shown an interest in cultivating a Soviet connection. Prime Minister Hatoyama's attempt in 1955–56 to conclude a peace treaty with Moscow represented a reaction to Yoshida Shigeru's policy of excessive dependence on the United States. In Hatoyama's view, rapprochement with Moscow was a means of improving Japan's standing vis-à-vis the United States. Secretary of State Dulles intervened, however, ostensibly on Japan's side. Dulles rejected Hatoyama's proposal—which sought the return of only Habomai and Shikotan islands—and professed his belief that Japan was entitled to all of the Kurile Islands. He also warned that for Japan to give up the Kuriles was tantamount to conceding more to the Soviets than had been envisioned under the San Francisco peace treaty, and that if that were the case the United States, too, would claim a semipermanent right to stay in Okinawa.[37] Dulles's broadside not only stiffened the opposition to Hatoyama's policies in Japan, it added to Soviet suspicion as well. As a result, the Soviet-Japanese peace treaty was shelved indefinitely.

The PRC's foreign ministry appears to have taken a leaf from Dulles's book when Japan reacted favorably to Gromyko's overture to reopen negotiations. Zhou Enlai gratuitously offered to "send troops" to the Northern Territories to help defend Japan's claim, and the Chinese media stepped up its attack against Soviet "hegemony" in the region.[38] China's unsolicited propaganda offensive on behalf of Japan continued until a Japanese foreign minister declared this support "counterproductive." Nonetheless, from the Chinese perspective, the campaign was quite successful, effectively freezing Japanese-Soviet relations. Beijing then worked on Japan to induce a tilt toward its side, which called for a certain amount of finesse since there was a territorial dispute between them as well. To help ease tensions in the controversy over Senkaku Island (Diaoyutai in Chinese), claimed by both Japan and China, Deng Xiaoping proposed postponing negotiations for "twenty to thirty years" and undertaking joint Sino-Japanese exploration for oil reserves around the island.[39]

This pattern of third-party interference in Japan's attempts to normalize its relationship with the Soviet Union underscores the frustration felt by career diplomats in the Japanese foreign ministry. Gaimusho is distressed that Japanese ambassadors are seldom given an audience with the top Soviet leaders and that the Soviets generally treat Japan as a third-rate power. The frustration was even greater in the 1970's, however, as Japan watched the spectacle of China playing up to American sentimentalism and pitting Washington against Moscow to secure for itself the status of a semi-superpower.

Japan has no intention of playing off Washington against Moscow for its own advantage. But being alone in Asia with the American colossus can be quite unnerving. At times, therefore, Japan feels a need to involve another party in its dealings with Washington, primarily to help relieve some of the pressure exerted

[35]For an overview of Soviet-Japanese relations since World War II, see *Japan: A Country Study*, op. cit., pp. 326–30.

[36]See Scalapino, loc. cit., pp. 198–99.

[37]Rajendra Kumar Jain, *The USSR and Japan, 1945–1980*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1981, p. 26.

[38]Ibid., p. 164.

[39]Ibid., p. 105.

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by the latter. This need became evident immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which prompted the Carter Administration to call for a tightening of the Western alliance and for much closer coordination of allied policies on defense and trade with the Soviet Union. Indeed, it was from about that time forward that the notion of "keeping abreast of the Western camp" became a Japanese watchword—doing no less but no more than France, Britain, or West Germany.

A positive fallout from this new Japanese attitude toward the "Western camp" has been Prime Minister Nakasone's stand on INF negotiations, which he put forth at the Williamsburg summit of advanced industrial nations in 1983. He expressed Japan's interest in taking part in some form in the Soviet-NATO dialogue on INF reductions. His reasoning was straightforward: if Japan is going to be called upon to oppose Soviet SS–20 missile redeployment to the East from the European theater, it should have some say in the Western allies' decision-making in this regard. Nakasone's move caught the Japanese pacifist media—determined to uphold the Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmament—off guard, for if Japan is to have any leverage in its bargaining with the Soviets, it must own up to the presence of US nuclear forces on its soil. Whether or not Nakasone will succeed in cutting the Three Principles down to two or two and a half (that is, changing "not possess, manufacture, or introduce" nuclear weapons to "not possess or manufacture") remains to be seen.

Japan's Economic Leverage

To complete this discussion, it is necessary to analyze Soviet-Japanese trade, confining this examination to a broad assessment of its strategic implications. Japan-Soviet trade is overwhelmingly (80 to 90 percent) Japan-Siberian trade.[40] It consists of investing

[40]For a detailed discussion of Soviet-Japanese joint ventures in Siberia, see Kazuyuki Kinbara, "The Economic Dimension of Soviet Policy," in Segal, op. cit., pp. 102–19.



A Soviet MiG-25 jet at Hakodate Airport on the Southern tip of Japan's Hokkaido Island in September 1976 after an emergency landing by a defecting Soviet pilot.

—Wide World.

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large amounts of Japanese capital and skill to develop lumber, oil, coking coal, natural gas, and nonferrous metal resources, in return for which Japan usually receives the final product to recoup its investment. Although the first joint projects got under way in 1969, the pace of Soviet-Japanese cooperative ventures hastened in 1971, as the Soviet Union sought to lure Japan away from close cooperation with China. Even after Moscow hardened its stance on the Northern Territories issue, the Soviets kept up their efforts to attract Japanese investment, especially after the oil shock of 1973, which they believed had put Japan in a desperate position. These efforts culminated in the Soviet proposal—by far the most strategically sensitive—to have Japan construct the second trans-Siberian railroad, from Tyumen oilfield to Nakhodka. (This offer was rejected by Japan.)[41] To counter the Soviet move, China offered to divert oil to Japan from Daqing oilfield and from Bohai Bay. Such a tactic proved unnecessary, however. In September 1976—with the defection to Japan of a Soviet pilot in his MiG-25—Soviet-Japanese relations started to cool off. Relations deteriorated even further in 1978 as the Soviet Union unilaterally published a draft treaty of friendship with Japan (which the Japanese summarily rejected)[42] and the Chinese and Japanese signed a peace treaty (which took on added significance the following year when China refused to renew its treaty of friendship with the USSR).

The exaggerated expectations for Japan-Soviet development cooperation came to an end in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In February 1980, Japan decided to cancel US$1.4 billion worth of credits to the Soviet Union,[43] which was the first overtly political use of economic or trade resources by Japan in the postwar period. Still, seven major joint Soviet-Japanese projects have been completed or are under way in Siberia: the first and second forestry resource development projects; the new harbor project at Wrangel, 50 miles east of the Vladivostok naval base (which is now closed to commercial traffic); a chip and pulp manufacturing project; the Yakut natural-gas development project and the south Yakut coal development project; and the Sakhalin continental-shelf oil and gas development project (with Gulf Oil participation).[44] According to Allen S. Whiting, Japan's commitments to these projects had brought Japan's official credits for Soviet economic development to nearly US$4 billion.[45]

Vasiliy Kasumov, left, a Soviet geologist, with Teiji Saito, a representative of the Japanese firm "Sodeco" (for Sakhalin Oil Development Cooperation Company, in which the US firm Gulf Oil has a minority holding), and Valeriy Rodygin, deputy chief of the Oha drilling rig, prospecting for oil on the continental shelf off Sakhalin Island in 1983.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Is Japan getting overly dependent on Siberian resources and thereby becoming susceptible to blackmail? The answer is definitely no. The decade of the 1970's has been marked by extreme politicization of Japan's external trade (the two oil shocks, the US soybean embargo in 1973). As a result, the Japanese government is carefully monitoring the volume and content of its trade with all countries in order to diversify trading partners and disperse risk, which is now one of Japan's national goals. Unless absolutely unavoidable, Japan tries its best not to become dependent on any one source of supply for resource materials. Siberia as a source of energy was attractive only to the extent that it enabled Japan to lessen its dangerous dependence on Persian Gulf sources. There is no reason for Japan to free itself from one source merely to fall prey to another. In any case, statistics show that Japan's trade with the Soviet Union declined from 2.2 percent of total Japanese trade in 1970 to 2.1 percent in 1979, a trend that was on some accounts going to continue throughout 1983.[46] By way of comparison in absolute terms, in 1979, Japanese trade with the

[41] See Scalapino, loc. cit., p. 203.

[42] See Chalmers Johnson, "Japan, the USSR, and Northeast Asia," *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1983, p. 62.

[43] Jain, op. cit., p. 164.

[44] See Johnson, loc. cit., pp. 62–63.

[45] Whiting, op. cit., p. 137.

[46] Donald G. Hellman, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on Northeast Asia," in Herbert J. Ellison, Ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1982, p. 177.

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Soviet Union totaled US$4.1 billion while that with China came to US$6.7 billion.[47]

On the long-run strategic advantage that may accrue to the Soviet Union from the development of Siberia, not merely those projects in which Japan participates, Whiting's study seems most authoritative:

Viewed overall, Siberian development offers only a limited increase in Soviet strategic military capability beyond that already in existence in the area. Its greatest contribution is in its strengthening of the region's logistical and support capacity before hostilities begin. Once a war starts, however, the defensive liabilities appear to outweigh the offensive advantages.[48]

[47]Ibid.
[48]Whiting, op. cit., p. 108.

It is important to note also that the Soviet Union is not dependent on Japan for its development of Siberia. It is true, of course, that Japanese participation in joint ventures does hasten development and saves investment funds that then become available for other purposes. On the face of it, there should be incentive enough for the Soviets to be more forthcoming on the terms of cooperation. But Moscow drives a hard bargain on the assumption that Japan's lack of natural resources will eventually put the Soviet Union in a seller's market. The Soviets also try to involve Japan in projects that are strategically inimical to Japanese national interests, such as the construction of the Tyumen-Nakhodka railway.

For their part, Japanese multinational corporations are confident of their superior position: they have the know-how, the capital, and in some cases Chinese



The Soviet aircraft carrier Novorossiysk *(top) in the South China Sea on February 20, 1984, on its way to join the carrier* Minsk *in the Soviet Pacific Fleet.*

—US Department of Defense.

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counteroffers (Daqing oil, for example). When a project has been considered too risky on a strict commercial basis, Japanese leaders have sought to involve other investors as a hedge, as in the case of Tyumen oil exploration. The rather disappointing results of Soviet efforts to develop Siberia at the present stage are testimony to the sheer intractability of the natural environment, the ponderousness of Soviet bureaucratic decision-making, the uncertainty of Soviet planning and resource allocation, and the extreme sensitivity of many projects to political interference.

A Cautious Optimism?

Present Soviet policy in East Asia seems to be a reaction to the Kremlin's failures there in the 1970's. Soviet attempts to contain, intimidate, and outflank China after the border clashes at Damanskiy (Zhenbao in Chinese) Island in March 1969 invited Chinese countermoves—namely, Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochements. Thereafter, the Soviets actively wooed Japan, offering numerous incentives, including discussion of territorial disputes, implementation of joint economic ventures in Siberia, and discussion of a treaty of friendship and of a collective security system in Asia.[49] When Japan refused Moscow's overtures, and the so-called Washington-Tokyo-Beijing axis began to emerge, Moscow turned to the military intimidation of Japan as well.

Although Japan's move toward Beijing early in the decade was in part a reaction to the "Nixon shocks" and carried anti-American and pan-Asian undertones, Tokyo ended up the decade with a rediscovery of a strong community of interest with the United States. The major catalyst for the reemergence of these sentiments was Washington's apparent tactical retreat from the region—the American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975; the reduction of US troops in South Korea in 1978; the termination of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979. Thus, Japan's subsequent tilt toward Beijing (i.e., the signing of the antihegemony clause) was a function of the US-Japanese tie rather than of the Sino-Japanese tie. This gave Washington a chance to enjoy Japanese and Chinese friendship simultaneously for the first time since the Communists took control of China in 1949.

The Soviet attempt to outflank China succeeded only in Vietnam,[50] but that came at the cost of the emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a surprisingly vibrant and confident grouping. In the early 1980's, Moscow seems to have reversed its approaches to China and to Japan—talking softly to China, but brandishing a big stick toward Japan. Bilateral talks with Beijing are still on, but they may not succeed because of Soviet intransigence and Chinese interest in a Western connection. The Soviet military buildup, on the other hand, is still going on with the stationing of a second aircraft carrier in the region, the *Novorossiysk,* and the further fortification of the Northern Territories. But Moscow has again failed to reap benefits from its military activities. Indeed, for all its posturing, the Soviet Union seems not only to have inspired a massive counter-buildup, it has also rekindled US-Japan solidarity. As a result, a sense of cautious optimism prevails in East Asia today.

[49]In April 1982, the Soviets abandoned talks of a collective security system (first put forth by Leonid Brezhnev in 1969 to try to isolate China) and offered instead to discuss a bilateral agreement. See Wolf Mendl, "The Soviet Union and Japan," p. 60, and Gerald Segal, "The Soviet Union and Korea," p. 73, both in Segal, op. cit.

[50]For a discussion of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia, see Douglas Pike, "Southeast Asia, the USSR, and Vietnam," paper prepared for conference on Soviet foreign policy, cosponsored by the United States Information Agency and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, DC, Mar. 2, 1984.

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Chernenko Succeeds

By Marc D. Zlotnik

Although the election of 72-year-old Konstantin Chernenko as the new general secretary of the CPSU at the February 13, 1984, plenum of the Central Committee was a victory for the Kremlin septuagenarians, Mikhail Gorbachëv and other younger leaders appear to have gained enough political influence to ensure them a major role in the Chernenko regime. Signs of tension surrounding the succession, however, suggest that this is a fragile coalition and that the arrangements of power in the Kremlin have not yet been fully stabilized.

Yuriy Andropov appears to have favored handing power over to the next generation of leaders and hoped to make 53-year-old Gorbachëv his successor. Andropov advanced Gorbachëv's career at an unusually rapid pace, and helped to bring other younger leaders into the senior ranks of the central leadership, including Grigoriy Romanov (61), Vitaliy Vorotnikov (58), and Heydar Aliyev (60). It seems likely that each of these men—as well as Ukrainian party leader Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi (66)—has ambitions of eventually becoming party leader, and each would have been reluctant to support a colleague who might occupy the top party post for many years. These younger leaders may therefore have looked upon Chernenko as a candidate whose limited tenure might give them time to consolidate their own positions. In addition, they were probably able to exact political concessions from Chernenko in return for their support.

Chernenko's political comeback was undoubtedly favored by the late Leonid Brezhnev's coterie in the leadership—Nikolay Tikhonov (78), Viktor Grishin (69), and Dinmukhamed Kunayev (72). While recognizing the need for carefully controlled changes to deal with the country's pressing problems, these leaders appear to favor continuing the basic policies of the Brezhnev era and would be reluctant to accept any broad personnel shakeups. Although Chernenko's public record suggests that he might be more favorably disposed toward reform than are some of his supporters, he seemed less likely than some of the younger candidates to disrupt the status quo.

Chernenko's political position was further strengthened by a solid base of support in the Central Committee. The personnel changes undertaken under Andropov had affected its composition relatively little. It remained pretty much as elected under Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the CPSU in early 1981 and is unlikely to change substantially until 1986—when the next congress is due. The three major groups represented in the Central Committee are the central party and state apparatuses and the regional party first secretaries. Many of these officials owed their careers to Brezhnev and probably viewed the accession of Brezhnev's protégé Chernenko as their best chance of retaining their positions. Chernenko cultivated this view in his 1982 book on party work when he criticized Khrushchev's policy of forced rotation of cadres, thereby hinting at a continuation of Brezhnev's policy of low cadre turnover.[1] Chernenko's ties to the regional party leadership were underscored in his acceptance speech as general secretary, where he made a highly unusual "special appeal" for their support.[2]

It is less clear how much support the remaining members of the Politburo gave to Chernenko. Defense

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[1] See K. U. Chernenko, *Voprosy raboty partiynogo i gosudarstvennogo apparata* (Questions of the Work of the Party and State Apparatus), 2nd ed., Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p. 221.

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 14, 1984.

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Minister Dmitriy Ustinov (75) appears to have played less of a role in the current succession than he did after the death of Brezhnev. His close ties to Brezhnev do not appear to have been transferred to Chernenko. Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko (74) also does not appear to have been an enthusiastic supporter of Chernenko. Given his long experience and foreign policy expertise, Gromyko would probably feel least threatened—and most likely to find his experience and international stature highly valued—by a younger leader. Mikhail Solomentsev (70) advanced under Brezhnev but remained a mere candidate member of the Politburo from 1971 until promoted to full membership under Andropov in December 1983. Hence, it is not clear where his allegiances lie.

Although the election of Chernenko was a victory for members of the Brezhnev group in the leadership, it does not signify a return to the policies of Brezhnev. The introduction of younger men into the leadership under Andropov, as well as the deaths of Andropov, Brezhnev, Mikhail Suslov, and Arvids Pelše, and the retirement of Andrey Kirilenko, have given the new and younger members of the Politburo a much more influential role in policymaking than they had under Brezhnev. Their power could be particularly enhanced if Chernenko made important political concessions to win their support. In addition, if Chernenko's own expressed interest in the need for change turns out to be more than rhetoric, he may look to younger leaders for support of new policy initiatives.

The contest to succeed Andropov appears to have been on the agenda of the top party leadership virtually since Andropov's election in November 1982. According to the official medical report issued after Andropov's death, his condition began to deteriorate three months after he took office, when he was first put on dialysis.[3] It would have been extremely difficult to keep this information from other members of the leadership, and it can be assumed that once it was evident that Andropov's tenure in office would be limited, active preparations were begun for the transfer of power.

This succession struggle went through several stages. The first began shortly after Andropov's accession and lasted until he dropped out of public view in August 1983. This was followed by an initial period of inaction by the leadership, and then by more intensive political maneuvering. This lasted until Andropov's death on February 9. The four days that followed, until Chernenko's election on February 13, marked the most intense stage of the power struggle. There are indications that another round in the political struggle may have begun with the election of Chernenko.

[3]See ibid., Feb. 11, 1984.



The new Soviet party General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko makes his election speech in the Kremlin Hall of Palaces on March 2, 1984. In the first row behind Chernenko are, left to right, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, Grigoriy Romanov, Mikhail Solomentsev, and Heydar Aliyev.

—Novosti from Gamma-Liaison.

Andropov's Ascendancy

After his election as party general secretary in November 1982, Andropov consolidated his position with remarkable speed, acquiring in seven months the same symbols of power that it had taken Brezhnev 13 years to attain: chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, leader of the Defense Council, plus recognition as "head" of the Politburo by other senior members. During this period Andropov built up the position of Gorbachëv and other younger leaders, while Chernenko appeared to have been relegated to a secondary role in the leadership.

Andropov rapidly promoted Gorbachëv by giving him new responsibilities, both symbolic and con-

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crete.[4] Gorbachëv soon appeared to take on the role of unofficial "second secretary" of the party, with broad oversight responsibilities in most major areas of party work. His added responsibilities and prestige were signaled in April 1983, when he signed the obituary of a high military official and in June when his name appeared on the obituary of a major cultural figure.[5] The fact that Andropov and Chernenko were the only other Politburo members to sign both obituaries suggests that Gorbachëv had joined the ranks of the senior members of the leadership. At the June 1983 CC plenum, he chaired two of the three sessions.[6] After the plenum, Gorbachëv took on a highly visible public role in the key area of cadres: overseeing the election of a new party leader in Leningrad to replace Romanov, nominating Vorotnikov as premier of the RSFSR, and opening an August meeting of the party election campaign.[7] Gorbachëv also became more active in foreign affairs.[8] During this period, the scope of Gorbachëv's public activities compared very favorably to those of the other senior members of the party Secretariat—Chernenko and Romanov.

As Gorbachëv's responsibilities expanded, Chernenko's appeared to be reduced to mere overseer of the ideological apparatus. His public activities were curtailed, and he was not seen for extended periods in January, April, and May 1983—possibly due to illness—missing even the obligatory leadership appearances at the April 22 Lenin Day celebration and the May Day parade in Red Square. At the June plenum two of Chernendo's political associates were removed from the Central Committee for "mistakes" in their work: the former head of the Krasnodar party organization Sergey Medunov, and the former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Nikolay Shchëlokov.[9] Nevertheless, Chernenko himself retained his protocol standing as number two in the party hierarchy and gave a major speech at the plenum. Chernenko's use of the term Politburo "headed by" Andropov and his nomination of Andropov to be Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium shortly thereafter demonstrated Chernenko's public recognition of Andropov's authority.

Two months later, in his last major public appearance, Andropov revealed his thoughts about his own condition and the direction he thought the succession should take. In a remarkable speech to party veterans, Andropov said that "with age, illness lies in wait for a person, and at times all this is accompanied by spiritual tribulations." He added that "age is age" and "withdrawing from activity in a pursuit one loves is not easy." Apparently alluding to the succession, he called for a transfer of power to younger, more able leaders, claiming that "each new generation is in some ways stronger than the previous one, knows more, and sees farther." He saw older leaders as often set in their ways and hence likely to "hamper the adoption of what is novel and unaccustomed."[10] Two weeks later the regime's interest in injecting new blood into the party ranks was signaled when the campaign of regional party elections was launched with an unusual amount of fanfare and hints that the party should rid itself of incompetent leaders.[11]

The only full Politburo members attending the August meeting of party veterans, other than Andropov, were from the younger generation: Gorbachëv, who delivered the opening remarks, and Romanov, who had been brought into the party Secretariat by Andropov at the June 1983 plenum. Gorbachëv's prominent role in the sessions, Andropov's remarks, and the rapid rise of Gorbachëv under Andropov all suggest that he was Andropov's choice for successor.

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[4]For example, at the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the USSR in December 1982 Gorbachëv chaired one of the ceremonial meetings—an honor shared only with more senior leaders, Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Ustinov. Ibid., Dec. 22 and 23, 1982. The meeting was attended by the entire leadership and by party leaders from bloc countries. Subsequently, Gorbachëv was the senior party leader at an early January 1983 meeting which helped launch Andropov's discipline campaign. Ibid., Jan. 8, 1983.

In the months that followed, Gorbachëv had a highly visible role as the Andropov regime focused its attention on the agricultural sector, which he managed. He wrote a major article on agriculture in the Feb. 10, 1983, *Pravda*, an article given the prestige of republication in the official newspapers of Armenia, Georgia, Kirgizia, Moldavia, and Uzbekistan. He also chaired a major all-Union conference of agricultural leaders of the party in March, and he spoke at an April Central Committee conference on agriculture which commanded the attendance of all members of the Politburo and was addressed by Andropov. *Pravda*, Mar. 20 and Apr. 19, 1983. Later that month he was given broad national exposure when he delivered the annual Lenin Day address. See ibid., Apr. 23, 1983.

[5]Ibid., Apr. 13 and June 2, 1983.

[6]*Plenum tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS, 14–15 iyunya 1983 goda: Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, June 14–15, 1983: Steonographic Report), Moscow, Politizdat, 1983.

[7]*Pravda*, June 22 and 25, and Aug. 30, 1983.

[8]He headed a delegation to Canada in May, helped host Hungarian party leader János Kádár in July, signed an August obituary of an ambassador, and was the senior party representative at an early August meeting of party officials working abroad. See Jerry Hough, "Andropov's First Year," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December 1983, pp. 62–63; and *Pravda*, Aug. 1 and 4, 1983.

[9]*Pravda*, June 16, 1983. Medunov had written a book review praising Chernenko. See *Ogonëk* (Moscow), No. 42, October 1981, p. 6. Shchëlokov had worked with Brezhnev and Chernenko in Moldavia.

[10]*Pravda*, Aug. 16, 1983. Andropov last appeared in public three days later at a Kremlin meeting with a United States Senate delegation. See ibid., Aug. 19, 1983. According to the Soviet media, Andropov also participated in a Sept. 28 meeting with a delegation from South Yemen, but in contrast to normal practice, no photographs appeared in the press and no location for the meeting was disclosed. Ibid., Sept. 30, 1983.

[11]In contrast to the last campaign five years earlier, a major meeting addressed by members of the leadership began this campaign (see *Partiynaya zhizn'* [Moscow], No. 18, 1983), and more articles and editorials on the election were published in the press. Reflecting his new responsibilities for cadres, Gorbachëv was the senior leader at this meeting.

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Yuriy Andropov (right) meets a delegation of US Democratic Senators in the Kremlin on August 18, 1983; facing the camera at far right is Senator Claiborne Pell, leader of the delegation.

—Wide World.

Gorbachëv's close personal ties with Andropov were suggested at the lying-in-state ceremonies for Andropov, where Gorbachëv was the only Politburo member shown on Soviet television sitting with Andropov's family.

A Leadership Vacuum

Once Andropov dropped from public view in August, the leadership situation began to change. The first sign was Chernenko's reemergence from political obscurity, as he resumed publishing articles in the press and meeting foreign delegations. In October he published a major article in *Kommunist,* and shortly thereafter articles on foreign policy and human rights.[12] When Andropov failed to attend the November 5 Kremlin meeting commemorating the anniversary of the October Revolution and the parade in Red Square two days later, Chernenko took the General Secretary's place as the senior member of the leadership.

Once Andropov's illness became public knowledge, signs began to emerge that his absence was creating tensions within the leadership. This was reflected in a highly unusual article in *Izvestiya* on a 1918 assassination attempt against Lenin, which appeared shortly after Andropov failed to make the de rigueur appearance at the November 7th parade. The article seemed to criticize the way the leadership was handling Andropov's prolonged absence and to suggest that more information about his condition should be made public. It pointed out that information about Lenin's condition had been made public and had not caused any great concern. It also suggested that a full disclosure was not necessary, stating that a "white lie" about a leader's health might be "fully permissible" in such a situation. The article pointedly said that the experience with Lenin is "highly topical even today."[13] Such an article could hardly have appeared by chance.

Earlier, after the Soviet downing of the Korean Air Lines passenger aircraft in early September, there were indications of unusual tension between civilian

[12] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 15, 1983, pp. 18–34. See also *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (Prague), No. 11, 1983, pp. 4–11; and an article on human rights released by Novosti Press Agency and printed in East European newspapers, e.g., *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsa), Nov. 3, 1983.

[13] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Nov. 15, 1983. At that point, the Soviet public had only been told that Andropov had a "cold." See *Pravda*, Oct. 30, 1983.

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and military leaders. The civilian leadership was noticeably slow to come to the defense of the military, and it was several weeks before the top party leadership commented on the situation.[14] At the same time, statements by Soviet officials traveling abroad appeared to suggest disapproval of the way the military had handled the situation.[15] The military assumed a high media profile following the KAL incident: Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov played a key role in a highly unusual television press conference defending the Soviet position, and other high military figures published a large number of articles in the civilian press.[16]

These apparent tensions between the political and military leaders seemed compounded by the need to agree on a response to initial NATO deployments of intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) in Western Europe. In mid-November, Soviet public statements on INF appeared to reflect either a lack of direction or conflicting instructions from the leadership. To respond to this embarrassing situation the Soviet foreign ministry took the unusual step of directly denying rumors circulating in the West of a new Soviet INF proposal by issuing an official statement that was reported in the Soviet press.[17]

Such tensions were also reflected in an allegorical article by one of the Soviet Union's leading political commentators, Fëdor Burlatskiy. Using the 1962 Cuban missile crisis as an example, Burlatskiy made sweeping negative statements about military leaders,

[14] *Pravda*, Sept. 29, 1983.

[15] Viktor Afanas'yev, the editor of *Pravda*, stated in a BBC interview that "our military people are guilty" in their reporting of the incident, they let "some inaccuracies slip by" and may not have been certain of what happened. Transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 19, 1983, p. DD/18.

[16] For the Ogarkov press conference see *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 12, 1983, pp. DD/10–30. A major article by General Aleksey Yepishev was published in *Izvestiya* on Oct. 11, 1983, for no apparent reason. Marshal Viktor Kulikov gave a long interview in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on Oct. 16, 1983. Particularly unusual was the double publication of an article by Ogarkov, in *Izvestiya*, and *Krasnaya Zvezda*, on Sept. 23, 1983.

[17] *Pravda*, Nov. 22, 1983.

Speculation heightened about another Soviet succession in December 1983 when Yuriy Andropov failed to appear at a Supreme Soviet session. Pictured voting at the session are prominent party leaders: first row left to right, Andrey Gromyko, Konstantin Chernenko, Nikolay Tikhonov; second row, Grigoriy Romanov, Viktor Grishin, and Mikhail Gorbachëv; third row, Boris Ponomarëv, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, and Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi.

—Wide World.

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saying that civilian leaders must never allow the military to influence sensitive political decisions. The most alarmist part of the article was its suggestion that if a political leadership resists pressure from the military, it risks being thrown out of office. The article stated that in an "acute crisis" the military are "the first to lose their heads" and that the opinions of the generals are "not worth a cent." Burlatskiy underlined the parallels to the present day when he asserted that "much of what happened then is recalled by the present crisis."[18]

The Soviet leadership was evidently also having difficulty in making decisions in areas other than foreign policy. Between late August and early December the pace of personnel appointments slowed dramatically, and other major political decisions were apparently postponed. For example, the sensitive post of Central Committee administrator of affairs, vacated in early September, remained unfilled. In addition, there was apparent confusion over scheduling a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet which was required to be held before the end of the year. Although official regulations state that "as a rule" sessions should be announced 30 days in advance,[19] this deadline had slipped by two days when the session was announced for 28 December.[20] In the past this rule has been observed and the announcement was often made even a few days early.

However, in December the pace of political activity picked up, and postponed decisions began to be taken: as noted, the date for the USSR Supreme Soviet session was set; and Nikolay Kruchina was appointed administrator of affairs.[21] At the same time, the pace of personnel changes began to increase. This was particularly evident in the regional party election campaign that had begun in August. By December, only three regional party leaders had been replaced at the oblast and kray level, but during December and January some 16 additional party leaders at this level were replaced—a larger number than in any election since Brezhnev's first year in office. During the same period there were also other important changes in the party and state apparatuses, including the appointment of a new USSR deputy premier, three new USSR ministers, and several important regional officials.[22]

Although most of these personnel changes cannot be reliably linked to any member of the top party leadership, more of the new appointees appear to be connected to Gorbachëv than to any other Politburo member. Two of the men promoted during this period had worked under Gorbachëv in the Central Committee Agriculture and Food Industry Department. Kruchina, the new CC administrator of affairs, had been first deputy head of the department, and a former sector chief, Yuriy Belov, was elected as the second secretary of Tadzhikistan on January 30.[23] The new first secretary of the important Volgograd oblast, elected on January 24, V. I. Kalashnikov had been Gorbachëv's top agricultural deputy when the latter was first secretary of Stavropol' kray.[24]

The personnel changes made at the CC plenum of December 26–27 indicated that Andropov's protégés were strengthening their position. The plenum promoted the premier of the RSFSR, Vitaliy Vorotnikov, to full Politburo membership, and made 63-year-old Yegor Ligachëv, head of the cadres department, a member of the CPSU Secretariat. The latter's promotion appeared to displace totally Central Committee Secretary Ivan Kapitonov, a Brezhnev appointee, from any role in the crucial area of cadres. Both Vorotnikov and Ligachëv had been brought to Moscow in the spring of 1983 when Andropov was at the height of his power. As already suggested, the loyalties of Mikhail Solomentsev, the head of the Party Control Commission, are less clear, and it is possible that his promotion to full Politburo membership may have been intended to balance Vorotnikov's. The plenum also promoted the 60-year-old head of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov, to candidate membership in the Politburo. Although Chebrikov was originally a Brezhnev protégé, he worked under Andropov for many years when the latter was head of the KGB.[25]

The December plenum not only promoted younger members of the leadership, it also provided further indications of Gorbachëv's leading role in the Andropov regime. Since Andropov's speech to the plenum was read on his behalf, Gorbachëv was the only member of the party Secretariat to address the plenum personally.[26] In keeping with normal practice, Gorbachëv's speech was not published in the press, but his re-

[18] *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Nov. 23, 1983.

[19] *Izvestiya*, Apr. 20, 1979.

[20] *Pravda*, Dec. 2, 1983.

[21] Ibid., Dec. 3, 1983.

[22] Ibid., Dec. 11, 1983, and Jan. 8, 11, and 15, 1984.

[23] Kruchina became first deputy head of the department in 1978. See *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii, 1981* (1981 Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1981, p. 585. Belov was identified as a sector chief from the department in the news report on his election in Tadzhikistan (*Pravda*, Jan. 31, 1984).

[24] *Pravda*, Jan. 25, 1984. Kalashnikov was identified as a secretary of the Stavropol' kraykom, where Gorbachëv was first secretary, when he wrote an article on local agricultural innovations. See *Sel'skaya zhizn'* (Moscow), Nov. 26, 1978. I am grateful to Werner G. Hahn for this reference.

[25] *Pravda*, Dec. 27, 1983.

[26] Ibid., Dec. 27 and 29, 1983.

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

In December 1983, Yegor Ligachëv (left) was appointed to the Central Committee Secretariat, and Nikolay Kruchina (right) was named Administrator of Affairs in the Central Committee.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

marks and those of Premier Tikhonov were given special attention by the premier of Uzbekistan. Addressing the USSR Supreme Soviet session following the plenum, Narmakhonmadi Khudayberdyyev pledged that the tasks set out by Tikhonov and Gorbachëv would be carried out in his republic. Normally, speeches that are not published are not discussed in the press either, and the unusual treatment of the Tikhonov and Gorbachëv speeches suggests that they may have been more important than indicated in the official report on the plenum. This passage of the Uzbek premier's speech was reported only in the Uzbek party paper, and was omitted from the versions carried in the central press.[27]

During the month of December there were increasing signs of political infighting that appeared to involve members of the Politburo. A CPSU Central Committee decree published in mid-December criticized the Moldavian leadership for a broad range of abuses in unusually sharp terms.[28] This appeared to be a veiled attack on Chernenko, who is closely associated with that republic. The target of a sharp Politburo rebuke in early December of the two USSR ministries slated to conduct a major economic experiment is less clear, but it was also apparently politically motivated.[29] The most likely target of the criticism was Premier Tikhonov, First Deputy Premier Aliyev, or Defense Minister Ustinov. The rebuke appeared to reflect poorly on the Council of Ministers as a whole, as well as on leaders of the defense industries who helped to organize the experiment. Presumably government officials would have preferred to deal with the problems themselves and treat them as an internal matter instead of having the Politburo interfere in the experiment.

In the weeks just preceding Andropov's death, one could also discern increased prestige for Chernenko. In late January, he and Tikhonov signed obituaries of two high government officials ahead of other leaders, rather than in alphabetical order.[30] In the same period, publication of a new, expanded edition of Chernenko's collected speeches and articles was announced in the press.[31] A similar collection of his writings had been published shortly before Brezhnev's death,[32] and there was no apparent reason for issuing the volume at this time. The book was quickly reviewed in *Pravda*, on the day before Andropov's death, although the review focused only on Chernenko's expertise in the narrow sphere of ideology (in contrast to reviews of his books while Brezhnev was still alive, which seemed designed to demonstrate Chernenko's expertise in the broad range of areas required of a general secretary).[33] Chernenko's influence was further suggested the week before Andropov's death by the publication in *Pravda* of a long article by Chernenko protégé Boris Yakovlev, head of the Central Committee's Letters Department.[34]

A Tense Transition

While the above portents suggest that on the eve of Andropov's death his supporters had a majority in the Politburo, once Andropov was no longer part of the political equation, this working coalition was severely weakened and probably disintegrated. While Andropov was alive the members of this coalition benefited from sticking together. Once he was dead, however, members of the group were not bound by any

[27] See *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), Dec. 30, 1983. Cf. *Izvestiya*, Dec. 31, 1983.
[28] *Pravda*, Dec. 15, 1983.
[29] Ibid., Dec. 10, 1983.
[30] Jan. 16 and 25, 1984. Chernenko's status was particularly enhanced by his signature on these obituaries, since he had no supervisory responsibility for either official and, judging by past practice, his name should have appeared only on the obituaries of figures in the fields of culture or ideology, or on obituaries signed by all members of the Politburo.
[31] Ibid., Jan. 24, 1984.
[32] See K. U. Chernenko, *Avangardnaya rol' partii kommunistov* (The Vanguard Role of the Party of Communists), Moscow, Mysl', signed to press on Oct. 10, 1982.
[33] *Pravda*, Feb. 8, 1984. In an apparent show of favor for Chernenko, the review was republished the following day in the party newspapers of Georgia and Moldavia. See *Zarya Vostoka* (Tbilisi), and *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (Kishinev), Feb. 9, 1984.
[34] *Pravda*, Feb. 3, 1984.

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ties, and each man sought to advance his own position in the hard bargaining that must have taken place in the Politburo. Both Gorbachëv and Romanov appear to have come out of the struggle stronger, and it appears that they will exercise considerable power in the Chernenko regime.

As the world waited for the announcement of Andropov's successor, it soon became evident that the Politburo was having a difficult time deciding on the new arrangements of power. When Chernenko was identified as chairman of the funeral commission—a position held by Andropov at Brezhnev's funeral in 1982 and by Khrushchev at Stalin's funeral in 1953—it was expected that the Central Committee would meet the following day to name Chernenko the successor. Instead, the plenum was put off for two more days, resulting in the longest interregnum in party history.[35]

The postponement was apparently decided upon at the same Politburo meeting that had named Chernenko head of the funeral commission. The delay in convening the plenum suggests that the selection of Chernenko to head the funeral commission may not have meant that the succession was already decided, but merely that Chernenko was given that honor as the senior party leader and that he was in a strong position in the continuing negotiations. The postponement of the plenum is particularly striking in view of the fact that the leadership must have expected Andropov's death for some time. According to the official medical report on Andropov's death, he developed serious kidney problems in February 1983 and his condition took a severe turn for the worse in late January 1984.[36] The postponement of Defense Minister Ustinov's trip to India, announced on February 4, suggests that the party leadership thought Andropov's death imminent.[37] In contrast, even though Brezhnev had been in poor health for many years, he appeared in Red Square three days before his death, and apparently died very suddenly. Nevertheless, the transfer of power following Brezhnev's death proceeded more quickly and smoothly.

There were other signs of confusion in the crucial days between Andropov's death and the CC plenum on February 13. When the leadership appeared on Soviet television to pay their respects at Andropov's bier after the plenum, they looked unusually haggard, as if they had been meeting in continuous session. The possibility that the Politburo was having extended meetings during these crucial days is also suggested by the fact that Ustinov did not appear at a memorial meeting for Andropov at the Ministry of Defense on February 10, even though he had attended a similar meeting after Brezhnev's death.[38]

Another possible sign of tension was an article that appeared on the eve of Chernenko's election, portraying Andropov in a much more favorable light than the modest praise he had received in the official assessment of his regime.[39] This article appeared in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and was written by the newspaper's first deputy editor, Valentin Chikin, who had been a strong advocate of reform when Andropov was general secretary. The article praised Andropov's "constructive boldness which sometimes seemed surprising," and suggested that his successor should also be an innovative leader. That the message of Chikin's article was the party's need of a younger, innovative leader is also indicated by the fact that in an article he published a year earlier, Chikin had argued that new blood was needed in the party's leadership, and had recalled Lenin's concern over the health and age of the members of the Central Committee.[40]

Other curious events during this crucial period also added to the impression that all was not proceeding smoothly. Ukrainian party leader Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi did not appear with other members of the leadership at two February 11 ceremonies at Andropov's bier that were shown on Soviet television, and only appeared in public after the plenum on the 13th.[41] Kazakhstan party leader Kunayev, an old Brezhnev crony and Chernenko supporter, was also absent from the initial leadership appearance on February 11, although he did appear with members of the leadership at a ceremony later in the day. The press photographs of the earlier ceremony were apparently doctored to make it appear that Kunayev had been present.[42] By comparison, all of the regional party leaders who were members of the Politburo had appeared in Moscow the day after the announcement of Brezhnev's death.[43]

Chernenko's election initially appeared a clear victory for the older generation, symbolized by the selec-

[35]Ibid., Feb. 11 and 14, 1984.

[36]Ibid., Feb. 11, 1984.

[37]Ibid., Feb. 5, 1984.

[38]Cf. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Feb. 11, 1984, and Nov. 13, 1982.

[39]These assessments were given in his obituary and an "address" of the leading party and state organs to the people. See *Pravda*, Feb. 11, 1984.

[40]*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Feb. 13, 1984; cf. ibid., Jan. 21, 1983.

[41]For descriptions of television coverage of these ceremonies, see *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 13, 1984, pp. P/9–12.

[42]In the *Pravda* photograph of Feb. 12, 1984, Kunayev is the only leader who does not cast a shadow. In the *Izvestiya* photograph of the same day, Kunayev's legs appear to be missing, and a thin white line is visible where he was inserted.

[43]*Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1982.

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tion of 78-year-old Tikhonov to deliver the nominating speech. Tikhonov was a Brezhnev associate from Dnipropetrovsk and the most obvious representative of the old guard in the leadership. This connection, together with the reference to Chernenko as a "true" associate of Andropov and of Brezhnev—the latter's name had not been mentioned by Soviet leaders for many months—appeared to underscore the victory of the Brezhnev/Chernenko faction that had previously lost out to Andropov. The apparent factional nature of the succession was further highlighted by Tikhonov's effusive praise for Chernenko as well as by his failure to stress the importance of collective leadership.[44] By contrast, in November 1982 the selection of Chernenko to nominate Andropov appeared to suggest that the entire Politburo had closed ranks behind the new leader. Chernenko's praise for Andropov at the nomination was much more restrained, and he strongly emphasized the importance of collectivity in the leadership.[45]

The presence of political tensions within the leadership was further revealed in the inconsistent treatment of Gorbachëv. There was a seemingly deliberate attempt to obscure his prominent role at the February 13 plenum. Immediately after the plenum, following normal practice, the Soviet media had carried an "information report" on the meeting as well as the text of speeches by Chernenko and Tikhonov, but gave no hint that any other leaders had spoken at the plenum.[46] Only two days later, in a booklet on the plenum's proceedings, was it revealed that Gorbachëv had given a short closing speech.[47] Information reports on Central Committee plenums routinely list all speakers, even when their speeches are not published. Thus, neglecting to list Gorbachëv as a speaker is a unique occurrence. Booklets similar to the one issued on February 15 have come out routinely after CC plenums in the past, but they have contained only materials previously published in the press.

The important role played by Gorbachëv in the succession was also suggested by his increased prominence in the leadership lineups after the February 13 plenum. When the leadership stood by Andropov's bier immediately after the plenum, Gorbachëv stood next to Chernenko on one side, while Tikhonov stood on the other.[48] Romanov was also more prominent after the plenum, standing next to Gorbachëv. These leaders were in the same position when they returned to pay their last respects to Andropov before the funeral the following day.[49] Gorbachëv's prominence was also highlighted when he and Chernenko acted as the lead pallbearers at the funeral.[50] These positions had been occupied by Andropov and Tikhonov at Brezhnev's funeral.[51] Resistance to Gorbachëv's new status by the senior leaders was suggested at the more formal leadership lineup in Red Square during the funeral, when Gorbachëv was in the lower position he had occupied before the plenum.[52] He also was seated below other leaders—Grishin, Gromyko, Tikhonov, and Ustinov—at Chernenko's Supreme Soviet election speech in early March.[53]

Despite these conflicting signs, Gorbachëv's new status as the third-ranking member of the leadership—after Chernenko and Tikhonov—was confirmed during the series of speeches for election to the USSR Supreme Soviet, which took place immediately after the succession. During the election campaign each member of the top leadership gives a major speech. The order in which these are delivered has long been a reliable sign of the protocol standings within the leadership, with the most important leaders speaking last. This year Gorbachëv spoke third from last, after all the other leaders except Tikhonov and Chernenko. This was the first clear indication that he had moved ahead of Grishin, Gromyko, and Ustinov in the protocol rankings.[54] In a similar series of speeches in 1979, for example, the last three speakers were Suslov, Aleksey Kosygin, and Brezhnev.

The increased authority of Gorbachëv since the plenum was also suggested by the appearance of his signature together with Chernenko's on two obituaries. The first was for Marshal Pavel Batitskiy, an obituary also signed by Romanov, Tikhonov, and Ustinov.[55] The second, for Sergey Trapeznikov, former head of the Central Committee's Science and Educational Institutions Department, was signed only by Chernenko

[44] Ibid., Feb. 14, 1984.

[45] Ibid., Nov. 13, 1982.

[46] Ibid., Feb. 14, 1984.

[47] Publication of the booklet was announced on Moscow domestic radio on Feb. 15, 1984 (trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 16, 1984, p. R/11), and in *Pravda*, Feb. 16, 1984. The most striking evidence of an about-face in the public handling of Gorbachëv's speech was the fact that it was not included with other plenum materials in the February 17 Russian-language edition of *Novoye Vremya* (Moscow), but was inserted in the English-language edition of the journal, *New Times*, which appears a week later.

[48] *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1984.

[49] Soviet television, described in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 15, 1984, p. R/1.

[50] *Pravda*, Feb. 15, 1984.

[51] Ibid., Nov. 16, 1982.

[52] Ibid., Feb. 15, 1984.

[53] Soviet television, described in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 5, 1984, p. R/1.

[54] The full Politburo members spoke in the following (reverse) order: Mar. 2, Chernenko; Mar. 1, Tikhonov; Feb. 29, Gorbachëv; Feb. 28, Ustinov; Feb. 27, Gromyko; Feb. 25, Grishin and Romanov; Feb. 24, Shcherbytskyi and Solomentsev; Feb. 23, Aliyev and Kunayev; and Feb. 22, Vorotnikov.

[55] *Pravda*, Feb. 19, 1984.

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Konstantin Chernenko, front right, and Mikhail Gorbachëv, front left, occupy positions of honor as the Soviet leadership bears the body of Yuriy Andropov to the Kremlin wall for burial on February 14, 1984.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

and Gorbachëv from the ranks of the Politburo.[56] The presence of Gorbachëv's name on both of these selective lists cannot be explained by any known personal ties to the deceased, and both men had worked in areas far afield from those in which Gorbachëv had been involved. The appearance of his name on these obituaries is consistent with the pattern that was developing under Andropov and suggests that Gorbachëv has a special status as a senior member of the leadership with broad oversight responsibilities. Further evidence of Gorbachëv's expanding role can be gleaned from the fact that he was the only senior member of the Secretariat who signed a February 23 *Pravda* obituary of a leading cultural figure.

Immediately after the February plenum Romanov assumed a new, highly visible role in the military sphere. In addition to signing Batitskiy's obituary, he attended the Marshal's funeral along with Ustinov and Moscow party chief Grishin—whose name curiously did not appear on the *Pravda* obituary.[57] Romanov's new role in military affairs was again demonstrated when he attended the annual anniversary meeting for Armed Forces Day, together with Defense Minister Ustinov and KGB head Chebrikov.[58] Romanov's attendance at the anniversary meeting contrasts with normal practice, since the top leaders at these ceremonies have invariably been military officials.[59] Romanov was also the only party secretary at a largely military commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the birth of cosmonaut Yuriy Gagarin on March 9.[60] Romanov's presence at these meetings was a clear signal that he had new responsibilities in the military sphere, which at a minimum would include supervision of the defense industries—and could even be an

[56] Ibid., Mar. 14, 1984.

[57] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Feb. 22, 1984.

[58] *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1984.

[59] The last time the meeting was attended by top civilian leaders was in 1978, when the entire Politburo attended to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the armed forces. Ibid., Feb. 23, 1978.

[60] Ibid., Mar. 10, 1984.

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indication of increased party oversight of the military.[61]

Chernenko's Political Standing

Romanov's newly visible role in the military sphere is only one indication that the Chernenko regime may hope to reduce the political influence of the military. Chernenko's public record suggests that he might be unsympathetic to increased defense spending, and the military seems less than enthusiastic over his election as general secretary. Indeed, one of the startling differences between the post-Brezhnev and post-Andropov successions is the absence of indications that the military played an important role in the current transition.

After Brezhnev's death the important role of the military was signaled by Ustinov's prominence in the leadership rankings and by Andropov's statements on the importance of a strong defense. Andropov stressed this point in his acceptance speech as general secretary and again at Brezhnev's funeral, and at a CC plenum a week later he pledged that the political leadership of the country would "provide the Army and Navy with everything necessary" to defend the country.[62]

Signs of military influence have been much less evident in the post-Andropov succession. While Ustinov was the only Politburo member other than Andropov to speak at Brezhnev's funeral, at Andropov's funeral he spoke after Foreign Minister Gromyko (who had not made an address at Brezhnev's funeral) and a *factory worker!*[63] Chernenko's initial statements as general secretary on the subject of defense were particularly noteworthy, given the deterioration in East-West relations since Brezhnev's death and the stress the Soviet leadership had placed on a strong defense during Andropov's leadership. The strongest statement made by Chernenko on this subject at the plenum was that there should be "no doubt" that the defense capability of the country will be "strengthened" sufficiently to "cool the hot heads of military adventurists."[64] Chernenko's remark at Andropov's funeral that "our defenses are strong" were conceivably less than reassuring to the military.[65]

Chernenko's reluctance to commit himself publicly to strengthening the country's defenses is consistent with previous public statements of concern over the need to curb worldwide defense spending. In October 1982, for example, when other leaders were stressing the need to strengthen defense in response to plans announced by the Reagan Administration to increase defense spending, Chernenko stated that Washington could do whatever it pleased—the Soviet Union was "strong enough" and could wait for reason to prevail; he stressed that "there are many reasonable people in the United States."[66] During the 1979 round of election speeches for the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chernenko was more enthusiastic than any of the other leaders in looking ahead to a new SALT agreement, and he expressed hope that money previously spent on the arms race would be used in the future for consumer goods production.[67] He also spoke out in unusually strong terms in April 1981 against the dangers of nuclear war, explicitly rejecting it as a "legitimate" or "rational" option for policymakers.[68] In 1984, the new General Secretary appeared to reaffirm his pro-consumer line when he pointed out that although the international situation in recent years had required the diversion of considerable resources for security needs, there was never any thought of curtailing social programs.[69]

Chernenko's attitude toward defense spending can be explained in part by his apparent view that domestic unrest is a greater potential danger to the political stability of the Soviet system than is the military threat posed by the West. Shortly after the start of the Polish crisis in mid-1980, Chernenko began to warn that similar unrest could erupt in other socialist countries, even the Soviet Union, if leaders failed to understand and meet the demands of the populace. Accordingly, Chernenko has stressed the importance of consumer goods production, and has called both for an expansion of public opinion polling and other methods of sociological research that can provide the leadership with an accurate sense of the mood of the public and forecast its future behavior, and for an expansion of public participation in the political process.[70]

[61] Romanov has established a record of being sympathetic to military interests. In his Supreme Soviet election speech, for example, he stated that the party and state will "equip the Army and Navy with everything necessary." *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1984. This was the strongest statement made by a civilian leader during the election campaign on the need for a strong defense; it paraphrases remarks made by Andropov (see *Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1982).

[62] *Pravda*, Nov. 13 and 23, 1982.

[63] *Ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1984.

[64] Ibid., Feb. 14, 1984.

[65] Ibid., Feb. 15, 1984.

[66] *Zarya Vostoka*, Oct. 30, 1982.

[67] *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, Feb. 27, 1979.

[68] *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1981.

[69] Ibid., Mar. 3, 1984.

[70] For a fuller discussion of Chernenko's writings, see my essay-review, "Chernenko's Platform," *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1982, pp. 70–75.

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The military's disappointment with the election of Chernenko was evident in the February 16 *Krasnaya Zvezda* editorial on the party plenum. While *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* editorials on the same day paraphrased the praise for Chernenko from Tikhonov's nominating speech, the military newspaper merely reported that Chernenko had been elected and that he had spoken to the plenum. On the same day, a deputy head of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces did not even mention Chernenko by name when he discussed the plenum at a military conference.[71] The military's coolness toward Chernenko was also evident in *Krasnaya Zvezda*'s February 23 Armed Forces Day editorial, which also discussed the plenum, but failed to mention Chernenko. In contrast, the newspaper's 1983 Armed Forces Day editorial had named Andropov, and the comparable 1982 editorial had named Brezhnev.[72]

Subsequently, however, there were indications that Chernenko and the military were coming to terms. At the first publicized Politburo session after the succession, Chernenko stated that one of the most important objectives of Soviet economic policy is to "strengthen the country's defense capability."[73] On the same day, Ustinov seemed to be calling on the military to put aside its differences with Chernenko when he said that the military is "well aware of the great attention" Chernenko devotes to "boosting the country's defenses," and gave a high evaluation of Chernenko's leadership qualities.[74] Ustinov repeated his positive evaluation of Chernenko several days later in his speech for the Supreme Soviet elections.[75]

The military is not alone in its lack of enthusiasm for Chernenko. Since his election there have been public indications suggesting that a tense atmosphere continues to exist among the political leaders in Moscow. Some members of the leadership have been slow in showing Chernenko full public support. At the same time, however, the public treatment of Chernenko by others has been unusually flattering, showing unconcealed jubilation over his election. Together these signs suggest that sharp divisions remain in the Politburo and that the political situation has not yet fully stabilized.

The post-succession divisions in the leadership roughly parallel those that were evident earlier. A sense of these divisions can be gleaned from the Supreme Soviet election speeches of the top party leaders, a quinquennial ritual that was getting under way just as Andropov died. The most striking differences observable in these addresses have been in the treatment of Chernenko and Andropov, tending to confirm earlier signs of a considerable degree of polarization within the Politburo between two groups: the old guard who had supported Chernenko and were being pushed out of power by Andropov and his supporters, and the younger leaders who were being advanced by Andropov at the expense of the Chernenko group.

The election speeches of most of the younger leaders whose careers advanced under Andropov fit neatly into this pattern. Nikolay Ryzhkov, Vorotnikov, and Romanov all avoided referring to Chernenko as an "outstanding figure" of the party and state, even though such praise was contained in the speeches of other leaders and in their own remarks on Andropov.[76] Ryzhkov's speech stood out by its lack of enthusiasm for Chernenko, merely noting that his election was "welcomed" by the people. Ligachëv would also appear to belong to this group. Although he gave his election speech before the announcement of Andropov's death, he praised him in stronger terms than did several other leaders in later speeches.[77] Chebrikov was the only leader promoted under Andropov who was more positive toward Chernenko in his speech.[78]

At the other end of the spectrum are the leaders who appeared to be strong supporters of Chernenko in the succession struggle. While flattering Chernenko, they were unceremoniously cool in their remarks on Andropov. Thus both Tikhonov and Kunayev praised Chernenko at length but almost ignored Andropov. Tikhonov merely stated that Andropov had "devoted his life" to serving the people;[79] Kunayev, in the *Pravda* version of his speech, only mentioned Andropov's name when praising Chernenko as a "loyal colleague" of Andropov and Brezhnev, and he added little more in the fuller version that appeared in Kazakhstan.[80] Moscow party leader Viktor Grishin, while more evenhanded in his election speech, had several days earlier praised Chernenko at length and referred to him as the "head" of the Politburo—an honorary title that has not been readily granted by other Politburo members

[71] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Feb. 17, 1984.
[72] Ibid., Feb. 22, 1983, and Feb. 23, 1982.
[73] *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1984.
[74] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Feb. 25, 1984.
[75] *Pravda*, Feb. 29, 1984.
[76] Ibid., Feb. 19 and 23, 1984; and *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1984. When longer versions of leaders' election speeches have been available from the regional press, these have been used instead of the abbreviated *Pravda* versions.
[77] *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1984.
[78] *Zarya Vostoka*, Feb. 21, 1984.
[79] *Pravda*, Mar. 2, 1984.
[80] Ibid., Feb. 24, 1984; and *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Alma Ata), Feb. 25, 1984.

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Vitaliy Vorotnikov, who was promoted rapidly under Andropov—to Premier of the Russian Republic and candidate member of the CPSU Politburo in June 1983, and to full Politburo member in December 1983.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

in the past.[81] Grishin, in fact, had lagged behind many of his colleagues in applying this title to Andropov.[82]

Chernenko received particularly strong support in the election speech of the 56-year-old Georgian party leader Eduard Shevardnadze, who praised the new General Secretary at greater length than did any other leader; drew attention to the special relationship Chernenko had developed with the Georgian republic; and credited him with personally helping to win support in Moscow for some of Georgia's recent economic innovations. Shevardnadze became only the second top leader (after Grishin) to refer to Chernenko as the "head" of the Politburo.[83] In contrast, Shevardnadze's treatment of Andropov was notably cool. Under Brezhnev, Shevardnadze had repeatedly gone out of his way to show favor to Chernenko, and would appear to have supported him in the post-Andropov succession.[84] Shevardnadze is the most innovative regional leader in the Soviet Union today, and his relationship with Chernenko suggests that the new General Secretary is open to collaboration with younger, reform-minded leaders.

The remaining Politburo members were less obviously partisan in their election speeches. Gorbachëv and Solomentsev both praised Andropov and were more restrained in their treatment of Chernenko.[85] Gromyko had few positive words to say about either leader.[86] Aliyev's remarks were carefully balanced between the two leaders.[87] Shcherbytskyi, perhaps reflecting his disappointment with not having been promoted to a post in Moscow under Andropov, was subdued in his praise of the departed leader. He praised Chernenko as an "outstanding figure," but only of the party.[88] Ustinov, perhaps reflecting earlier efforts to help improve Chernenko's standing with the military, praised both Andropov and Chernenko in equally positive terms.[89]

Anomalies in the central press concerning the use of the term "Politburo headed by" Chernenko also suggest that the political situation in Moscow did not stabilize immediately after Chernenko's election. Accounts in *Pravda* and other central papers of the meeting where Tikhonov gave his election speech noted that the gathering had elected an honorary presidium composed of the Politburo "headed by" Chernenko, whereas the first edition of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* merely reported the election of a presidium composed of the Politburo.[90] This striking omission was quickly corrected for the second edition.[91] This slight to Chernenko comes against the background of other signs that *Sovetskaya Rossiya* may be cool toward the new General Secretary.[92] In contrast, *Pravda*

[81] *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1984; and *Moskovskaya Pravda*, (Moscow), Feb. 21, 1984 (the latter an address to the Moscow City party organization).

[82] At the June 1983 CC plenum, Grishin was the only full Politburo member who spoke and did not address Andropov as "head" of the Politburo. The term was used by Chernenko, Kunayev, and Shcherbytskyi. See *Plenum* ..., pp. 7, 52, and 61.

[83] *Zarya Vostoka*, Feb. 22, 1984.

[84] See Zlotnik, loc. cit., p. 74.

[85] *Pravda*, Feb. 25 and Mar. 1, 1984.

[86] *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (Minsk), Feb. 28, 1984.

[87] *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* (Baku), Feb. 24, 1984.

[88] *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Feb. 25, 1984.

[89] *Moskovskaya Pravda*, Feb. 29, 1984.

[90] Compare *Izvestiya*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, and *Pravda*, Mar. 2, 1984, with the first edition of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* of the same date. See *FBIS–SOV*, Mar. 6, 1984, p. R/3.

[91] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Mar. 2, 1984, second edition.

[92] The Feb. 13 Chikin article cited above was exceedingly warm in its praise of Andropov. *Sovetskaya Rossiya*'s Feb. 16 editorial on Chernenko's election was cooler in its treatment of the new General Secretary than the editorials of that day in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, but somewhat more positive than that published in *Krasnaya Zvezda*.

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went out of its way in reporting that a republic party plenum in Georgia had referred to Chernenko as "head" of the Politburo.[93]

Chernenko's Agenda

These continuing public indications of differences within the leadership suggest that Chernenko is in a weaker position than Andropov was upon his selection, when there had been few signs of conflict. This impression is reinforced by signs that the Politburo is acting more as a collective than it has in many years. In a departure from recent practice, Chernenko has emphasized before foreign visitors and domestic audiences that he was speaking on behalf of the "collective."[94] In a speech to the Ukrainian party, Shcherbytskyi stressed the need to "strictly observe" the "principle of collective leadership" and appeared to underscore the principle's new importance by referring to the remarks of Tikhonov and Gorbachëv at the February plenum (he was the first leader to make public mention of Gorbachëv's speech), and by noting that Chernenko, Tikhonov, Gromyko, and Ustinov had all met with foreign delegations after Andropov's funeral.[95] A new emphasis on collectivity has been most evident in foreign policy. During trips abroad, both Ustinov and Aliyev conveyed greetings on behalf of Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Gromyko, rather than of the General Secretary alone.[96] In addition, in a Supreme Soviet election speech, Chernenko's long-time deputy in the Central Committee's General Department, Klavdiy Bogolyubov, stated that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been elaborated in the speeches of Chernenko, Gromyko, and Ustinov.[97] This formulation is unusual and contrasts with the normal practice of referring only to the foreign policy pronouncements of the general secretary.

At age 72, however, Chernenko will have little time to consolidate his power. He is, therefore, more likely to try to tackle the problems that confront the Soviet Union by working with all leaders than to engage in a full-scale struggle to increase his own political power. Chernenko is a "restless man"—to use Brezhnev's description on the occasion of Chernenko's 70th birthday[98]—and it seems likely that he would want to make an impact quickly in order to leave some legacy. Despite the apparent pressures on him to maintain the status quo, Chernenko's public record suggests that he is open to change. This should help him find common ground with the newer members in the leadership, who are unlikely to want to continue a policy of muddling through. If Chernenko can succeed in bringing together the old and new groups in the leadership, his regime could turn out to be an active period of change. Nevertheless, Chernenko himself would probably stop short of going against the interests of the long-entrenched party and state bureaucrats who helped to put him in office and who are thought to be a major impediment to reform.

Initial signs do suggest that Chernenko may be under pressure from other leaders to confront the problems of the party and state apparatuses. In his speech to the party plenum, Chernenko stressed the need to continue efforts begun under Andropov to improve the work of the state apparatus, and in his Supreme Soviet election speech he called for a "serious restructuring" of the system of economic management.[99] Four days after the latter speech, Chernenko gave what was billed as a "major speech" before a highly unusual gathering of the Central Committee apparatus. Chernenko seemed to be telling the group that those who favored maintaining the status quo could take little comfort in his election. He informed them that improving the "style and methods" of the apparatus was now a priority of the party leadership, and appeared to hint that personnel changes could be expected. As if to suggest that this line was not entirely his own, Chernenko stated that policy was being "collectively worked out," and, indeed, he came to the meeting with other members of the Secretariat.[100] In an apparent effort to underscore this toughness, *Pravda*, in an unusual announcement two days later, reported that the Party Control Committee had expelled a former deputy minister from the party for pursuing "selfish aims," and that the USSR Procurator's Office was bringing criminal charges.[101]

[93] *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1984. When Andropov was general secretary, *Pravda* had avoided reporting similar references at meetings held away from Moscow to the Politburo "headed by" Andropov.

[94] In a Kremlin meeting with the head of the West German Social Democratic Party, Hans-Jochen Vogel, Chernenko stressed that the line "collectively worked out" by the Soviet leadership would be continued. Ibid., Mar. 13, 1984. He also stressed collectivity in his Supreme Soviet election speech and in a speech before the party apparatus. Ibid., Mar. 3 and 7, 1984.

[95] *Pravda Ukrainy*, Mar. 7, 1984. In contrast, Chernenko supporters Kunayev and Shevardnadze did not mention Gorbachëv in similar speeches on the CC plenum delivered before party leaders in their respective republics. Unlike Shcherbytskyi, Kunayev referred simply to the meeting of Chernenko and "other leaders" that took place after Andropov's funeral. See *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1984; and *Zarya Vostoka*, Feb. 28, 1984.

[96] *Pravda*, Mar. 5 and 12, 1984.

[97] *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (Frunze), Feb. 22, 1984.

[98] *Pravda*, Sept. 25, 1981.

[99] Ibid., Feb. 14 and Mar. 3, 1984.

[100] Ibid., Mar. 7, 1984.

[101] Ibid., Mar. 8, 1984.

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Other signs suggest that there is also agreement to move ahead with the economic reforms begun under Andropov and to push them further. In his first public statements as general secretary, Chernenko appeared to endorse this view, calling for greater decentralization of economic decision-making and "bold actions" in the economic sphere.[102] The initial decisions of the new regime also point in this direction. A Central Committee resolution criticizing the work of the Institute of Economics suggests that the party is looking for innovation to improve economic performance.[103] The first major appointments made under Chernenko are a new Minister of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, the 48-year-old Vladimir Chirskov, who only became first deputy minister in 1983, and a new Minister of Industrial Construction, Yuriy Solov'yëv, who worked directly under Romanov in Leningrad.[104] Both selections suggest that younger leaders are now playing a key role in the sensitive area of personnel appointments.

While the first indications suggest that agreement on the need for change now exists among the collective ruling in the Kremlin, tensions already evident in the leadership could increase as practical measures are considered. Younger ambitious leaders, such as Gorbachëv and Romanov, who are already positioning themselves for the post-Chernenko succession, can be expected to press hardest for changes that will allow them to build up their own political machines. Other leaders, who feel that their power bases are being threatened, will no doubt resist, arguing for maintenance of the status quo. As the political balance in the Kremlin continues its inevitable shift toward the next generation of leaders, this struggle can be expected to intensify. Thus, the Chernenko regime can be viewed as a transitional one, in which policy will be an instrument of leadership politics as the succession struggle goes on.

[102] Ibid., Feb. 14, 1984.
[103] Ibid., Feb. 24, 1984.
[104] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 23 and Mar. 4, 1984.

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Notes & Views

Soviet General Staff's New Role

By Kenneth Currie

WESTERN students of Soviet military affairs usually repeat Soviet assertions that the Communist Party determines the country's military doctrine.[1] Although that view is certainly justified in nominal terms, this essay argues that in operational terms the view that the formation of Soviet military doctrine remains solely within the purview of the party is mistaken. During Stalin's dictatorship, to be sure, the explication of military doctrine *was* the sole prerogative of the party, inasmuch as Stalin, who personified the party, was the sole articulator of that doctrine—a situation that stifled its meaningful development. The sudden burst of debate over a new Soviet military doctrine that followed Stalin's death in 1953 stands as stark testimony to the stultifying impact of the former dictator.

Khrushchev, in turn, also attempted to place his personal stamp upon Soviet military doctrine, as demonstrated by his speech at the January 1960 meeting of the Supreme Soviet.[2] Khrushchev's innovations were resisted by then Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskiy and a number of disaffected senior military officers; a downturn in Soviet-American relations over the next two years also compelled the Soviet leader to shelve many of his proposals. Nevertheless, Khrushchev was able to carry through his plan to disestablish the Ground Forces as a separate service arm. But this decision was overturned the year after his departure by a new leadership seeking to demonstrate its commitment to satisfying the needs of the military.

Since Khrushchev's ouster, there has been very little evidence of overt attempts by the party leadership to establish new directions in Soviet military doctrine. Rather, what has occurred has been a ratification by the party leadership of the precepts of the new doctrine spelled out by military spokesmen in the early 1960's. This ratification has taken the form of public statements on the need to maintain a strong defense and of internal party decisions to increase allocations to the military sector of the national economy. The latter trend is apparent in the across-the-board expansion of military capabilities that prevailed under Brezhnev and clearly continues today, financed by a defense budget that continues to grow (albeit at perhaps a somewhat slower rate).[3] The party leadership has been content to make very general pronouncements on what the Soviets call the "political content" of their military doctrine: assertions about its "defensive nature" and warnings about the destructiveness of nuclear war.

The military leadership, for its part, appears to have been given a relatively free hand in the development of the "military-technical" aspect of doctrine, which

[1] See, for example, Harriet Fast and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979, p. 37, where doctrine is described as "the military policy of the Communist party [which] governs the actions of the leadership of the armed forces"; and John J. Dziak, *Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice*, New York, Crane, Russak, and Company, 1981, p. 21, where military doctrine is described as "party writ ... the policy of the Party-State—worked out by the political leadership—on the nature of future war...."

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 15, 1960.

[3] See, for example, US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Soviet Defense Expenditures and Related Programs*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on General Procurement, 96th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1980, pp. 29–55; and US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, pp. 71–81.

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focuses upon the deployment and combat employment of military forces. There is no evidence of attempts by the party leadership to tinker with force structure decisions, as Khrushchev tried to do during his final years in power. Indeed, current Chief of Staff Nikolay Ogarkov's reported role in the SALT I negotiations is indicative not only of the close hold with which the military treats information on Soviet weapons systems, but also of the general parochialism of the Soviet military leadership and of its keen desire to protect what it feels to be its decision-making prerogatives.[4]

In neglecting this record, the conventional wisdom in this area is misleading. For example, Harriet and William Scott, in their standard reference work on the subject, see the third stage of Soviet military doctrine as extending from January 1960 (that is, from Khrushchev's speech) to the present.[5] In fact, the doctrine extant today is Khrushchevian only to the extent of its partial reliance upon nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The former leader's de-emphasis of a surface navy, manned bombers, and mass armies has been totally swept aside in favor of a strong emphasis on combined-arms warfare—warfare using all the nation's armed forces in whatever weapons regime is dictated by circumstances, whether conventional or nuclear. As a party leader meddling in military doctrine, Khrushchev was the last of a line; moreover, the doctrine he propounded was itself an uncomfortable aberration in the Soviet pattern.

It is more correct to see the beginnings of contemporary doctrine in the "Special Collection" cited by Oleg Penkovskiy[6] and given public form by Malinovskiy in his speech to the 22nd Party Congress that met in October 1961. Malinovskiy argued that victory could be achieved only through the "joint action of all the services of the Armed Forces."[7] This combined-arms doctrine, with its stress upon a nuclear war–fighting capability, continues to be given expression and definition by Soviet military writers and spokesmen, from Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy to Ogarkov. It has not been the subject of detailed public statements by the party leadership, who appear willing to leave this critical area to the theoreticians of the Soviet High Command. No party leader has publicly challenged the necessity of being prepared to wage nuclear war, though many have decried its destructiveness. Party and military leaders alike view a future world war as likely to be nuclear,[8] and agree on the necessity of dealing any "aggressor" a "decisive rebuff."

In other words, the party leadership has lately commented only upon the purely political aspect of Soviet military doctrine, and only in very general terms at that. The military, for its part, has also undertaken to comment upon the political component of doctrine, usually referring to the need to consider the "military-political situation." There is no clear wall separating this political component from the military-technical one, as far as the military leadership is concerned. It does not feel constrained from commenting upon the former aspect, even if the party apparently does feel constrained from elaborating upon the latter. Indeed, commentary upon the military-technical side of Soviet military doctrine has been the exclusive province of the military. And, as the Scotts concede, it is that side of military doctrine which "best explains Soviet moves in the international arena."[9]

If the military is the primary elaborator of the details of Soviet military doctrine, this is mainly because its leadership continues to possess a near monopoly on the information and skills necessary to make the doctrine work. This is not to deny the enhanced competence of certain party leaders to make decisions on national defense issues through such bodies as the Defense Council and the Politburo. Ultimate authority on security matters continues to reside within these organs. Still, not even the most knowledgeable Politburo member—whose concerns must extend beyond the military sphere to include vital domestic issues as well—can compete with the depth and detail of knowledge possessed by a military leader like Ogarkov. In the absence of a conscious party effort to alter this situation, the disparity is likely to grow as the military command becomes master of increasingly complex weapons technology. The military may not enjoy a total monopoly on military knowledge, but it does occupy a position of unchallenged preeminence. As a result, while the party may provide a skeleton for Soviet military doctrine, it is the military itself that provides the organs and the flesh which give this doctrine life.

The military's dominant role in the formulation of Soviet military doctrine should not, of course, be taken to imply that the Soviet High Command has usurped party prerogatives or achieved independence

[4]Anthony Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983, p. 192.

[5]Scott and Scott, op. cit., pp. 41–49.

[6]Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers*, trans. by Peter Deriabin, New York, Doubleday and Company, 1965.

[7]Cited in Scott and Scott, p. 43.

[8]See, for example, Nikolay Ogarkov, "Military Strategy," in *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol. 7, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1979, p. 564.

[9]Scott and Scott, op. cit., p. 59.

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from the party. Rather, the party leadership appears content with this division of labor. It certainly cannot offer any meaningful alternative; there is no influential clique of civilian military theoreticians (as there is in the West) to challenge the military's expertise. From the party leadership's perspective, this arrangement should not constitute grounds for alarm, for the party must still place its imprimatur on whatever the military proposes and make the final decisions about whether or not the nation goes to war.

This issue of Soviet military autonomy is a crucial one, for it could raise fundamental questions about Soviet foreign policy goals and means for achieving them. A hypothetical Soviet polity dominated by a military leadership—especially one that has let it be known it believes victory in nuclear war to be "objectively" possible[10]—is not a comforting prospect. But has the military in fact attained autonomy? If that condition is defined as complete freedom to pursue organizational goals independently of other actors in the system, then the Soviet military clearly has not achieved autonomy, nor is it ever likely to do so.[11] However, if autonomy is viewed as a continuum on which organizations can achieve greater or lesser freedom of action in the conduct of affairs related to their areas of responsibility or expertise, it becomes much easier to view the Soviet military's involvement in doctrinal issues as a measure of increased autonomy in at least that aspect of Soviet defense policymaking. Autonomy by this definition does not necessarily entail a threat to system stability, as long as the party retains ultimate political authority.

Military Decision-Making on Doctrine

Once the Soviet military has been identified as the chief elaborator of military doctrine, one must establish the locus of doctrinal thinking within the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Defense. There is only one organ with the organization and resources necessary to tackle the complex task of developing, refining, and improving Soviet military doctrine and military science: the Soviet General Staff.

Western literature on the Soviet military usually tends to gloss over the role of the General Staff. The focus of such writings is usually upon the Defense Council and the Ministry of Defense, with the General Staff treated as but one organ—though an important one—of the latter. Even in Western studies of the Soviet command and control system, relatively little attention is devoted to the critical role of the General Staff; the command and control nets are treated as if they were independent entities, rather than the nervous system connecting the forces in the field to the General Staff.[12] This analysis, instead, emphasizes the preeminent role of the General Staff with respect to the other organs of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The powers of the General Staff far exceed those of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, the closest analogue to the Soviet General Staff is probably the German General Staff up to the end of World War II.

Soviet descriptions of the General Staff leave little doubt as to its central role in the formulation of Soviet strategy, including the military-technical component of the country's military doctrine. One Soviet officer characterizes that component as concerned with

questions of organization, training, and employment of the armed forces in war, determin[ing] *the major trends for combat employment, the technical equipping, and the organizational structure of the armed forces; the development of military art, and the requirements for the combat training of troops and their combat readiness.*[13]

"This aspect of military doctrine," continues the author, "is much more dynamic when compared with its political aspect"—and it is, by other Soviet accounts, determined primarily by the General Staff. For example, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, Chief of the General Staff from 1971 to 1977, described that organ (borrowing the title of Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov's monumental study[14]) as the "brain of the army" which "directs the development of theory ... [and] solves current problems of Soviet military science." Kulikov then recited a

[10]See, e.g., Ogarkov, loc. cit.

[11]This appears to be the definition of autonomy used by William Odom to dismiss any suggestion of increased political influence on the part of the military. In his view there can be no military preeminence in the formulation of military doctrine, for that would challenge the Soviet system as a whole. William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978, p. 40.

[12]Harriet Fast and William F. Scott, *The Soviet Control Structure: Capabilities for Wartime Survival*, New York, Crane, Russak, and Company, 1983, pp. 53–56. The importance of the General Staff is not really spelled out in any detail in this volume, however. There is a cursory description of the directorates of the General Staff and a brief assertion that the General Staff has "responsibilities for all the forces and activities of the Ministry of Defense." A somewhat more comprehensive view of the General Staff's role appears in John Hemsley, *Soviet Troop Control: The Role of Command Technology in the Soviet Military System*, Oxford, Brassey's Publishers, 1982, pp. 29–30. Nevertheless, Hemsley also falls short of recognizing the Staff's preeminence in Soviet military planning and operational activities.

[13]Army General S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *Voyennaya Mysl'* (Moscow), May 1969, trans. in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Eds., *Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963–1973*, Studies in Communist Affairs, Vol. 5, Part II, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 24.

[14]Boris M. Shaposhnikov, *Mozg armii* (The Brain of the Army), 3 vols., Moscow, 1924.

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list of tasks that go a bit beyond the above-stated concern with just the military-technical component of doctrine:

The General Staff comprehensively analyzes and evaluates the developing military-political situation, determines the trends in the development of the means of waging war and the methods of their application, organizes the training of the Armed Forces, and ensures their high combat readiness to repel any aggression.[15]

A more recent and more subtle indication of the General Staff's increased importance can be found in the new Military Encyclopedic Dictionary published by the Ministry of Defense, whose editorial commission was chaired by Chief of the General Staff Marshal Ogarkov. The relevant entry notes the "enhanced" role of the General Staff in the postwar years in ensuring the country's "reliable defense." More significant, the dictionary notes the expanded role of the General Staff vis-à-vis the other organs of the ministry:

The General Staff coordinates the activities of the services of the Armed Forces, the Rear, Civil Defense of the USSR, and the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense.[16]

This should be compared with the description of the General Staff authored by Marshal Kulikov that appeared in the 1975 Soviet Military Encyclopedia:

In the postwar years the General Staff . . . ensures the coordination of the activities of the main staffs of the services of the Armed Forces, the staff of the Rear Services, the staff of Civil Defense of the USSR, and the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense.[17]

In this description, the General Staff merely ensures the coordination of the *staffs* of the defense ministry's organs. Ogarkov's 1983 account, by contrast, argues that the General Staff directly coordinates the activities of the organs themselves, not just the activities of their staffs. This change cannot be explained merely as an omission for the sake of brevity, for it clearly suggests an expanded role for the General Staff.

Indeed, the General Staff now seems to be the executant of the defense minister's formal authority within his ministry. According to a 1978 history of the Soviet Armed Forces, the defense minister "directs" *(rukovodit')* those forces through the General Staff and the main and central directorates.[18] Since the General Staff coordinates the activities of those directorates, it appears to exercise considerable authority on behalf of Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov. In a similar vein, Soviet listings of the defense ministry's organs always place the General Staff in first position—ahead, for example, of the Main Political Administration, led by Gen. Aleksey Yepishev, which enjoys the authority of a department of the CPSU Central Committee.[19] While the latter fulfills the important task of political indoctrination of Soviet troops, its role in the broader operational control of the armed forces can safely be described as minimal at best. In short, there is no institution within the Ministry of Defense (other than the minister himself) that exercises greater authority than does the General Staff.

In his capacity as chief of that staff, then, Ogarkov functions as Ustinov's second-in-command; the former, according to Michael Sadykiewicz, actually "deputizes for the Minister of Defense in his absence."[20] As the individual responsible for coordinating the activities of all organs of the ministry, with more operational experience and knowledge than the management-oriented Ustinov, Orgarkov is probably the best-informed member of the defense hierarchy. Sadykiewicz asserts—not implausibly, given Ogarkov's responsibility to keep on top of all matters within the ministry—that the Chief of the General Staff must countersign "each draft of the Minister's instructions, orders, or dispositions before it is signed by the Minister himself." Ogarkov, according to this account, must also approve the drafts of all 14 deputy ministers of defense before they are sent forward to Ustinov, thus assuring the former's "prior knowledge of all the important matters presented to the Minister of Defense."[21]

All this, of course, does not mean that Ogarkov has acquired more political power than Ustinov or usurped his position as top Soviet military spokesman. Ustinov is clearly Ogarkov's superior in both the political and military hierarchies; and, as a full member of the Politburo and former long-time overseer of de-

[15]Viktor G. Kulikov, "The Brain of the Army," *Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1974.

[16]"The General Staff," in *Voyennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar*, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1983, p. 186.

[17]"The General Staff," in *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 2, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, p. 513.

[18]S. A. Tyushkevich, *Sovetskiye vooruzhennyye sily* (The Soviet Armed Forces), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1978, p. 465.

[19]See, for example, *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 5, p. 295; and *Upravleniye v oblasti administrativno-politicheskoy deyatel'nosti* (Management in Regional Administrative-Political Activities), Moscow, Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1979, p. 40.

[20]Michael Sadykiewicz, "Soviet Military Politics," *Survey* (London), Winter 1982, p. 203.

[21]Ibid, p. 204.

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fense industry, Ustinov wields more real power in the Soviet party and state. (For example, he apparently was a central player in the 1982 Andropov accession,[22] though his role in Chernenko's subsequent rise to power is less clear.) Nevertheless, on military doctrine and related matters, Orgarkov's professional competence may well give him a decisive voice.

Since 1977, significantly, the chief of the General Staff has been second only to the minister of defense in protocol rankings, altering a long-standing tradition in which the commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces stood in second position. This reflects not only Ogarkov's personal competence, but the greatly enhanced institutional position of the General Staff as well.

The strong influence of the General Staff is perhaps best exemplified in arms control (specifically SALT I) negotiations. Most students of Soviet military affairs concede a significant role to the Soviet General Staff in the preparation and defense of substantive Soviet positions presented during those negotiations.[23] Because the Staff plays a key role in Soviet weapons procurement, military planning, and strategic intelligence assessment, it is in a unique position to defend the interests of the Soviet military on arms control issues. Ogarkov himself was the senior Soviet military delegate to SALT I (at a time when he was also serving as a first deputy chief of the General Staff); and the Soviet military delegation as a whole largely reflected the influence of the General Staff. In turn, the heavy representation on that Staff of officers with strong operational backgrounds ensures that any arms control decisions will take into account their desire to field the forces necessary for some future war. And, in fact, the limitations on Soviet strategic weapons imposed by the SALT agreements appear to have had little if any impact upon Soviet weapons programs.[24]

General Staff Structure

The General Staff consists of a number of directorates and departments organized along functional lines.[25] The most important of the General Staff's suborgans is the Main Operations Directorate, or GOU *(Glavnoye Operativnoye Upravleniye)*. This directorate is probably headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Army General V. I. Varennikov. According to one of his predecessors, Army General S. M. Shtemenko, during World War II the Main Operations Directorate was responsible for planning all operations, collecting and analyzing information on the battle situation at the various fronts, and checking fulfillment of the orders and directives of the Supreme High Command.[26] More recent accounts suggest that this directorate is now also concerned with developing targeting and war plans and helping to formulate general military policy. Some Western analysts, for instance, argue that the Main Operations Directorate oversaw the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—an assertion which is entirely plausible, given the directorate's responsibilities for operational military planning.[27] As for broader doctrinal responsibilities, it is logical that the directorate with far-reaching planning and control responsibilities within the defense ministry would also have a key role to play in defining military-technical aspects of doctrine. Thus, the Main Operations Directorate is probably the central player within the General Staff in the formulation of the specific force structure–related details of contemporary Soviet military doctrine. For example, the center of General Staff activity on SALT I appears to have been the Arms Control Section (or Department) of the Main Operations Directorate.[28] One Western expert claims that the directorate played a major role in drafting "substantive parameters for SALT and other arms control proposals."[29]

The arms control organization within the General Staff appears to have undergone some changes over the past several years. First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev emerged as a major military spokesman on arms control issues after assuming that position in 1979.[30] Before that Akhromeyev was reportedly chief

[22]William E. Odom, "Choice and Change in Soviet Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May–June 1983, p. 4.

[23]See, for example, Edward L. Warner III, *The Soviet Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis*, New York, Praeger, 1977; and Thomas W. Wolfe, *The SALT Experience*, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1979.

[24]Mark E. Miller, *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority*, Washington, DC, Advanced International Studies Institute, 1982, pp. 176–81.

[25]The General Staff Directorates today appear to be as follows: Main Operations, International Negotiations, Main Intelligence, Main Organization-Mobilization, Military Science, General Staff Academy, External Relations, Main Foreign Military Assistance, Communications, Central Military Topographic, Cryptography, Personnel, Administrative, and the Main Directorate for Warsaw Pact Affairs. Scott and Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, p. 110; US Defense Intelligence Agency, *Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces*, DDB–2680–40–78, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, February 1978, pp. 2–5; and personal conversations of the author with former General Petro Grigorenko, spring 1980.

[26]S. M. Shtemenko, *General'nyy shtab v gody voyny* (The General Staff in the War Years), Vol. 1, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1981, p. 186.

[27]Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race*, New York, Praeger, 1972, p. 39.

[28]Warner, op. cit., pp. 240–43.

[29]Wolfe, op cit., p. 63.

[30]For a recent example of Akhromeyev's activities in this capacity, see *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 15, 1983.

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of the Main Operations Directorate, where he may have overseen the activities of the Arms Control Section. His continued statements on arms control indicate that he may now be in charge of a separate directorate within the General Staff responsible for international negotiations. The existence of such a directorate would be consistent with the Soviet emphasis on arms control despite the twists and turns in Soviet-American relations over the years. Its existence is also suggested by the presence of a Legal and Treaty Department, headed by General Nikolay F. Chervov, within the General Staff. Chervov has been a frequent commentator on INF issues;[31] but the title of his department is not consistent with this function, suggesting its subordination to a larger body responsible for international negotiations within the General Staff. If that larger body exists, and if it is indeed headed by Akhromeyev (the only first deputy chief of the General Staff to hold marshal's rank), it reinforces indications of a major role for the General Staff in arms control and other international issues related to Soviet military doctrine.[32]

Perhaps the most direct aspect of the General Staff's involvement in the formation of Soviet military doctrine, though, is its responsibility for developing Soviet military science—the study of the phenomena of armed combat in order to determine the means for achieving victory in war. Soviet military spokesmen state unequivocally that military science interacts with doctrine. According to one influential Soviet military volume:

On its military technical side it [*doctrine*] *relies on conclusions and recommendations "selected" by military science. In turn, doctrine evolved on the basis of military scientific data has a tremendous organizing and mobilizing effect on the development of the Armed Forces and all military affairs....*

History shows that military doctrine becomes more scientifically sound, objective and, therefore, more vital, the greater its reliance on the objective evaluations and conclusions of military science.[33]

Within the General Staff there are two organs principally responsible for the development of Soviet military science, although all Staff directorates and departments are theoretically responsible for contributing to its growth. The two principal organs are the Military Science Directorate and the Voroshilov General Staff Academy. Other military academies (particularly the Frunze Academy) also play a role in developing military science, and the General Staff coordinates their involvement in this area through the various services and through the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions.

The Voroshilov Academy, according to its official history, had as of 1976 over 150 military scientists engaged in the preparation of textbooks and training manuals and in the "elaboration of the major problems of military science and the art of warfare."[34] The Academy sponsors military scientific conferences dealing with a variety of issues, conducts war games, and disseminates the results of its studies throughout the armed forces. The most immediate benefits of such research are, of course, passed on to current students at the Academy, senior field-grade officers destined to hold high-level operational commands. According to Marshal Kulikov, the focus of the Academy's military scientific endeavors during the period 1965–76 included the "elaboration of theory" on the "organizational development" and "operational-strategic employment" of the armed forces, examination of the "problem of troop control," and analysis of the "postwar development of military affairs, taking into account the experience of the local wars of imperialism."[35] When such statements are matched with the military reorganization that has reportedly taken place in recent years,[36] and with the qualitative improvements in Soviet command and control techniques,[37] they suggest the scope of the Academy's efforts to perfect and apply Soviet military science.

The Military Science Directorate reportedly oversaw the publication of the famous "Special Collection" of documents that led to the development of the revised Soviet military doctrine of the 1960's.[38] This director-

[31]Chervov was especially active in the summer and early fall of 1983, just before the first deployments of NATO Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. His views appeared frequently in East European newspapers, and he visited West Germany and the Netherlands. See, e.g., *Izvestiya*, Oct. 12, 1983.

[32]The evolution of that doctrine also depends upon an accurate assessment of enemy capabilities and dispositions. The General Staff organ charged with that task is the Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU *(Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye)*, headed by I. Ivashutin, former deputy chairman of the KGB. His directorate is responsible for coordinating the intelligence gathering activities of the five services of the Armed Forces; it also coordinates these activities closely with the KGB. See US Department of the Air Force, *Soviet Aerospace Handbook*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 16. For a detailed, though somewhat dated, description of the organization of the GRU, see Penkovskiy, op. cit. pp. 71–93.

[33]S. N. Kozlov, Ed., *The Officer's Handbook*, trans. and published under the auspices of the US Air Force as No. 13 in the Soviet Military Thought series, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 64.

[34]V. G. Kulikov, *Akademiya general'nogo shtaba* (The General Staff Academy), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, pp. 14–15.

[35]Ibid., p. 203.

[36]See US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, esp. ch. 3.

[37]See Hemsley, op. cit.

[38]Scott and Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, p. 46.

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ate, established in 1959, sponsors military scientific conferences and a variety of relevant publications, probably including the restricted journal of the General Staff, *Voyennaya mysl'* (Military Thought).

Still other key concerns of the military-technical component of Soviet military doctrine involve the organizational structure best suited for effectively prosecuting a war and the manpower necessary to flesh out that structure prior to the onset of hostilities. Such tasks are the responsibilities of the Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate—the third General Staff directorate whose activities interact with evolving Soviet military doctrine in a major way. As is the case with the other organs of the General Staff, relatively little is known about this directorate, but Sokolovskiy has given an indication of the scope of some of its likely functions:

The General Staff determines the time required to develop a comprehensive mobilization plan and gives dispatching data for planning to the military districts, troops, and military registration and enlistment offices only after the government has made its decisions concerning the scope of the mobilized Armed Forces and the rate of involvement of natural resources.[39]

Shtemenko, too, provides some insight into the responsibilities of this directorate. He notes the numerous organizational changes made necessary by the course of combat and the arrival of new weapons and personnel in 1943, and argues that such changes "could not be decided apart from the General Staff." Unfortunately, there was an overlap between the General Staff and GLAVUPRAFORM, the Main Directorate for Forming and Bringing Up to Strength the Forces of the Red Army, created as an entity directly subordinate to the Stavka (the supreme Soviet military-civilian strategic staff during World War II) in 1941. The exigencies of combat, however, eventually made it necessary to revive the Organization Department within the General Staff, with responsibility for "drafting organizational and other directives, for follow-up on their implementation, and for keeping track of the forces at the fronts." Consequently, GLAVUPRAFORM suffered a loss of power, although it temporarily maintained an Organization and Personnel Department. Despite these changes, there remained a number of structural redundancies until May 1943, when GLAVUPRAFORM was disbanded and all its functions transferred to the General Staff.[40] The officers of the newly created Organization Department worked closely with the operations officers—of whom Shtemenko was chief—and the information they provided was crucial to the planning of future operations. According to Shtemenko:

They could always answer one's questions as to the size of any division on any sector of the front, its losses, and the time it would take to get new troops. And they could provide similar data on any corps, army, or front, or for the Armed Forces as a whole. About reserves, they knew exactly where, how, and in what strength they were being formed, their degree of combat readiness, the locations en route to the front, etc. The hard-working organization officers were the right hand of the operations officers.[41]

Under contemporary conditions, when the Soviets stress the need for preparing for war ahead of time in order to avoid a repeat of the disaster of June 1941, the importance of the Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate has probably grown apace. The directorate must keep track of increasingly complex formations, compute losses in the fog of war, and satisfy projected manpower needs in the midst of intensive, possibly nuclear, combat conditions. It must also keep tabs on the multimillion-man reserve force and be prepared to draw these individuals back into the active armed forces at virtually a moment's notice. In sum, the Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate has a vital role to play—in combination with the other General Staff organs described above—in preparing for some future war.

The General Staff and the Defense Council

Whether or not the chief of the General Staff is also a member of the Defense Council—the especially secretive high-level body that presumably has ultimate authority over Soviet strategy—continues to be a source of contention. Sadykiewicz, along with a number of other scholars and analysts, asserts that there are no military representatives on the Council, notwithstanding Ogarkov's vast responsibilities within the Ministry of Defense. (Ustinov is not included in the category of military members, since he is not a professional military officer.) But Ogarkov probably is called on frequently to attend Defense Council meetings, given his keen grasp of the relevant issues. Therefore,

[39]V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, trans. and ed. by Harriet Fast Scott, New York, Crane, Russak, and Company, 1975, p. 312.

[40]S. M. Shtemenko, *The Last Six Months*, trans. by Guy Daniels, New York, Doubleday, 1977, pp. 5–7.

[41]Ibid., p. 8.

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even if he is not a formal member, his viewpoint undoubtedly carries great weight. Indeed, Sadykiewicz claims that Ogarkov's "opinion may have crucial influence on the resolutions and decisions" of the Defense Council, because he is the "principal representative of the strategic interests of the Ministry of Defense, and often of the entire body of the Soviet armed forces."[42]

Another viewpoint suggesting that the Chief of the General Staff exercises great influence on the Defense Council argues that Ogarkov—along with the other first deputy ministers of defense—is actually a full member of that body. The best evidence for this comes from a Soviet scholar who asserted that there were more military members on the Defense Council than on the Politburo. Since there is only one "military" member of the Politburo—Ustinov—there must be other members of the High Command on the Defense Council, if the source is correct. The logical candidates are the first deputy ministers of defense. Their membership can also be inferred from scattered references to them as leading military and "state" figures—a formula implying membership in a formal state body, probably the Defense Council.[43]

A third argument focuses on staff support for the Defense Council, regardless of whether or not Ogarkov is a member. There is no evidence that the Council is supported by its own staff agency or secretariat. This tends to confirm the lack of a role for the Defense Council in the day-to-day leadership of the armed forces; instead, such leadership devolves upon the ministry of defense and its executive agent, the General Staff. The Defense Council may therefore depend upon the General Staff for necessary staff support functions. If true, this clearly puts the General Staff in a position to set the agenda and formulate the options to be discussed at the Council's meetings.[44]

All three of the preceding arguments would probably agree on one point: the General Staff—through its influence on the Defense Council, direct or indirect—is in a good position to shape not just the military-technical but also the political dimension of Soviet military doctrine. The intense involvement of the General Staff in such matters as arms control makes that body indispensable to the Defense Council. And it is very probably the Defense Council, according to one Western expert, that "approves doctrinal and strategic formulations."[45] In performing that task, the Council appears to depend heavily upon the General Staff and its agencies for the vital information on Soviet forces and capabilities necessary to make decisions consistent with Soviet national interests.

Implications for the Future

The General Staff's reach now extends throughout the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Nearly all high-level commanders are graduates of the Staff Academy, and their careers appear to be regulated as much by the General Staff Personnel Directorate as by the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. This officer corps possesses greatly enhanced technical competence compared to its predecesors. It is also an officer corps increasingly confident of the capabilities of its forces and the perspicacity of its strategy, despite its current problems in Afghanistan. Ogarkov himself, of course, typifies this self-assurance—as displayed in the highly unusual press conference he gave after his forces shot down a Korean Air Lines passenger plane in September 1983.[46]

On a larger scale, the prerequisites of a superpower status based almost wholly upon military power could compel the party leadership to accord the military ever greater autonomy in military affairs.[47] As long as military strength remains the *ultima ratio* in Soviet perceptions of national power and prestige, the military will have a strong, even determinant say in the formulation of Soviet military doctrine. And as long as this doctrine dictates that the entire system must prepare itself in peacetime for the contingency of global nuclear war, it is the General Staff that will continue to

[42]Sadykiewicz, loc. cit., pp. 204–05.

[43]This argument also asserts that the Defense Council, not the Main Military Council, would become the wartime Stavka. The assertion is based largely on World War II precedent, when the State Defense Committee, the GKO, was composed exclusively of civilians while the Stavka included both civilian and military members. It is postulated that in wartime another body similar to the GKO would be formed from members of the ruling Politburo. For the clearest statement of this argument, see Tommy L. Whitton, "Soviet Strategic Wartime Leadership," in Gregory Varhall and Kenneth M. Currie, Eds., *The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead?* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, forthcoming. The Soviet scholar cited was Nikolay Inozemtsev, then head of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO).

Another student of Soviet affairs who believes the Defense Council would become the Stavka is John Hemsley; op. cit, p. 60. The Scotts, however, argue that in wartime the Main Military Council would become the new Stavka—an assertion that ignores the relatively limited and exclusive membership of the Stavka during World War II. They also maintain the Defense Council could be transformed into the GKO in wartime. See Scott and Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, pp. 98 and 100.

[44]Arthur J. Alexander, *Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, Adelphi Papers, Nos. 147–148, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, p. 16. David Holloway argues similarly that the General Staff may serve as the "secretariat" for the Defense Council. See his *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1983, p. 111.

[45]Alexander, op. cit., p. 15.

[46]For the text of Ogarkov's initial statement on the KAL incident, see Foreign Brodadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Sept. 9, 1983, pp. DD/1–3. For the full transcript of his press conference, see ibid., Sept. 12, 1983, pp. DD/10–34.

[47]Roman Kolkowicz, *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp. 245–47.

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enjoy the decisive role in explicating Soviet strategy. Thus—barring an unforeseen radical shift in Soviet perceptions of the utility of military power as an instrument of foreign policy—the influence of the General Staff within the Ministry of Defense will very likely remain great.

These factors augur well for the Soviet professional military leadership in the coming years. At the same time, they could pose a problem for the party leadership. The preeminence of the General Staff under Ogarkov—its probable oversight of virtually every activity of the Ministry of Defense, and its influence at the highest levels of military decision-making in the USSR—may produce the elitist, exclusivist mindset about which Roman Kolkowicz argues the party must at some point become concerned.[48] This is not to say the party is already casting wary glances over its shoulder for the "man on the white horse." Nevertheless, by surrendering certain prerogatives to military leadership, the party is creating the conditions for ever greater military involvement in policymaking, or even (should the party be beset by an acute internal or external crisis) military intervention to preserve the Soviet state and the High Command's prerogatives within it. The party gives no indication of concern about this problem, however.

Such speculation aside, what is the likely near-term future of the General Staff? Its prestige is likely to be still further enhanced if (as now appears likely) Ogarkov is selected as the next minister of defense—possibly within the coming few years, considering the age of Marshal Ustinov. Given Ogarkov's solid background in operational and technical matters, his established stature as a strategic thinker,[49] and his clear-cut position as second-in-command of the ministry, he emerges as the obvious choice for the defense portfolio. In this context, it is perhaps significant that it was Ogarkov, rather than Ustinov, who identified Chernenko as the new head of the Defense Council in early 1984.[50] Although it can be argued that Ogarkov, as defense minister, might choose to downgrade the role of the General Staff in order to consolidate undisputed authority, more likely he will continue to boost the status of that body and use it as one of his primary instruments of power.

Altogether, to paraphrase Alfred Meyer,[51] it is not too difficult to envisage a situation in which the entire defense ministry functions in essence as a General Staff "writ large." The global scale and complexity of Soviet military operations argue for an effective central command and control organ, and the General Staff under Ogarkov has performed that role admirably. It has dealt effectively with all sorts of crucial matters, from arms control to military assistance, from nuclear targeting to esoteric military science. It is quite clearly the center of activity within the Ministry of Defense. Beyond that, the Soviet General Staff may take on the characteristics of many such organs in the past; it may come, in the words of another Western observer, to "possess, accumulate, and exercise vast—although often indirect—power in the social, political, and economic activities"[52] of the entire Soviet state.

[48] Idem, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 21.

[49] For example, Ogarkov authored the article on Soviet military strategy in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, the most authoritative statement on the subject to appear since the publication of Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy*. See *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 7, pp. 555–65. Also, see Ogarkov's *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982, in which he discusses the need for the Soviets to think of contemporary warfare in terms of the theater of military operations, or *TVD*.

[50] "Chernenko May Have Taken Post of Chief of Defense Council," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 28, 1984.

[51] Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System: an Interpretation*, New York, Random House, 1965, p. 468.

[52] J. D. Hittle, *The Military Staff: Its History and Development*, Harrisburg, PA, Military Service Publishing Company, 1961, p. 7.

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Checklist of Communist Parties in 1983

EDITORS' NOTE: As a service to scholarship, we present, by arrangement with Richard F. Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, the latest version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties," covering developments in 1983. This Checklist continues a series presented in Hoover's *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA)* since 1976, and jointly published with *Problems of Communism* since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of that which is to appear in the 1984 edition of the *YICA*. The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.

By Richard F. Staar

IN AN INTERVIEW broadcast over Moscow domestic television on September 27, 1983, Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the International Department in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), stated that 97 countries have communist parties and that the total number of members in these organizations is "nearly 80 million." While the figures may not be definitive, we are inclined to believe that they more or less accurately represent the dimensions of the world communist movement as viewed by Moscow. The figures represent an increase of three countries and 3 million members over those provided by the late General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981.[1]

As suggested in the commentary accompanying last year's Checklist, the editorial board of the magazine *Problems of Peace and Socialism* in Prague is the only ongoing international body joining representatives from the bulk of these communist parties. Yet, it is important not to lose sight of other important instrumentalities by which Moscow attempts to control the different elements of this vast array of communist organizations. Foremost among these are the International Department and the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, both in the CPSU Central Committee. Other means include periodic meetings of first and other secretaries and military leaders of East European communist parties with their Soviet counterparts and bilateral, regional, and worldwide meetings of representatives of both ruling and non-ruling communist parties.

The Checklist offered below focuses on the

Richard F. Staar, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, has resumed editorship of Hoover's Yearbook on International Communist Affairs *after having served as US Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna from 1981 to 1983. His monograph on Soviet foreign policy will be published in 1985.* *He is indebted to Dennis L. Bark, Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Thomas H. Henriksen, Ramon H. Myers, William E. Ratliff, and Margit N. Grigory—all members of the* Yearbook *editorial board—for their contributions to this essay.*

[1] Zagladin's interview is translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 30, 1983, p. CC/1; cf. *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

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Moscow-recognized communist parties in what we take to be the 97 countries mentioned by Zagladin. It is assumed that this number includes Guadeloupe, Martinique, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Réunion, and West Berlin—none of which is an independent country but each of which has its own "independent" communist party (a form of self-ascription in which Moscow seems to concur). In Australia, India, New Zealand, Sweden, and (apparently) Spain, Moscow recognizes two parties.[2]

In addition, we provide information on the nine parties termed "vanguard revolutionary democratic" by the Soviets: those in Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Mozambique, and South Yemen (Yemen—Aden). None of these parties has become sufficiently organized in a Leninist mold to be recognized as "communist" by the CPSU, or even to use the word in its formal name. However, they are deemed by the Soviets the ones most likely to evolve into full-fledged communist parties.[3] Some seem less likely than others: in Ethiopia the Commission for the Organization of the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) has not really established a viable governing party as an alternative to the military organized in the Derg, and in Bahrain, we have only a weak underground movement (in fact the only non-ruling one of the nine parties), albeit one that refers to itself as communist and regularly participates in meetings together with the communist parties of other Arab countries.[4]

The New Jewel Movement of Grenada, noted in the Checklist in italics, is merely a "revolutionary democratic" party in Soviet eyes, i.e., at a lower stage of development than the above nine. In the case of several other countries—Greece, Kampuchea, Norway, and the Philippines—we have also listed (again in italics) certain other significant "communist" or radical leftist parties that are apparently not recognized by Moscow.

The Checklist is organized by geographic region. Where the name of the local communist party is not simply "Communist Party of ____" or "____ Communist Party," we have provided acronyms and a legend. In column 2 is the mid-1983 estimated population of the respective geographic entities. In column 3 is the latest membership figure for the party—the most recent claimed membership or an estimate as of December 31, 1983, if there is no claim or the claim is viewed as inaccurate. In subsequent columns, we list the party's current leader (its secretary general, unless otherwise noted); its legal status (ruling, legal, unrecognized, or outlawed); dates of any congress or national conference held in 1983; and the party's most recent electoral performance (where relevant).

Before looking at developments by region, it might be useful to make some summary observations. The 15 countries ruled by communist parties comprise what Moscow sees as the "world socialist system." Moscow now excludes from this list Kampuchea, whose Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party is, as we have seen, now viewed only as a "vanguard revolutionary democratic" party.[5] These ruling parties include 75 million of the 80 million party members in the Moscow-recognized movement. In addition, communists participate in the governments of Bolivia, France, and Martinique, and provide one of San Marino's two governing captains-regent. Beyond this, there are the seven ruling "vanguard revolutionary democratic" parties noted above (eight if one includes Ethiopia).

Three communist parties were declared illegal during 1983, although one of them regained legality later in the year. On May 4 the Tudeh party in Iran was banned as a treasonous instrument of the Soviet Union.[6] On July 30 the Communist Party of Sri Lanka was banned along with two other leftist parties after communal rioting in that island state, but the party regained legality in September.[7] Finally, the December coup in Nigeria resulted in the banning of all political parties. Revision of the legal status of other parties since the 1982 version of the Checklist reflects new analytical interpretations rather than significant

[2] All but Spain are mentioned in "The World Communist Movement: Yesterday and Today," *Socialism: Theory and Practice* (Moscow), August 1983, pp. 117–22.

Moscow had explicitly taken note of a Catalan Communist Party in *Pravda*, Apr. 17, 1982. With the emergence in early 1984 of the pro-Moscow "Communist Party" (later "Communist Party of the Spanish People"), it is conceivable that the Soviets may recognize three movements in Spain, although it is more likely that the Catalan group has merged into the new national party. The CPSU apparently sent a party delegation to the new party's founding congress in January and, in *Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1984, publicly acknowledged the new party's existence. In response to a complaint from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), the CPSU Central Committee pointedly reminded the former that in "some countries where there are two communist parties (for instance, Sweden and India), the CPSU has relations with both parties." For this exchange, see *Mundo Obrero* (Madrid—organ of the PCE), Feb. 3–9, 1984, pp. 6–7, trans. partly in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC, hereafter *FBIS-WEU*), Feb. 10, 1984, pp. N/1–4, and partly in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 16, 1984, pp. G/2–3.

[3] On the revolutionary democratic parties, see Wallace H. Spaulding, "The Communist Movement and Its Allies," in Ralph M. Goldman, Ed., *Transnational Parties*, Lanham, MD, University of America Press, 1983, pp. 25–60. An earlier version of this chapter was published under the title "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement,'" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1982, pp. 77–82.

[4] See, e.g., an account of such a meeting of the 12 Arab communist parties in *Information Bulletin* (Prague), No. 17, 1983, pp. 47–56.

[5] See, for example, *Socialism: Theory and Practice*, August 1983, pp. 118–19.

[6] *The Washington Post*, May 5, 1983.

[7] See *The New York Times*, July 31, 1983; and Colombo Domestic Service, Oct. 15, 1983, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC), Oct. 17, 1983, p. G/1.

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CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN 1983

B—pro-Beijing; IM—independent, moderate; IR—independent, radical; M—pro-Moscow/ L—legal; O—outlawed; R—ruling; and U—unrecognized.

Africa and the Middle East[a]	Mid-1983 population[b]	Party membership[c]	Party leader[d]	Congress if any	Orientation/ legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[e]
1. Algeria (PAGS)	20,695,000	450 est.	Sadiq Hadjeres	—	M/O	(1982)
A. Angola (MPLA-PT)	7,567,000	31,000 claim	José Eduardo Dos Santos	—	M/R	— (1980); all 203 approved by MPLA
B. Bahrain (NFL/B)	393,000	Negligible	Yusuf al-Hassan al-Ajaji	—	M/O	n/a
C. Benin (PRPB)	3,754,000	200 claim	Mathieu Kerekou	—	M/R	— (1979); all 336 approved by PRPB
D. Congo (PCT)	1,694,000	7,000 est.	Dennis Sassou Ngouesso	—	M/R	— (1979); all 115 approved by PCT
2. Egypt	45,851,000	500 est.	Farid Mujahid	—	M/O	(1979)
E. Ethiopia (COPWE)	31,265,000	2,000 est.	Mengistu Haile Mariam	2nd, Jan. 3–6	M/R[f]	n/a
3. Iran (Tudeh)	42,490,000	No current data	Nureddin Kianuri	—	M/O	3.0 (1980); none
4. Iraq	14,509,000	2,000 est.	Aziz Muhammad	—	M/L	(1980)
5. Israel	3,957,000[g]	1,500 est.	Meir Vilner	—	M/L	3.4 (1981); 4 of 120
6. Jordan	3,436,000	200 est.	Faiq Muhammad Warrad	—	M/O	n/a
7. Lebanon	2,598,000	15,000 est.	George Hawi	—	M/L	— (1972); none
8. Lesotho	1,438,000	No current data	Jacob M. Kena	—	M/O	n/a
9. Morocco (PPS)	22,889,000	2,000 est.	'Ali Yata	3rd, Mar. 25–27	M/L	2.3 (1977); 1 of 264
F. Mozambique (Frelimo)	13,047,000	15,000 claim	Samora Machel	4th, Apr. 26–29	IM/R	— (1977); all 226 approved by Frelimo
10. Nigeria (SWPP)	85,219,000	No current data	(Idi) Dapo Fatogun	—	M/O	— (1983); none
11. Palestine CP	n/a	200 est.	Naim Ashab (?)	—	M/O	n/a
12. Réunion	531,000	10,000 claim	Paul Vergès	—	M/L	32.7 (1983); 16 of 45, none in Paris[h]
13. Saudi Arabia	10,443,000	Negligible	Abd-al-Rahim Salih[i]	—	M/O	n/a
14. Senegal (PIT)	6,335,000	No current data	Seydou Cissoko	—	M/L	— (1983); none
15. Somalia	6,248,000	No current data	Abdurahman Aidid Ahmad	—	M/O	(1979)
16. South Africa	30,938,000	No current data	Moses Mabhida	—	M/O	(1981)
17. Sudan	20,585,000	1,500 est.	Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud Mansur	—	M/O	n/a
18. Syria	9,739,000	5,000 est.	Khalid Bakdash	—	M/L	0.0 (1981); none[j]
19. Tunisia	7,020,000	100 est.	Muhammad Harmel	—	M/L	0.8 (1981); none[j]
G. Yemen—Aden (YSP)	2,086,000	19,000 claim	Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani	—	M/R	— (1978); all 111 approved by YSP
20. Yemen—Sanaa	5,744,000	No current data	(Unknown)	—	M/O	n/a

The Americas[a]	Mid-1983 population[b]	Party membership[c]	Party leader[d]	Congress if any	Orientation/ legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[e]
21. Argentina	29,627,000	70,000 est.	Athos Fava	Extraord., Sept. 5–6	M/L	1.3 (1983); none[k]
22. Bolivia	5,883,000	300 est.[l]	Jorge Kolle Cueto	—	M/L[m]	— (1980); none
23. Brazil	131,305,000	6,000 est.	Giacondo Dias	—	M/U	(1982)[n]
24. Canada	24,882,000	2,500 est.	William Kashtan	—	M/L	.05 (1980); none
25. Chile	11,486,000	20,000 est.	Luís Corvalán	—	M/O	n/a

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The Americas[a] (cont'd)	Mid-1983 population[b]	Party membership[c]	Party leader[d]	Congress if any	Orientation/ legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[e]
26. Colombia	27,663,000	12,000 est.[o]	Gilberto Vieira	—	M/L	1.2 (1982); 4 of 313[j]
27. Costa Rica (PVP)	2,599,000	3,500 est.[p]	Humberto Vargas Carbonell	Extraord., Nov. 12–13	M/L	3.2 (1982); 3 of 57 via United People's coalition
28. Cuba	9,852,000	434,143 claim	Fidel Castro Ruz	—	M/R	— (1981); all 499 approved by PCC
29. Dom. Republic (PCD)	6,248,000	5,000 est.[q]	Narciso Isa Conde	—	M/L	7.1 (1982); none
30. Ecuador	8,811,000	500 est.	Réne Mauge	—	M/L	3.2 (1979); 1 of 71 via Popular Democratic Union
31. El Salvador	4,685,000	500 est.[r]	Shafik Handal	—	M/O	(1982)
Grenada (NJM)	*111,000*	*30,000 claim*	*(Unknown)*[s]	—	*M/L*	*n/a*
32. Guadeloupe	312,000	3,000 est.	Guy Daninthe	—	M/L	22.6 (1983); 11 of 41, 1 of 3 in Paris[h]
33. Guatemala (PGT)	7,714,000	750 est.	Carlos González	—	M/O	(1982)
34. Guyana	834,000	100 est.	Cheddi Jagan	—	M/L	19.5 (1980); 10 of 65[j]
35. Haiti (PUCH)	5,666,000	350 est.	René Theodore	—	M/O	(1979)
36. Honduras	4,276,000	1,500 est.[t]	Rigoberto Padilla Rush	—	M/U	(1981)
37. Jamaica (WPJ)	2,335,000	No current data	Trevor Munroe	—	M/L	Boycotted 1983 elections
38. Martinique	303,000	1,000 est.	Armand Nicolas	8th, Nov. 12–13	M/L	9.1 (1983); 4 of 41, none in Paris[h]
39. Mexico (PSUM)	75,702,000	40,800 claim	Pablo Gómez Alvarez	2nd, Aug. 9–14	IM/L	4.3 (1983); 17 of 400
40. Nicaragua (PSN)[u]	2,812,000	250 est.	Luis Sánchez	—	M/L	n/a
41. Panama (PPP)	2,059,000	750 est.[v]	Rubén Darío Souza	—	M/L	— (1978); none
42. Paraguay	3,526,000	3,500 est.	Antonio Maidana[w]	—	M/O	n/a
43. Peru	19,161,000	2,000 est.	Jorge del Prado	—	M/L	2.8 (1980); 2 of 60
44. Puerto Rico	3,196,520	125 est.	Franklin Irrizarry	—	M/L	— (1980); none
45. United States	234,193,000	17,500 claim	Gus Hall	23rd, Nov. 10–13	M/L	.01 (1980); none
46. Uruguay	2,916,000	7,500 est.	Rodney Arismendi	—	M/O	n/a
47. Venezuela	17,993,000	4,000 est.	Jésus Faría	—	M/L	2.0 (1983); 3 of 195

Asia and the Pacific[a]	Mid-1983 population[b]	Party membership[c]	Party leader[d]	Congress if any	Orientation/ legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[e]
H. Afghanistan (PDPA)	14,177,000	90,000 claim	Babrak Karmal	—	M/R	n/a
48. Australia (CPA)	15,265,000	1,000 est.	Judy Mundey	—	IM/L	— (1980); none
(SPA)		600 est.	Peter Dudley Symon	—	M/L	— (1980); none
49. Bangladesh	96,539,000	3,000 est.	Mohammed Farhad	—	M/L	— (1981); none[x]
50. Burma	37,061,000	3,000 claim	Thakin Ba Thein Tin (Chairman)	—	B/O	n/a
51. China	1,059,802,000	40,000,000 cl.	Hu Yaobang	—	B/R	— (1981); all 3,202 approved by CCP
52. India (CPI)	740,009,000	470,000 claim	C. Rajeswara Rao	—	M/L	2.6 (1980); 12 of 544
(CPM)		270,000 claim	E.M.S. Namboodiripad			6.0 (1980); 36 of 544[j]
53. Indonesia (PKI)	160,932,000	50 est.	Tomas Sinuraya, Secty., Central Committee	—	M/O	(1982)
PKI-Beijing		*200 est.*	*Jusuf Adjitorop*	—	*B/O*	*(1982)*

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Asia and the Pacific[a] (cont'd)	Mid-1983 population[b]	Party membership[c]	Party leader[d]	Congress if any	Orientation/ legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[e]
54. Japan	119,205,000	400,000 est.	Tetsuzo Fuwa	—	IM/L	9.4 (1983); 26 of 511
I. Kampuchea (KRPP)	5,996,000	700 est.	Heng Samrin	—	M/R	99.0 (1981); all 117
(DK)		*No current data*[v]	*Pol Pot*	—	*B/O*	(1981)
55. Korea/North (KWP)	18,802,000	3,000,000 claim	Kim Il-song	—	IR/R	100 (1982); all 615 approved by KWP
56. Laos (LPRP)	3,647,000	35,000 est.	Kaysone Phomvihan	—	M/R	n/a
57. Malaysia (CPM)[z]	14,995,000	1,100 est.	Chin Peng (?)	—	B/O	(1982)
58. Mongolia (MPRP)	1,809,000	76,240 claim	Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal	—	M/R	99.0 (1981); all 370 approved by MPRP
59. Nepal[aa]	16,179,000	200 est.	Bishnu Bahadur Manandhar	—	M/O	n/a
60. New Zealand (CPNZ)	3,142,000	80 est.	Richard C. Wolfe	—	IM/L	— (1981); none[bb]
(SUP)		135 est.	George Jackson	—	M/L	— (1981); none[bb]
61. Pakistan	96,874,000	200 est.	Ali Nazish (a.k.a. Azaz Nasir)	—	M/O[cc]	n/a
62. Philippines (PKP)	53,162,000	400 est.	Felicismo Macapagal	—	M/O	n/a
(CPP-ML/NPA)		*7,500 est.*	*Rafael Baylosis*	—	*IR/O*	*n/a*
63. Sri Lanka	15,647,000	6,000 est.	Kattorge P. Silva	—	M/L	1.9 (1977); 1 of 168[dd]
64. Thailand	50,731,000	3,000 est.	(Unknown)	—	B/O	n/a
65. Vietnam	57,036,000	1,727,784 claim	Le Duan	—	M/R	97.9 (1981); 497 of 538, all 538 approved by VCP

Eastern Europe and the USSR[a]	Mid-1983 population[b]	Party membership[c]	Party leader[d]	Congress if any	Orientation/ legal status	Percentage of vote: seats in legislature[e]
66. Albania (PPSh)	2,846,000	122,000 claim	Enver Hoxha	—	IR/R	99.9 (1982); all 250 to Democratic Front
67. Bulgaria	8,944,000	825,876 claim	Todor Zhivkov	—	M/R	99.9 (1981) all 400 to Fatherland Front
68. Czechoslovakia	15,420,000	1,600,000 claim	Gustav Husák	—	M/R	99.0 (1981); all 350 to National Front
69. East Germany (SED)	16,724,000	2,202,277 claim	Erich Honecker	—	M/R	99.9 (1981); all 500 to National Front
70. Hungary (MSzMP)	10,691,000	852,000 claim	János Kádár	—	M/R	99.3 (1980); all 352 to Patriotic People's Front
71. Poland (PZPR)	36,556,000	2,327,349 claim	Wojciech Jaruzelski	—	M/R	99.5 (1980); all 460 to Fatherland Front
72. Romania	22,649,000	3,300,000 claim	Nicolae Ceauşescu	—	M/R	98.5 (1980); all 369 to Front of Socialist Democracy and Unity
73. USSR	272,308,000	18,331,000 claim	Yuriy Andropov[ee]	—	M/R	99.9 (1979); all 1,500 approved by CPSU
74. Yugoslavia (SKJ)	22,826,000	2,200,627 claim	Mitja Ribičič	—	IM/R	— (1982); all 308 to Socialist Alliance

Western Europe[a]	Mid-1983 poulation[b]	Party membership[c]	Party leader[d]	Congress if any	Orientation/ legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[e]
75. Austria	7,574,000	16,000 claim	Franz Muhri	—	M/L	0.66 (1983); none
76. Belgium	9,865,000	10,000 est.	Louis van Geyt	—	IM/L	2.3 (1981); 2 of 212[j]
77. Cyprus (AKEL)	653,000	14,000 claim	Ezekias Papaioannou	—	M/L	32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats[ff]

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Checklist of Communist Parties in 1983

Western Europe[a] (cont'd)	Mid-1983 poulation[b]	Party membership[c]	Party leader[d]	Congress if any	Orientation/ legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[e]
78. Denmark	5,115,000	10,000 est.	Poul Emanuel (Secretary)	27th, May 12–15	M/L	1.1 (1983); none[gg]
79. Finland	4,850,000	50,000 claim	Arvo Aalto	—	M/L	14.0 (1983); 27 of 200
80. France	54,604,000	710,000 claim	Georges Marchais	—	M/L	16.2 (1981); 44 of 491
81. Great Britain	56,078,000	16,000 est.	Gordon McLennan	38th, Nov. 12–15	IM/L	0.03 (1983); none
82. Greece (KKE)	9,898,000	27,500 est.	Kharilaos Florakis	—	M/L	10.9 (1981); 13 of 300
(KKE-I)		*12,000 est.*	*Yiannis Banias*	—	*IM/L*	*2.7 (1981); none*
83. Iceland (AB)	236,000	3,000 est.	Svavar Gestsson	Annual mtg., November	IM/L	17.3 (1983); 10 of 60
84. Ireland	3,534,000	500 est.	Michael O'Riordan	—	M/L	— (1982); none
85. Italy	56,345,000	1,670,000 claim	Enrico Berlinguer	16th, Mar. 2–6	IM/L	29.9 (1983); 198 of 630
86. Luxembourg	366,000	600 est.	René Urbany	—	M/L	5.0 (1979); 2 of 59
87. Malta	363,000	145 est.	Anthony Vassallo	—	M/L	1.0 (1981); none[j]
88. Netherlands	14,374,000	14,000 est.	Elli Izeboud	—	IM/L	1.9 (1982); 3 of 150[j]
89. Norway (NKP)	4,131,000	500 est.	Hans I. Kleven	—	M/L	0.3 (1981); none
(AKP)		*1,000 est.*	*Paal Steigan*	*3rd, Apr. 4–5*	*B/L*	*0.7 (1981); none*
90. Portugal	10,008,000	187,000 claim	Alvaro Cunhal	10th, Dec. 8–11	M/L	18.0 (1983); 44 of 250
91. San Marino	22,000	300 est.[hh]	Ermenegildo Gasperoni	—	IM/L	24.3 (1983); 15 of 60
92. Spain	38,234,000	100,000 est.[ii]	Gerardo Iglesias	11th, Dec. 14–18	IM/L	3.8 (1982); 4 of 350
(PCC)[jj]		No current data	Pere Ardiaca[kk]	—	M/L	n/a
93. Sweden (VPK)	8,331,000	17,500 claim	Lars Werner	—	IM/L	5.6 (1982); 20 of 349
(APK)		5,000 claim	Rolf Hagel	27th, May	M/L	0.1 (1982); none
94. Switzerland (PdAS)	6,463,000	5,000 est.	Armand Magnin	12th, May 21–22	IM/L	0.9 (1983); 1 of 200
95. Turkey	45,155,000	Negligible	Haydar Kutlu	5th, Oct. or Nov.	M/O	(1983)
96. West Berlin (SEW)	2,000,000	4,500 est.	Horst Schmitt	—	M/L	0.7 (1981); none
97. West Germany (DKP)	61,543,000[ll]	48,856 claim	Herbert Mies	—	M/L	0.2 (1983); none

[a]Arabic numerals indicate the 97 countries in which Moscow apparently recognizes the existence of communist parties. Listed alphabetically with capital letters "A" through "I" are nine countries where there exist what Moscow calls "vanguard revolutionary democratic" parties, i.e., organizations on the verge of evolving into full-fledged communist parties. In italics are assorted important rival Marxist organizations that not recognized by Moscow.

[b]The estimates of the July 1983 population are from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook—1983*, CR 83-11300, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, May 1983.

[c]Usually the figure claimed by the party or by associated communist parties, if available—unless the author of the party's profile for the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* deemed some other estimate more accurate.

[d]Normally the party secretary general except where some other official is the most important one identifiable, in which case his position is noted in parentheses.

[e]An em-dash indicates that the communist party was legal and presumably participated in the election but the percentage of the vote received is not known. Where the party did not participate, the year of the most recent election (where the legislature still sits) is given in parentheses.

[f]COPWE still appears to have to defer to the power of the military comprising the Derg.

[g]This figure does not include persons living in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war.

[h]Under a reform introduced by the Mitterrand government, voters in this overseas department of France now elect, directly and proportionally, members of local assemblies, and, as before, also elect three delegates to the national government in Paris.

[i]His position is not known.

[j]The data reported for the latest election has been updated since last year's Checklist.

[k]The party fielded a presidential candidate, Rubens Iscaro.

[l]Communist sources claim that the Communist Party of Bolivia has 20,000 members—see *horizont* (East Berlin), No. 11, 1982.

[m]Hernán Siles Zuazo appointed two Communists to his government in October 1982.

[n]The Communist Party itself was not allowed to run, but elected several of its members under the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement.

[o]Communist sources claim that the Communist Party of Colombia has 25,000 members—see *horizont*, No. 49, 1980.

[p]Communist sources claim that the Communist Party of Costa Rica has 10,000 members—see *La Nación* (San José), Dec. 27, 1983.

[q]Estimate is a total for some 30 leftist groups in the Dominican Left Front.

[r]The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, in which the Salvadoran Communist Party is a minor member, makes an exaggerated claim of 50,000 members.

[s]Maurice Bishop was murdered in October by radical forces under Bernard Coard. Coard in turn was arrested when the island was occupied a short time later.

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LEGEND OF ACRONYMS

AB	People's Alliance
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
AKP	Communist Workers' Party [Norway]
APK	Communist Workers' Party [Sweden]
COPWE	Commission for the Organization of the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia
CPA	Communist Party of Australia
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPM	Communist Party (Marxist) [India]
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPNZ	Communist Party of New Zealand
CPP–ML/NPA	Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist)/New People's Army
DK	Democratic Kampuchea [formerly Khmer Rouge]
DKP	German Democratic Party
Frelimo	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
KKE	Greek Communist Party
KKE–I	Greek Communist Party (Interior)
KPRP	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
KWP	Korean Workers' Party
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party
MPLA–PT	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Party of Labor
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MSzMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
NJM	New Jewel Movement
NKP	Norwegian Communist Party
NLF/B	National Liberation Front/Bahrain
PAGS	Socialist Vanguard Party
PCC	Catalan Communist Party
PCD	Dominican Communist Party
PCT	Congolese Labor Party
PdAS	Swiss Party of Labor
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PGT	Guatemalan Party of Labor
PIT	Party of Independence and Labor
PKI	Communist Party of Indonesia
PKP	Communist Party of the Philippines
PPP	People's Party of Panama
PPP	People's Progressive Party [Guyana]
PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
PPSh	Albanian Party of Labor
PRPB	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin
PSN	Socialist Party of Nicaragua
PSUM	Unified Socialist Party of Mexico
PUCH	Unified Party of Haitian Communists
PVP	Popular Vanguard Party
PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party
RVP	Revolutionary People's Party
SED	Socialist Unity Party
SEW	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SPA	Socialist Party of Australia
SUP	Socialist Unity Party
SWPP	Socialist Working People's Party
VPK	Left Party Communist
WPJ	Workers' Party of Jamaica
YSP	Yemen Socialist Party

[t]This is a combined estimate for all forces of the Left.

[u]The ruling party of Nicaragua, the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN), is organized on the Cuban model and has close ties with Cuba and other communist governments, but does not acknowledge itself to be a communist party, even though it regularly has party-to-party contacts with the CPSU. The FSLN has an estimated membership of 40,000 and is headed by a nine-member National Directorate.

[v]Communist sources claim that the People's Party of Panama has 36,000 members—see *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), May 5, 1982. The party claimed to have registered 35,906 supporters in anticipation of the 1984 presidential election in Panama—see Panama City National Television, Jan. 23, 1984, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), Jan. 25, 984, p. N/1.

[w]Antonio Maidana was arrested in 1980; there is no indication of his replacement.

[x]The Bangladesh Communist Party supported the presidential candidate of the National Awami Party, Muzaffar Ahmed, in 1981.

[y]Democratic Kampuchea insurgent forces (not all of them party members) are estimated at 30,000—see *The New York Times*, Dec. 12, 1983.

[z]The Communist Party of Malaya also maintains a branch in Singapore with an estimated 200 members; the party does not recognize Singapore's independence from Malaysia.

[aa]The Moscow-approved wing of the party is in the minority. Pro-Beijing factions have an estimated 3,800 members.

[bb]The combined vote for all leftist parties was 0.5 percent.

[cc]The Communist Party of Pakistan is not legal; its members are in the National Progressive Party.

[dd]The Sri Lanka Communist Party won its seat in a January 1981 by-election.

[ee]Andropov died on Feb. 9, 1984; the CPSU Central Committee elected Konstantin Chernenko General Secretary on Feb. 13, 1984.

[ff]AKEL entered into a "minimum program" of cooperation with the Democratic Party to help reelect the DP's Spyros Kyprianou president in February 1983—see *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1983.

[gg]In national elections in early 1984, the Danish Communist Party received only 0.7 percent of the vote.

[hh]Communist sources claim that the Communist Party of San Marino has 1,040 members—see *Neues Deutschland*, Dec. 8, 1980.

[ii]Party membership dropped to an estimated 84,000 in January 1984 as a result of the formation of a pro-Moscow Communist Party of the Spanish People. See fn. "jj."

[jj]This pro-Moscow Catalan splinter within the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) was recognized by *Pravda* (Moscow) on Apr. 17, 1982, and was part of some 25,000 members that split off from the PCE in January 1984, first as the "Communist Party," and subsequently as the "Communist Party of the Spanish People."

[kk]Ardiaca was president of the PCC and was absorbed into the leadership structure of the new Communist Party of the Spanish People in January 1984, under Secretary General Ignacio Gallego.

[ll]The estimate includes the 2,000,000 people of West Berlin.

changes on the scene. Thus, we now consider "illegal" a more appropriate term than "unrecognized" for describing the status of the Algerian and Nigerian communist parties. Similarly, the Iraqi Communist Party does remain formally "legal," despite severe repressions. In Bangladesh, the government's lifting of a ban on opposition political activity presumably applies to the local communist party, and in Honduras the

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party, while still "legal," experienced hardship (including the imprisonment of its secretary general) at the hands of the government.

Reported membership figures continued their upward climb in the case of most ruling communist parties. The membership of the Chinese Communist Party grew by 1 million, to 40 million, despite a modest purge of party ranks. CPSU membership grew from 17,800,000 to 18,118,000. However, in Poland, party membership continued to decline (by another 161,000) to 2,327,000. Membership was also down in Albania (from 143,363, to 122,000) and Yugoslavia (from 2,200,000 to 2,154,627). For the Yemen Socialist Party, we now have a claimed membership figure of 26,000; and for the Progressive Party of the Working People (on Cyprus) we have a claimed membership of 14,000.[8]

Elsewhere, communist parties did not fare so well in claimed membership. Official figures were down in Afghanistan (from 80,000 to 50,000); Italy (from 1,720,000 to 1,670,000); Mexico (from 201,000 to a more realistic 40,800); and the United States (from 20,000 to 17,500). Claimed membership in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation front of El Salvador, at 10,000, was lower than last year's unrealistic estimate of 60,000. The Communist Party of El Salvador itself probably has no more than 500 members.

In the case of independent estimates, membership figures are also generally not rising. Exceptions are the Philippines, where estimates of the strength of the New People's Army ranged from 5,000 to 10,000, and Burma, where communist guerrillas may number from 12,000 to 15,000 (In neither case do all insurgents belong to the local communist party). By contrast, membership in the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) is estimated to have declined from 100,000 to 84,000, with the bulk of the decline reflecting those who have transferred their allegiance to the new Communist Party of the Spanish People. Estimated membership in Belgium is down from 14,000 to 10,000; and despite continued claims of 710,000 members, the French Communist Party is also likely to have suffered declining membership.[9]

The trend toward decline in the case of non-ruling parties is also reflected in election results. Communists suffered declines in their percent of the vote in elections in Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, San Marino, Switzerland, and West Germany. In France, two of the four Communist cabinet ministers in the Mitterrand government were reduced to "junior minister" status.[10] Armand Magnin, leader of the Swiss Party of Labor, lost his parliamentary reelection bid. Only the communist parties in Martinique, Portugal, Réunion, and Venezuela registered electoral gains.

Let us turn now to highlights of developments by geographic area.

1. Africa and the Middle East. In this region, the communist cause suffered a major setback with the May 1983 disbandment of the Tudeh party by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some 1,000 Tudeh members were arrested, and 45 of its leaders were reported executed. In subsequent months, trials and televised confessions revealed close ties between the Tudeh and the CPSU, ties which were termed treasonous by the Tehran government.[11] In June, a meeting of delegations from all 12 communist parties of Arab countries at an undisclosed location voiced solidarity with their Tudeh comrades.[12] At year's end, the official newspaper of the CPSU denounced the trials in Tehran as a farce and part of an anti-Soviet campaign.[13]

Communists in Israel, Lebanon, and Syria by and large supported their mentors in Moscow. Little was heard from the Palestine Communist Party in its second year of existence, although its name did appear on various joint statements of Arab communist parties, such as the one cited above; it is possible that control over this party is exercised by the movement in Jordan.[14]

Parties in Ethiopia, Morocco, and Mozambique held conferences during 1983. At its January congress the Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) prepared the framework for its conversion into an Ethiopian communist party. At the end of the year, a Soviet commentator expressed the opinion (one might almost say "hope" in light of the long time that it has been under way) that this

[8] This is up from an estimated 12,000, perhaps reflecting the party's minimum compromise with the governing Democratic Party. See *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1983.

[9] See, for example, *Business Week* (New York), Sept. 26, 1983, p. 25.

[10] *The New York Times*, Mar. 23, 1983.

[11] On developments affecting the Tudeh, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilemma," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1984, pp. 1–20.

[12] For a full text, see *Pravda*, June 24, 1983, p. 4, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 29, 1983, pp. H/1–4; also the issue of *Information Bulletin* cited in fn. 4.

[13] K. Vital'yev, "Who Needs This?" *Pravda*, Dec. 31, 1983, p. 5.

[14] See Naim Ashkhab (a member of the Politburo of the Palestine party), "Toughness on Principles and Flexibility in Tactics," in Yu. A. Sklyarov et al., Eds., *Partii nauchnogo sotsializma v Azii i Afrike* (Parties of Scientific Socialism in Asia and Africa), Prague, Mir i Sotsializm, 1983, pp. 113–25.

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process "had entered its final stage."[15] The April congress of Frelimo (The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) approved plans of that party's central committee to shift emphasis in agriculture from state farms to small family farms and large private enterprises. It also decided to return to colonial-era punishments such as flogging for "economic crimes." Nevertheless, the party scheduled another congress for September 1984, reportedly to ratify the transformation of Frelimo into a Marxist-Leninist party.[16]

2. The Americas. Five parties in this region held congresses during the year, the November gathering of the Communist Party of the USA nominating leader Gus Hall (age 73) and Central Committee member Angela Davis for president and vice-president in the 1984 national elections. Four years ago, the CPUSA ticket ran in fewer than half the states and won 45,000 votes.[17]

In Grenada, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and his pro-Cuban collaborators were murdered on October 19, with more openly pro-Soviet forces emerging as the leadership of the New Jewel Movement. This internecine violence occasioned the joint occupation of the island by forces of the United States of America and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the arrest of the coup's leaders. Captured documents included the texts of secret treaties with Cuba, North Korea, and two with the Soviet Union,[18] as well as lists of heavy military equipment to be provided by those three countries. It is conceivable that these developments, if unchecked, might have led Moscow to revise its low estimation of the "communist" credentials of the New Jewel Movement. Elections are now scheduled for late November 1984 on Grenada (the first in the country since 1976); these should provide information on the strength of the New Jewel Movement, which remains legal and intends to run candidates.[19]

The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua continued to funnel arms, ammunition, and supplies in general from Cuba and the Soviet Union to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation (FMLN) front in El Salvador.[20] The mysterious deaths of two leaders of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL—one of the guerrilla groups in the FMLN) in Managua[21] may have resulted from a dispute with the regimes supplying their movement with weapons, as well as from personal rivalries and disagreements over levels of cooperation within the umbrella FMLN.

On January 1, 1984, Havana celebrated in a subdued manner a quarter-century of rule by Fidel Castro. His government survives thanks to US$4 billion worth of Soviet economic aid a year—equivalent to 25 percent of the island's gross national product. Another 1 billion in military assistance from the USSR permits this client state to have the most powerful armed forces in the region and to fuel insurgencies throughout Central America. Cuban military units also serve Soviet foreign policy objectives in other parts of the Third World, primarily in Africa.[22]

In Peru, the government had by year's end declared a state of emergency in 10 provinces to cope with the Maoist guerrilla activities of the Shining Path *(Sendero Luminoso)* movement.[23] However, other pro-Chinese and pro-Moscow groups pursued the peaceful path as members of the United Left, which received 30 percent of the vote during November municipal balloting and elected its candidate Alfonso Barrantes mayor of Lima. Communists in Argentina joined an electoral alliance with Peronists for balloting in December, and in the same month the Venezuelan Communist Party won 3 seats in the national legislature and increased its share of the vote to almost 2 percent (in 1978 the PCV won only one seat and 1.4 percent of the vote).

3. Asia and the Pacific. In China, a relatively modest "purification" campaign occurred within the ranks of the 40-million-member Communist Party.[24] In the last two months of the year, there was also a brief campaign devoted to eliminating "spiritual pollu-

[15] Radio Moscow, Dec. 23, 1983, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 28, 1983, p. J/4. On training of Ethiopian cadres, see *Pravda*, Feb. 11, 1984, p. 5.

[16] *Tempo* (Maputo), May 8, 1983, p. 5.

[17] Associated Press dispatch from New York in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, Jan. 24, 1984.

[18] See US Information Agency, *Documents Pertaining to Relations Between Grenada, the USSR, and Cuba*, Washington, DC, December 1983.

[19] CANA (Bridgetown), Jan. 19, 1984, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), Jan. 20, 1984, p. S/3.

[20] Henry Kissinger, Chairman, *Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America*, Washington, DC, January 1984, Ch. 6, p. 87.

[21] *Barricada Internacional* (Managua), Apr. 25, 1983; *The Washington Post*, July 8, 1983; and *The New York Times*, Sept. 25, 1983.

[22] Free Press International, *International Report* (New York), Jan. 18, 1984, p. 3; and William Ratliff, "Castro's Cuba Today," *The Peninsula Times Tribune* (Palo Alto, CA), Jan. 22–25, 1984, a four-part eyewitness report.

A Jan. 24, 1984, Reuters account out of Addis Ababa published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* on Jan. 25, 1984, reported that Cuba would pull the majority of its 10,500 men out of Ethiopia by June, ostensibly because of the heavy maintenance costs borne by the local government and its assessment of reduced risk of new Somali attacks. Departing troops were apparently headed toward Angola, but it was not known whether this involved a reassignment or merely a stop in transit back to Havana.

[23] Edward A. Lynch, "Is Peru Next?" *Backgrounder* (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC), No. 314, Dec. 9, 1983, p. 11; also Cynthia McClintock, "Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1983, pp. 19–34; and Jonathan Cavanaugh, "Peru's War against Guerrillas," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Feb. 27, 1984.

[24] "The Purge: Why and How," *Inside China Mainland* (Taipei), November 1983, pp. 5–8.

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tion"—i.e., to reinforcement of "socialist" values, especially among intellectuals, who have the most extensive exposure to foreign influences.[25] The Chinese party has been able to maintain relations with various Eurocommunist parties of Western Europe, the latter being only too glad to have ties with a strong anti-Soviet communist power.[26] It would appear that Beijing has renewed its competition with Moscow over which party will be most influential in the world communist movement.

North Korea introduced a stark new element in its struggle against its rival regime in Seoul on October 9, when its agents assassinated 17 high-ranking South Korean government officials who were on a visit to Rangoon.[27] Other terrorists and infiltrators from Pyongyang had been captured below Korea's 38th parallel during the autumn.

In Japan, communists voting support was on the decline both nationally and locally. The party won less than 10 percent of the votes and lost three seats in the December national elections to the lower house of the Diet, and it also lost 37 positions it previously had held in local assemblies. As a result, the JCP has slipped to fifth place among Japanese parties in the Diet.[28]

Military stalemate continues in Afghanistan between Islamic freedom figthers and the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal, the latter clinging to power thanks only to a Soviet troop presence that has numbered some 105,000 since December 1981.[29] A somewhat similar situation prevails in Kampuchea where some 180,000 Vietnamese soldiers support the client government of Heng Samrin against communist and noncommunist opposition forces. An additional 200,000 Vietnamese civilians occupy strategic areas of Kampuchea. In another interesting development Vietnamese generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Vo Bam revealed in an interview over French television that a Vietnam Communist Party plenum in 1959 had decided to start armed activities in the South, a full year before the National Liberation Front had even been established in South Vietnam.[30]

The governments of Malaysia and Thailand seem to be making considerable headway against communist insurgencies through a combination of amnesty programs and joint armed sweeps. The guerrilla forces may also be experiencing reduced support from a China currently more drawn to cultivation of regular diplomatic relations with those Southeast Asian states in light of Beijing's rivalry with Hanoi. Communist insurgent forces in Burma and the Philippines seem to be on the upswing, however, in the former case apparently buoyed by a new involvement in the international drug traffic.[31]

4. Eastern Europe and the USSR. There were no party congresses or national elections in this region during 1983, although as the year ended the Soviet Union was preparing for the ritual of national elections, scheduled for March 4, 1984.

The most important news from this region involved the declining health of CPSU General Secretary Yuriy Andropov, last seen in public on August 18. The uncertain situation was resolved on February 9, 1984, when Andropov succumbed to a combination of kidney failure and diabetes. During 1983, emphasis was placed on labor discipline, improvement of industrial production, and streamlining of party work. Grigoriy Romanov and Yegor Ligachëv were named CPSU secretaries; Mikhail Solomentsev and Vitaliy Vorotnikov received promotion to full Politburo status; and Viktor Chebrikov became a candidate member of the Politburo.[32] In December, the process of electing regional party officials was begun after the virtual "freeze" in such assignments during the latter part of the Brezhnev era.

Elsewhere, the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) continued to suffer the consequences of the imposition of martial law and suppression of the Solidarity workers movement in December 1981. Despite the ostensible lifting of martial law and vigorous recruitment efforts, the party saw its membership rolls continue to shrink (the total is down 800,000 over the past three years). The official youth movement also has difficulty in attracting members, who normally constitute the pool from which future party members are drawn.[33]

In foreign policy, Moscow gave top priority to attempts to decouple the United States from Western Europe. Abuse of Ronald Reagan increased, especially after the first cartoon of the US President ap-

[25] "Drive on Spiritual Pollution," ibid., February 1984, pp. 13–17.

[26] D. J. Radenkovic, "Eurocommunism in Beijing," *Politika* (Belgrade), Sept. 3, 1983, p. 4.

[27] Free Press International, *International Report*, Jan. 18, 1984, p. 4.

[28] The Liberal Democrats won 250 seats; the Socialists, 112; Komeito, 58; the Democratic Socialists, 38; and the Communists, 27. *Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1983, p. 5.

[29] The troops of Karmal have dwindled to an estimated 30,000, or only one-third the size of the Afghan army in 1978 when the insurgency began. *The New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1984.

[30] *The Economist* (London), Feb. 26, 1983, pp. 56–57.

[31] See William Branigin, "Burmese Army in South Battles Wide-Ranging Array of Insurgencies—Communists, Drug Traffickers and Tribesmen," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 26, 1984.

[32] See *Pravda*, June 16 and Dec. 27, 1983.

[33] *Polityka* (Warsaw), July 2, 1983, p. 2; and *Sztandar mlodych* (Warsaw), Jan. 9, 1984, pp. 1–2.

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peared in *Pravda* on October 15, 1983. Top officials of the Warsaw Treaty Organization met seven times during the year; in early December, WTO foreign ministers unanimously endorsed the Soviet decision to install new battlefield missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, allegedly as a response to US deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. However, there were signs of considerable uneasiness with the WTO decision in Romania as well as in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.[34]

Countries in the region as a whole suffered from an economic slowdown. There was resentment at the apparent Soviet decision to supply less petroleum and natural gas to Eastern Europe, and at the higher prices that existing formulas placed on such shipments. There was no success in attempts to convene a summit of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; there has been no such meeting since 1971.[35]

5. *Western Europe.* Parties of the region held seven congresses and participated in 10 national elections. As noted above, in most cases the results of the elections were disappointing.

The Soviet party showed its displeasure with the "Eurocommunist" Italian party by sending a relatively low-ranking delegation (headed by *Pravda* Editor Viktor G. Afanas'yev) to the PCI's congress in March. By contrast, this was the first Italian party enclave attended by Beijing representatives in 20 years. The December congress of the Spanish Communist Party was marked by turmoil over the PCE's Eurocommunist line. Only a month later, in January 1984, a new group, which eventually settled on the name "Communist Party of the Spanish People," formed a pro-Soviet movement claiming 25,000 members (presumably including those of the pro-Moscow Catalan Communist Party). Moscow quickly acknowledged the existence of the new organization.[36] In the case of Finland, the former leader of the Finnish Communist Party, Aarne Saarinen, publicly accused the Soviet Union of continuously interfering with the party's internal affairs.[37]

Moscow is presumably more pleased with the fortunes of the Portuguese Communist Party. This pro-Moscow movement registered gains in national polling in April.

Communist parties in six West European NATO states joined their counterparts in Canada and the United States during May with an appeal for a nuclear freeze.[38] Similarly, leaders of the East German, West German, and West Berlin communist parties signed an appeal to prevent deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe.[39]

[34] Eric Bourne, "NATO and Soviets woo East Europe," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Feb. 3, 1984, pp. 7 and 10.

[35] A CMEA summit was slated for February 1984, but would appear to have been once again postponed as a result of Andropov's death. See Radio Belgrade, Jan. 18, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Jan. 19, 1984, pp. AA/1–2.

[36] See fn. 2.

[37] Radio Stockholm, Dec. 6, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-WEU*, Dec. 8, 1983, p. P/1.

[38] Radio Moscow, May 2, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 3, 1983, p. G/1.

[39] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Sept. 27, 1983.

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Communist International Fronts in 1983

By Wallace Spaulding

DURING 1983, the international communist front organizations continued to be an important adjunct of Moscow's foreign policy. As can be seen from Table 1, there is relatively little new information on the membership and affiliates of the 10 most important Soviet-line international fronts. However, it seems useful at this juncture to provide some detailed information about the top policymaking and working-level leaders of these organizations, found in their "presidential boards" and secretariats, respectively, and about the Soviet "connection" thereto. In addition, it is of interest to what effect Moscow mobilized these fronts in its campaign to block the NATO deployment of theater nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

The Fronts

In looking at the fronts' leaderships, I concentrate on their "presidential boards" (by which I mean their presidents and vice presidents) and secretariats. Included in these numbers, of course, are the Soviet secretaries, generally believed to be the resident controllers of their respective organizations (if there is no Soviet secretary, the Soviet vice president is believed to perform the same function).[1]

Even though the Soviets studiously avoid taking either of the top two positions (president or secretary general) in these organizations—in order to preserve the groups' "international" image—Moscow still comes out with the greatest total number (13) of members of the two leadership bodies of the eight "universal" fronts treated herein. (AAPSO and CPC are excluded from this particular calculation because of their expressly regional nature.) The Soviets are followed by the French (with 10 positions occupied, and another one traditionally held by a French citizen but currently unoccupied); the Cubans (10); the Poles and Indians (9 each); the Bulgarians and Czechs (8 each); and the East Germans (7).

Moreover, when the positions are given a weight of 5 points each for president and secretary general, 3 points each for vice president, deputy secretary general, and the like, and 1 each for secretary, the Soviets (with 28 points) still are only barely edged out by the French (who register 28 points, with one 1-point vacancy to be filled), despite the aforementioned Soviet avoidance of all "5-point" positions. The French and Soviets are followed in this "qualitative" listing of officials by India (with 25 points), Cuba (24), Czechoslovakia (22), Finland (20), and Poland (17). Indeed, the French, the Indians, and the Finns are the only non-bloc nationalities to figure prominently in either the unweighted or weighted frequency tabulations of representation in communist front leadership. This is somewhat surprising in view of the fronts' evident attempt to appear broadly based. It may reflect difficulties in attracting sufficient numbers of "reliable" and capable personnel for the fronts in most parts of the noncommunist world.

In view of the status of the WPC as the largest and most important front and the coordinator of the other organizations noted herein,[2] I have indicated which of the latter groups' leaders were elected to the new

[1] Robert Wesson, Ed., *1983 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983, p. 394.

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[2] Ibid.

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Table 1: Major International Communist Front Organizations

	Year founded	Head-quarters	Claimed membership	Affiliates	Countries
World Peace Council (WPC)	1949	Helsinki	No data	No data	142*
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)	1945	Prague	Ca. 206,000,000	90*	81*
Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)	1945	East Berlin	Over 200,000,000	131	116
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)	1945	Budapest	Over 150,000,000	Over 270	123
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)	1957	Cairo	No data	87	No data
International Union of Students (IUS)	1946	Prague	Over 10,000,000	117	109
World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)	1946	London*	Ca. 450,000	Ca. 33	Over 70
International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)	1946	Prague	Over 180,000	No data	Over 120
Christian Peace Conference (CPC)	1958	Prague	No data	No data	At least 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)	1946	Brussels	Ca. 25,000	No data	Nearly 80

*New information.

SOURCES: Figures are from Wallace Spaulding, "International Communist Fronts, 1982," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1983, p. 104, as updated from *Yearbook of International Organizations, 1983–84*, New York, Union of International Associations and International Chamber of Commerce, 1983, item C3533; *World Trade Union Movement* (Prague), No. 6, 1983, inside front cover; and *Bratislava Pravda*, June 28, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), July 8, 1983, pp. D/1–5.

WPC Presidential Committee in June 1983.[3] Indeed, I have combined the strength of such representation together with claimed membership figures and the number of national affiliates to give a rough approximation of the relative importance of each front organization. The fronts are treated below in this presumed order of importance.

I also indicate the status that each group has, as a nongovernmental organization, with various specialized agencies of the United Nations: the UN Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO—status in Categories A, B, or C); the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC—Categories I or II, or inclusion on the Roster List); the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); and the International Labor Organization (ILO).

The latest issue of the officially "communist" *World Marxist Review (WMR)* in which a leader of a given front has an article is also noted, together with the author involved. The *WMR* plays an important role in coordinating activities of the fronts.[4] Publication in this journal confirms an author's importance in a given front: in most cases the person published turned out to be the front's spokesman before the UN Special Session on Disarmament II in 1982,[5] and the individual in the front who received the highest WPC position in the June 1983 reorganization of that organization's Presidential Council. Journals published by the fronts are also noted.

The most recent top-level meeting held by each front is mentioned. This generally pinpoints the date of election of the present leadership of the front. In addition, I note the major meetings sponsored by each front during 1983 and the major propaganda themes emphasized at them.

Finally, I list certain organizations apparently related to the major fronts, with an indication of the nature of the relationship. Asterisks in these listings indicate officials newly identified during 1983.

World Peace Council (WPC)

"Presidential board." President (and also de facto secretary general): Romesh Chandra (India). Vice presidents: Severo Aguirre de Castro (Cuba); Olga Aviles Lopez* (Nicaragua); Richard Andriamanjato (Madagascar); Eduardo Arevalo Burgos* (Colombia); Ali Ba Dhib* (South Yemen); Muhammad J. Bajbouj (Syria); Vital Balla (Congo); Freda Brown (Women's

[3] *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 6, 1983, p. 2.

[4] Note that the *World Marxist Review* participated in a meeting of some 13 international fronts (WPC, WFTU, WIDF, AAPSO, IUS, IOJ, CPC, International Institute for Peace, Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization, Berlin Conference of European Catholics, "and others" held in Prague on Oct. 8–9, 1983, to coordinate policies. See *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Oct. 10, 1983; and *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Oct. 21, 1983.

WMR is the English-language version of *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma*, based in Prague. *Problemy* appears in 75 national editions and 40 languages, distributed in 145 countries. See *New Age* (New Delhi), Sept. 18, 1983.

[5] Wesson, op. cit., p. 396.

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International Democratic Federation); Marta Buschmann* (West Germany); Josef Cyrankiewicz (Poland); Camara Damantag (Guinea); Jacques Denis (France); Gunther Drefahl* (East Germany); Luís Echeverría* (Mexico); George Georges (Australia); Dawit Giorgis (Ethiopia); Francisco de Costa Gomes (Portugal); Matti Kekkonen* (Finland); James Lamond (Great Britain); Pascual Luvualu (Angola); Khalid Muhyi-al-Din (Egypt); John Hanley Morgan* (Canada); Gus Eugene Newport* (United States); Alfred Nzo (South Africa); Camilio O. Perez (Panama); Phan Anh (Vietnam); Yevgeniy M. Primakov* (Soviet Union); Nadim Abd-al-Samad (Lebanon); Ilona Sebestyan* (Hungary); Blagovest Sendov (Bulgaria); Aziz Sharif (Iraq); Filifing Sissoko* (Mali); T. B. Subasinghe* (Sri Lanka); Amerigo Terenzi (Italy); Mikis Theodorakis* (Greece); Emma Torres* (Bolivia); Tomas Travincek* (Czechoslovakia); Alfredo Varela (Argentina); and Ibrahim Zakariya* (World Federation of Trade Unions).

Secretariat. Executive secretary: Frank Swift* (Great Britain). Secretaries: Sana Abu Shakra* (Lebanon); Daniel Cirera (France); Nathaniel Hill Arboleda (Panama); Kosta Ivanov (Bulgaria); Karoly Lauko (Hungary); Karel Lukas (Czechoslovakia); Rolf Lutzkendorf* (East Germany); Max Moabi (South Africa); Bahig Nasser (Egypt); Ryszard Tyrluk* (Poland); Arsenio Rodríguez (Cuba); Carl Rosschou* (Denmark); Mamadou Sako (Mali); Tair Tairov (Soviet Union); Karen Talbot (United States).

Last WMR article. December 1981 (Romesh Chandra).

Publications. New Perspectives (6 times a year); *Peace Courier* (monthly); and *Disarmament Forum** (monthly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (A); ECOSOC (Roster); UNCTAD.

Last top meeting. WPC Meeting (Prague, June 1983).

Other major 1983 meetings. Western WPC affiliates (Moscow, January—against deployment of US missiles in Europe); WPC vice presidents (Prague, February—against deployment of US missiles in Europe); International Forum on Southeast Asia (Phnom Penh, February—support of pro-Moscow Kampuchean regime); International Conference on Human Rights, Disarmament, and the Right to Life (Mexico City, March); International Conference in Solidarity with Front-Line States (Lisbon, March, cosponsored with the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization [AAPSO]—support for the African National Congress and the Southwest Africa People's Organization, and opposition to apartheid); Conference for Peace and Security in Asian and the Pacific (Ulan Bator, April—opposition to nuclear arms race); World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War (Prague, June—against deployment of US missiles in Europe, for universal disarmament); International Conference on Israel–South Africa Alliance (Vienna, July, cosponsored with AAPSO and other organizations); International Conference for Solidarity with Cyprus (Lisbon, October); First World Emergency Meeting for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean (Mexico City, November—support for Grenada and Nicaragua); WPC Presidential Committee Bureau (Athens, November—against deployment of US missiles in Europe). The WPC was also a major participant in the Conference on Proposals to Avert the Dangers of War from Europe (Vienna, February) and the Second Vienna Dialogue—International Conference on Disarmament and Détente (November, sponsored by the WPC-related International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces).

Related organizations. International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (although Romesh Chandra serves as its head, it involves additional and more innocuous organizations in pursuing WPC aims); International Institute of Peace (research body left behind in Vienna when the WPC moved to Helsinki in 1968); International Committee for European Security and Cooperation (pursues WPC aims regionally—its head, Raymond Goor, is a WPC observer); Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (its secretary general, Edith Ballantyne, played a leading role in organizing and running the World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War; she is also a vice president of the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces).

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

"Presidential board." President: Sandor Gaspar (Hungary). Vice presidents: Indrajit Gupta (India); Elias Habre (Lebanon); Karel Hoffmann (Czechoslovakia); Robert Veiga (Cuba); Romain Vilon-Guezo (Benin); Andreas Ziartides (Cyprus).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Ibrahim Zakariya (Sudan). Secretaries: Ernesto Araneda Briones*

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(Chile); Boris Averyanov (Soviet Union); Jindrich Kusnierik (Poland); Jan Nemoudry (Czechoslovakia); K. G. Srivastava (India).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Zakariya* (a WPC vice president) and Gaspar*.

Last WMR article. January 1983 (Zakariya).

Publications. World Trade Union Movement (monthly); *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (weekly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (A); ECOSOC (I); UNCTAD; UNIDO; UNICEF; FAO; ILO.

Last top meeting. 10th World Trade Union Congress (Havana, February 1982).

Major 1983 meetings. 35th WFTU General Council Meeting (Nicosia, April—against deployment of US missiles in Europe, for "worker solidarity" in struggle against unemployment, traditional support for Arabs and black South Africans and opposition to US troops in South Korea and Turkish troops in Cyprus, attack on US policies in Central America and the Caribbean); 9th International Conference of Chemical, Oil, and Allied Workers' Trade Union International [hereafter TUI] (Prague, May); International Trade Union Conference on Chemical Weapons (Ho Chi Minh City, May—condemnation of new US chemical weapons); 8th International Conference of Food, Tobacco, Hotel, and Allied Workers' TUI (Moscow, September); 9th International Conference of Agricultural, Forestry, and Plantation Workers' TUI (Budapest, October); 9th International Conference of Building, Wood, and Building Materials Industries Workers' TUI (Sofia, October); 30th meeting of the WFTU Bureau (Damascus, October—against deployment of US missiles in Europe, united action against transnational corporations, opposition to the arms race, support to Syrian workers and people).

Related organizations. There are trade union internationals (each coordinated by a WFTU department and represented on the WFTU Council and WFTU Bureau) for these sectors or professional groups: agriculture, building industry, chemical industry, commerce, food industry, metalworkers, miners, public service, teachers (World Federation of Teachers' Unions), textiles, transport. De facto regional affiliates (a high percentage of constituents jointly affiliated with the WFTU): Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin American Workers (CPUSTAL); International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions; Organization of African Trade Union Unity. Other: International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament (many WFTU-affiliated personnel).

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

"Presidential board." President: Freda Brown (Australia); Vice presidents: Issam Abd-al-Hadi (Palestine); Aruna Asaf Ali (India); Luisa Amorim (Portugal); Vilma Espin de Castro (Cuba); Fatima Zohra Djaghroud (Algeria); Fanny Edelman (Argentina); Fuki Kushida (Japan); Salome Moiane (Mozambique); Nguyen Thi Dinh (Vietnam); Valentina Nikolayeva-Tereshkova (Soviet Union); Ilse Thiele (East Germany).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Mirjam Vire-Tuominen (Finland). Organizing secretary: Sabina Hager (East Germany). Secretaries: Mercedes Alvarea Moreno (country unknown); Evgeniya Andrei (Romania); Marie-Therese Avemeka (country unknown); Aurora Barcena (Mexico); Hanna Bushra (Iraq); Helga Dickel (West Germany); Olga Gutierrez (Argentina); Norma Hidalgo (Chile); Valeria Kalmyk (Soviet Union); Surjeet Kaur (India); Susan Mnumzana (South Africa); Azza al-Horr Mroueh (Lebanon); Anna Maria Navarro (Cuba); Soledad Parada (country unknown); Nancy Ruiz (Cuba—presumably stationed in Cuba rather than in East Berlin); Maria Taneva (Bulgaria); Wanda Tycner (Poland).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Brown (a WPC vice president); Vire-Tuominen.

Last WMR *article.* March 1983 (Brown).

Publications. Women of the Whole World (quarterly); *Documents and Information* (frequency unknown).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B); ECOSOC (I); UNICEF; ILO (Special List).

Last top meeting. 8th WIDF Congress (Prague, October 1981).

Major 1983 meetings. Women's Consultative Meeting (East Berlin, January—against deployment of US missiles in Europe); WIDF Council (Budapest, October—mobilization against nuclear war and for women's rights). The WIDF also played an important role in the seminar entitled "The Economic and Social

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Effects of the Arms Race on the Situation of Women and Their Families" (Copenhagen, April).

Related organizations. De facto regional affiliates (presumed joint affiliations—all participate with WIDF in WPC activities): All-African Women's Organization; Arab Women's Federation; Continental Front of Women (Against Intervention in Central America).

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

"Presidential board." President: Walid Masri (Lebanon). Vice presidents: Khalil Elias (Sudan); Manuel Hernandez Vidal (Chile); Hoang Thuy Giang (Vietnam); Alfred Junion (Angola); Kim Chang Yong (North Korea); Vsevolod Nakhodin (Soviet Union); Francisco Phillipe (Portugal); Jorge Prigoshin (Argentina); Pablo Reyes Dominguez (Cuba).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Miklos Barabas (Hungary). Deputy secretaries general: Oscar Gonzales (Colombia); Turay Saidu* (Sierra Leone). Secretaries: Akira Kassai (Japan); Salim Obayid Altamini (South Yemen), Joachim Brueckner* (East Germany); Tarley Francis* (Grenada); Franklin Gonzales (Venezuela); Ivan Nicolae Joan (Romania); Lubomir Ledl* (Czechoslovakia); Allan Lopez*-(Costa Rica); Leonard Mabassy (Congo); Vesselin Mastikov (Bulgaria); Panayotis Michalotos (Greece); Thomas Borg Mogensen (Denmark); Markku Soppela (Finland); Jacek Paliszewski (Poland); Daniel Santana (Dominican Republic); Denis Sibeko (South Africa); there are also positions (currently unoccupied) for additional secretaries from France, Italy, Palestine, and the United States, but none known for the USSR.

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Barabas, Masri*.

Last WMR *article.* None noted.

Publications: World Youth (monthly); *WFDY News* (twice monthly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B); ECOSOC (I); FAO; ILO (Special List).

Last top meeting. 11th WFDY General Assembly (Prague, June 1982).

Major 1983 meetings. Enlarged WFDY European Commission (Budapest, March—against deployment of US missiles in Europe); WFDY Executive Committee (West Berlin, April—solidarity with peoples of Lebanon, Palestine, Nicaragua, El Salvador—followed immediately by a "Youth Peace Conference," also in West Berlin); International Youth Seminar on Peace (Warsaw, October).

Related organizations. Official subsidiaries: International Bureau of Tourism and Youth Exchange (BITEJ); International Commission of Children's and Adolescents' Movements (CIMEA); International Voluntary Service for Friendship and Solidarity of Youth (SIVSAJ). De facto regional affiliates: Arab Youth Union (presumed joint affiliations); Pan-African Youth Movement (joint affiliations).

Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

"Presidential board." President: Abd-al-Rahman Sharkawi (Egypt). Vice presidents: Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar (Palestine); Abdul Aziz (Sri Lanka); Mirza Ibragimov (Soviet Union); Vassos Lyssarides (Cyprus); Nguyen Thi Binh (Vietnam); Alfred Nzo (South Africa); Anahita Ratebzade (Afghanistan); Aziz Sharif (Iraq).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn (Iraq). Deputy secretaries general: Facinet Bangoura (Guinea); Chitta Biswas (India); Abd-al-Galil Ghaylan (South Yemen); Abdurashid Isskhodzhayev (Soviet Union). Secretaries: Dan Cindi (South Africa); Joaquim de Lemos (Angola); S. T. Haidongo (Namibia); Zubayr Sayf al-Islam (Algeria); Daniel Kouyela (Congo); Eva Ranaweera (Sri Lanka); Assim O. al-Rzyah (Sudan); Joshua Siyolwe (Zambia); Muhammad Sobayh (Palestine); Tran Van Anh (Vietnam); Dieter Wagner (East Germany). Assistant secretary general for technical affairs: Eduard al-Kharrat (Egypt).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Husayn, Sharkawi; also AAPSO vice presidents Ratebzade, Sharif, and Nzo represent their respective countries on this body, the latter two as WPC vice presidents.

Last WMR *article.* August 1980 (Husayn).

Publications. Solidarity (monthly); *Development and Socio-Economic Progress* (quarterly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (C); ECOSOC (II); UNCTAD; UNIDO.

Last top meeting. 5th AAPSO Conference (Cairo,

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January 1972). However, extensive organizational changes occurred at the Aden 13th Council Session of March 1981.

Major 1983 meetings. AAPSO Arab affiliates (Aden, January—support for the Palestinian people); International Conference on Palestine and Lebanon (Athens, April—support for the Palestinian people); 12th AAPSO Presidium (Nicosia, December—dangers of US war preparations, especially nuclear).

Related organizations. Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (AALAPSO or OSPAAL) and Afro-Asian Writers' Association—both of these presumed related to AAPSO, judging from scope and involvement in leftist activities, including those of the WPC.

International Union of Students (IUS)

"Presidential board." President: Miroslav Stepan (Czechoslovakia). Vice presidents: Muhammad Bakir (Iraq); Leonardo Candiero Celano (Mozambique); Jose Castillo (Panama); Leszek Kaminski (Poland); Kim Guang Hub (North Korea); Ravane Kone (Senegal); Ong Dung (Vietnam); Antonio Pardo Sanchez (Cuba); Petrus Schmidt (Namibia); Aleksandr N. Zharikov (Soviet Union); Vladimir Zlatinov (Bulgaria).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Srinavasan Kunalan (India). Secretaries: Manuel Coss (Puerto Rico); Nicolae Daravoinea (Romania); John Gallagher (Ireland); Karoly Gyorgy (Hungary); Gerardo Herrera (El Salvador); John Kwadjo (Ghana); Faysal al-Miqdad (Syria); Christina Valanidou (Cyprus); Ahmad Salim al-Wahishi (South Yemen).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Stepan.

Last WMR *article.* August 1983 (Stepan).

Publications. World Student News (monthly); *IUS News Service* (fortnightly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B); ECOSOC (Roster).

Last top meeting. 13th IUS Congress (East Berlin, November 1980).

Major 1983 meetings. International Student Conference on Palestine (Athens, January—support for Palestinian and Lebanese people); European Students' Peace Forum (Helsinki, February—peace and disarmament).

Related organizations. De facto regional affiliates (presumed joint affiliations): All-African Students Union, Latin American Continental Students Organizations (OCLAE).

World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)

"Presidential board." President: Jean-Marie Legay (France). Vice presidents: N. G. Basov (Soviet Union); Kiril Bratanov (Bulgaria); Pierre Biquard (France); T. Hirone (Japan); N. P. Gupta (India).

Secretariat. Secretary general: John K. Dutton (Great Britain). Deputy secretary general: M. A. Jaegle (France). Organization secretary: unknown. Assistants to the secretary general: G. Durrafourg (France) and G. Kotovski (Soviet Union).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. None since the January 1980 death of then-president E.H.S. Burhop.

Last WMR *article.* April 1973 (Burhop).

Publication. Scientific World (quarterly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (A); ECOSOC (Roster).

Last top meeting. 13th WFSW General Assembly (Paris, September 1983).

Other major 1983 meetings. International Round Table on Science and the Qualitative Arms Race (East Berlin, April); WFSW Executive Council (Prague, April—to welcome "intensification" of the peace movement); Symposium on Science and the Crisis of Development (Paris, September—to point out the adverse economic effects of the arms race).

Related organizations. None known.

International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)

"Presidential board." President: Kaarle Nordenstreng (Finland). Vice presidents: Bola Adedoja (Nigeria); Viktor Afanasýev (Soviet Union); Wieslaw Bek (Poland); Marcelo Ceballos Rosales (Ecuador); Baba Dagamaissa (Mali); Dao Tung* (Vietnam); Jerome Dramou (Guinea); Saber Falhout (Syria); Salah Galal (Egypt); Gerard Gatinot (France);

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Said Qassim Hammudi (Iraq); Eberhard Heinrich (East Germany); Kim Kwi Nam (North Korea); Teodomiro Leite de Vasconcelos (Mozambique); Juan Molina Palacios (Nicaragua); Tsend Namsrai (Mongolia); Efrain Ruiz Caro (Peru); Paavo Rounaniemi (Finland); Nassim Abu Sharif (Palestine); Luís Suarez Lopez (Mexico), Shiro Suzuki (Japan); José Miguel Varas (Chile); Ernesto Vera (Cuba).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Jiri Kubka (Czechoslovakia). Secretaries: Kosta Andreev (Bulgaria); Miguel Arteaga (Cuba); Sergiusz Klaczkow (Poland); Boris Sakharov (Soviet Union); Victor Stamate (Romania); Leopoldo Vargas Fernandez (Colombia); Manfred Weigand * (East Germany).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Kubka.

Last WMR *article.* December 1974 (Kubka).

Publications. The Democratic Journalist (monthly); *IOJ Newsletter* (twice monthly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B); ECOSOC (II).

Last top meeting. 9th IOJ Congress (Moscow, October 1981).

Major 1983 meetings. IOJ Presidium (Luanda, January—solidarity with peoples of Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, support for "new world information and communications order"); 4th Consultative Meeting of Journalists (Prague, June—journalistic ethics, preservation of world peace); World Conference of Journalists Against Imperialism (Pyongyang, July—support for Korean unification); enlarged session of IOJ Presidium (Paris, November—support of Soviet peace campaign).

Related organizations. De facto regional affiliates: Federation of Arab Journalists (presumed joint affiliations); Federation of Latin American Journalists (FELAP, presumed joint affiliations); Union of African Journalists (joint affiliations).

Christian Peace Conference (CPC)

"Presidential board." President: Bishop/Dr. Karoly Toth (Hungary). Vice presidents: The Rev. Dr. Richard Andriamanjato (Madagascar); Metropolitan/Dr. Paulos Mar Gregorios (India—also elected a co-president of World Council of Churches in August); Prof./Dr. Gerhard Bassarak (East Germany); Prof./Dr. Sergio Arce-Martinez (Cuba); Metropolitan Nicolae Corneau (Romania); The Rev. Dr. Lee Charles Gray (United States); General/Bishop/Prof. Jan Michalko (Czechoslovakia); Bishop Pham Quang Phuoc (Vietnam); Mrs. Bernadeen Silva (Sri Lanka). Continuation Committee Chairman: Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia (Soviet Union).

Secretariat. Seretary general: The Rev. Dr. Lubomir Mirejovsky (Czechoslovakia). Deputy secretaries general: The Rev. Alfred Christian Rosa (Sri Lanka); Archmandrite Sergey Fomin (Soviet Union). Office director: Dr. Tibor Gyorgy (Hungary). The CPC does not appear to have the usual group of full-time secretaries at its headquarters. Its International Secretariat, of which Dr. Gyorgy is a member, is apparently brought together only occasionally.

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. Toth (in addition, Andriamanjato also represents Madagascar on this body as a WPC vice president).

Last WMR *article.* December 1981 (Toth).

Publications. CPC (quarterly); *CPC Information* (twice monthly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (C); ECOSOC (II).

Last top meeting. 5th All-Christian Peace Conference (Prague, June 1978).

Major 1983 meetings. CPC International Secretariat (Prague, February—opposition to deployment of US missiles in Europe); Consultative Meeting on Disarmament (Budapest, May); CPC International Secretariat (West Berlin, September); CPC Working Committee (Moscow, October—disarmament).

Related organizations. Official regional subsidiaries: African CPC; Asian CPC; CPC in Latin America and the Caribbean. Complementary organizations (having different religious constituencies but cooperating with CPC): Berlin Conference of European Catholics; Asian Buddhists Peace Conference.

International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

"Presidential board." President: Joe Nordmann (France). First vice president: Gerhard Stuby (West Germany). Vice presidents: Abderahmane Bouraoui (Algeria); Solange Bouvier-Ajam (France); Cho Min Sin

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(North Korea); Joao Cruz Pinto (Guinea); Apoliner Diaz Callejas (Colombia); Gloria Gabuardi (Nicaragua); V. R. Krishna Iyer (India); Igor I. Karpets (Soviet Union); Ahmad al-Khawaga (Egypt); Karl J. Lang (Finland); Adam Lopatka (Poland); Shabib al-Maliki (Iran); Zuhayr al-Midani (country unknown); Josef Ondrej (Czechoslovakia); Susumi Ozaki (Japan); John Platts-Mills (Great Britain); Jean Salmon (Belgium); Boris Spasov (Bulgaria); Jamal Surani (Palestine); Umberto Terracini (Italy); Armando Uribe (Chile); Francisco Varona y Duque Estrade (Cuba); Doris Brin Walker (United States).

Secretariat. Secretary general: Amar Bentoumi (Algeria). Secretaries: either Eduardo Barcesat or Nelly Minyerski (Argentina); Tudor Draganu (Romania); Ahmad al-Hilali (Egypt); Lennox Hinds (United States); Sergio Insunza (Chile); Semën Ivanov (Soviet Union); Lorand Jokai (Hungary); either Pierre Lavigne or Roland Weyl (France); Ugo Natoli (Italy); Phan Anh (Vietnam); Saito Kazuyoshi (Japan); Jitendra Sharma (India).

Representation on WPC Presidential Committee. No known representative.

Last WMR *article.* None noted.

Publication. Review of Contemporary Law (twice yearly).

Status with UN. UNESCO (B); ECOSOC (II).

Last top meeting. 11th IADL Congress (Valletta, November 1980).

Major 1983 meetings. IADL Bureau (Pilisszentkereszt, Hungary, October—"human rights" and rights of peoples to peace, security, sovereignty, and development); except for the above, no major IADL activity has been seen since the International Lawyers' Conference on the Mediterranean, held in Algiers in December 1982. The IADL was apparently the only one of the major fronts not to have representation at the World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War, which was held in Prague in June 1983.

Related organizations. De facto regional affiliate: Arab Lawyers Union (joint affiliations).

[6] *Tageszeitung* (West Berlin), Jan. 4, 1983.
[7] *Tribune* (Sidney), June 15, 1983.

Moscow's Fronts and the Peace Movement

Through these international communist front organizations affiliated with the World Peace Council, Moscow made considerable efforts in 1983 to prevent the scheduled year-end emplacement of US Pershing II and cruise intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe (see the frequency with which the topic arose at gatherings sponsored by these organizations). However, these groups represented only one strand of the "peace movement" as a whole. The other strand represented a more diverse and independent group, including religious and secular pacifists and environmentalists. This second strand—which was the more powerful one in Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany—tended to place equal blame on both superpowers for the nuclear arms race, and called for dismantling of Soviet SS–20 missiles as well as nondeployment of the new US theater nuclear weapons. This strand includes groups such as the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the "Greens," the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), and even considerable elements among the "Eurocommunist" parties of the indicated countries (even though members of these parties are in a number of cases affiliated with the WPC). This independent strand also antagonized the Soviets by openly sympathizing with "unofficial" (non–WPC affiliated) peace groups in Eastern Europe. The latter combined a similarly neutralist approach to disarmament with a call for Western-style civil rights in the Soviet bloc. Most notable here were Charter '77 in Czechoslovakia, Swords into Plowshares in East Germany, and the Dialogue Movement in Hungary.

During the first half of the year, a series of events conspired to further alienate this independent strand from the Soviet positions. First, in January there came to light a letter that the Soviet Peace Committee (chaired by Yuriy Zhukov) had written to organizers of the independents' then-projected Second European Nuclear Disarmament Conference claiming the independents were trying to "split the peace movement" and that their "equal responsibility" theory attempted to "justify the aggressive, militaristic policies of the United States and NATO."[6] When the conference was held, in West Berlin in May, there were no delegates from either the official Soviet-bloc peace movements (WPC affiliates) or their "unofficial" counterparts (who were prevented by their respective governments from attending).[7] Moreover, members of a delegation of Greens who crossed over to East Berlin for a peace demonstration were arrested and sent back. Similarly,

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independent observers at the WPC–organized World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War the following month in Prague ran into police harassment when they met with Charter '77 leaders outside of the assembly framework. This situation, incidentally, resulted in the premature departure of at least three Greens and two Italian Communist Party members.[8] The Prague assembly, like its independent counterpart a month earlier, claimed over 3,000 participants,[9] and was clearly the major communist front meeting of the year.

According to a Western press account, the Prague assembly devoted "much if not most" of its efforts to planning " 'joint actions' against 'US militarism' and 'imperialism' in general."[10] And a communist account similarly reported that the majority of representatives criticized the theory of US-Soviet "joint responsibility."[11] It was therefore surprising that the "Appeal" adopted by the assembly, aside from trumpeting "No to new missiles in Europe" as its lead slogan (thereby countenancing the SS–20's already in place), went a long way toward compromise with the independent line. Specifically, the United States was not singled out by name as the chief villain, and the need for disarmament by both sides was stressed.[12] Subsequent events seemed to indicate that this reflected a change from the "stick" to the "carrot" in Soviet efforts to influence the independent peace movement.

Other interesting developments followed in short order. First, at a reorganizational meeting of the WPC held the day after the Prague assembly ended, Yuriy Zhukov failed to be reelected a WPC vice president—most unusual treatment for a Soviet Peace Committee chairman![13] Second, in clear contrast with Zhukov's earlier comments, the influential Soviet "political observer" Aleksandr Bovin wrote of the Prague assembly as a "dialogue" between two strands of the peace movement and characterized the "even-handed" group as "sincerely mistaken."[14] Then, in the next month, Moscow's *Kommunist*, No. 12, carried an unsigned editorial entitled "Peace, the Working Class, and Communists," which again stressed the "representative nature" of the Prague assembly and chided the narrow-minded attitude of "some comrades" toward pacifist (e.g., CND and IKV) and ecological (e.g., the Greens) organizations, who were "unable to see in these movements their objective allies in the struggle for peace."[15] Finally, Boris Ponomarëv, the Soviet party's secretary responsible for relations with non–socialist bloc political parties, hosted a delegation of Greens in Moscow that included two of the very same leaders (Petra Kelly and General Gerd Bastian) who had been ousted from East Berlin in May.[16] This delegation, incidentally, appears to have had an audience with East German party chief Erich Honecker in East Berlin on its way home.[17]

Despite the ultimate failure to prevent deployment of the US missiles, the Soviet efforts did have considerable success in uniting West European peace movements along the desired lines. Whatever their theoretical outlook, the independents had by late 1983 become de facto unilateralists, i.e., were focusing on the US missiles and tending to ignore the Soviet theater nuclear weapons already in place. Perhaps the most extreme, though indirect, example was CND leader Bruce Kent's branding of both Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan (but not Yuriy Andropov) as "international criminals."[18] As noted by *Pravda* of October 23, the greatest successes were in West Germany. On October 22, a "human chain," claimed to be 250,000 strong, was strung between US European Command headquarters near Stuttgart and the projected Pershing II site in Neu-Ulm. Massive demonstrations opposing deployment were held in Bonn (500,000 claimed) and Hamburg (400,000 claimed).[19] And in November, the Social Democrats, in a reversal of their previous position, voted against the NATO missile deployment. One source states that while only two of the 26-odd groups comprising the peace movement in West Germany are clearly pro-communist, the German Communist Party has been able to influence the movement strongly through superior organizational skills and large-scale Soviet funding.[20]

The capitals of the other countries facing year-end deployment also experienced massive demonstrations

[8] *The Times* (London), June 27, 1983; and Radio Free Europe *Research* (Munich), July 12, 1983.

[9] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), July 2, 1983.

[10] *Reformatorisch Dagblad* (Apeldoorn), June 27, 1983.

[11] TASS from Prague, June 26, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), June 27, 1983, p. CC/18.

[12] Ibid.

[13] *Peace Courier* (Helsinki), July–August 1983.

[14] *Izvestiya*, July 2, 1983, emphasis added.

[15] Trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report: Translation from KOMMUNIST No. 12* (Washington, DC), JPRS 84724, Nov. 10, 1983, pp. 22, 27.

[16] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 30, 1983.

[17] TASS, East Berlin, Nov. 1, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Nov. 1, 1983, p. E/1.

[18] *Morning Star* (London), Nov. 17, 1983.

[19] *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 4, 1983; and *New Age*, Nov. 6, 1983.

[20] *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Oct. 19, 1983.

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on October 22 at the beginning of UN Disarmament Week. Rome had a claimed turnout of 500,000 to 750,000, while London had a claimed 500,000.[21] The Soviets' assiduous cultivation of European socialists on this issue during the year appears to have been successful not only in West Germany, but in Great Britain, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries. On the other hand, the ruling Socialists in Italy have not opposed the deployment.[22] Of course, both the WPC, which has long incorporated elements of the socialist Left,[23] and the independent peace movement had a role to play here, the former directly and the latter indirectly.

[21] *New Age*, Nov. 6, 1983; and *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 4, 1983.

[22] *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Oct. 19, 1983.

[23] See Ralph M. Goldman, Ed., *Transnational Parties: Organizing the World's Precincts*, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1983, pp. 38–39, 324.

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Books

Struggle for Central America

By Mark Falcoff

ROBERT WESSON, Ed. *Communism in Central America and the Caribbean.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

H. MICHAEL ERISMAN and JOHN MARTZ, Eds. *Colossus Challenged: The Caribbean Struggle for Influence.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

BARRY B. LEVINE, Ed. *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

BERNARD DIEDERICH. *Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America.* New York, E. P. Dutton, 1981.

THOMAS W. WALKER, Ed. *Nicaragua in Revolution,* New York, Praeger, 1982.

JOHN A. BOOTH. *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

FIVE YEARS AGO, the collapse of the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua touched off a political earthquake in Central America whose reverberations are still being felt throughout that region. The waves of violence and counterviolence there, and their uncertain implications for the international political order, have also had an impact on the United States, generating perhaps the nastiest foreign policy debate since the end of the Vietnam war.

The current controversy over Central America really consists of three separate but related issues. The first concerns the indigenous causes of Central American instability—in other words, to what degree are events there nothing more than a natural response to poverty, injustice, and economic dislocation? The second concerns the role of outside powers—regional and global—in fomenting or containing political upheaval in the region. And the third centers around differing views about the significance of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions—as if to say, "If those are the 'worst case' scenarios, just how much do we have to fear from the falling of further dominoes?"

AT THE OUTSET it might be useful to make one basic point: even in the absence of outside forces, the Central American republics would find themselves in a crisis of major proportions. Some of the problems stem from economic factors: the tenfold increase in the world price of oil since 1973; the more or less contemporaneous drop in the value of local exports, particularly sugar, cotton, and coffee; and the crisis in credit structures provoked by high interest rates in the industrial countries. Others are long-term maladies that have simply grown exponentially: deficiencies in health, housing, education, and employment.

Nevertheless, however parlous this situation, there is no simple and direct relationship between poverty and the nature or fortunes of revolutionary groups throughout the isthmus. This is the finding of Robert Wesson and his colleagues in *Communism in Central America and the Caribbean.* On the one hand, in countries like Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama, the most revolutionary elements are also among the more prosperous ones, namely, workers in the multinational corporations and some secondary-school and university students.[1] On the other hand, even in poverty-stricken Guatemala and El Salvador, where an active guer-

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[1] Neal J. Pearson, "Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama," in the Wesson volume reviewed here, pp. 94–116.

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rilla movement already exists, the Left is seriously divided and unlikely to assume power in the near future.[2]

This does not mean an easy ride for the peoples of these countries (nor for the luckless few who govern them); but it does offer a far less dramatic picture than we are accustomed to getting from the electronic media and the daily press. It also suggests that exogenous actors do—or at any rate, can—make a difference. Who they are and what role they play is the topic of W. Raymond Duncan's essay on "Moscow, the Caribbean, and Central America" in the Wesson volume, and of the contributions to *Colossus Challenged* and to *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean.*

I suppose it requires no great brilliance to see that in spite of recent losses, the United States is still the most important single outside power in the area; but few view that fact in quite as jaundiced a light as does H. Michael Erisman, in his opening essay to the collection he coedited with John Martz. Erisman boldly sets forth the thesis that just about everything that is wrong with the countries of the Caribbean basin can be laid firmly at Washington's door—not just the Reagan Administration but very emphatically its predecessors as well. His case rests upon two fundamental premises, both of which must be accepted without reservation in order for it to make any sense. One is that the United States has no legitimate national interests in the area, or at any rate, none that justifies a serious projection of its power and influence. And the second, which follows from the first, is that anything that challenges the status quo (defined as US hegemony) is bound to benefit the people of the region, and is therefore fully justified—whether done by the Cubans, the Nicaraguans, or anyone else. That is why, Erisman writes, even "conservative" Latin American governments like those of Mexico and Venezuela oppose the drift of US policy.

No doubt there is much in that policy past and present worthy of careful reexamination, but a wholesale indictment of this sort is not terribly useful. How, for example, can one condemn the United States for a hegemony it no longer possesses, while at the same time masochistically celebrating its loss? Erisman also blurs some critical distinctions concerning the regional powers, Mexico and Venezuela—distinctions that fortunately are resupplied by some of his own authors a few pages away.

Clearly, Venezuela would prefer to keep Caribbean conflicts out of an East-West frame of reference, but this does not mean (as Erisman implies) that Caracas imagines this can be done simply by ignoring the extrahemispheric forces at work. Nor does it mean that Venezuelan leaders of either major party favor the victory of "popular" (i.e., Marxist) forces in the area—far from it. Rather, as Martz points out in his chapter on that country, its leaders believe that their own nation's security is best served by the spread of conventional democratic institutions throughout the Caribbean basin. This automatically creates a tactical convergence with US policy, which—however inconvenient it may be for any Venezuelan government's self-image—is for all practical purposes the same thing as agreement with Washington.[3]

The case of Mexico is more complicated. Edward J. Williams puts it very well, in his contribution to this anthology, when he characterizes that country's policy (or rather, *policies*) as informed by "a solid strain of inconsistency."[4] One dimension of that policy—the "revolutionary" one—is well known. It includes a public position of solidarity with Cuba, combined with diplomatic, economic, and political initiatives to assist and encourage revolutionary forces in El Salvador along with the Sandinista regime currently installed in Nicaragua. But often missed is what Williams calls the "prudential" dimension of Mexican policy: diplomatic relations with established Central American regimes of whatever ideological stripe; significant economic aid to same in the form of reduced oil prices; an unprecedented program of modernization for the Mexican military;[5] and, what is perhaps most interesting of all, military and security cooperation with the Guatemalan army in a few limited matters of mutual interest.

For example, Williams reports that Mexico apparently assisted in the capture of Guatemalan guerrilla leader Marco Yon Sosa. And in 1980, Guatemalan officers participated in military maneuvers in the Mexican states bordering their country—maneuvers that one observer cited by Williams described as "the most important [in the region] in the last fifty years" (p. 157). From this it would appear that Mexico actually pursues two Central American policies—one for

[2]Daniel Premo, "Guatemala," in ibid., pp. 73–93; Thomas Anderson, "El Salvador," in ibid., pp. 61–72.

[3]John D. Martz, "Ideology and Oil: Venezuela in the Circum-Caribbean," in the Erisman and Martz volume reviewed here, pp. 121–48.

[4]Edward J. Williams, "Mexico's Central American Policy: Revolutionary and Prudential Dimensions," in ibid., pp. 149–70.

[5]See especially George Fauriol, "Mexican Security," in Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies and Los Alamos Laboratories, *Project on Modern Weapons: Third World Motivations, Capabilities, Absorptions, and Acquisitions*, Washington, DC, September 1983 (mimeo).

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Guatemala, from which no revolutionary contagion can be viewed with equanimity; and one for the rest of Central America, where apparently it can. Either that, or the Mexicans are simply hedging their bets.

OF COURSE, when one speaks of external actors in Central America it is not the United States, Mexico, or Venezuela one may now have in mind but the Soviet Union. Here the really important issues are the links between Moscow's strategy and the conduct of its regional ally and pawn, Castro's Cuba. Of the ultimate objectives of Soviet policy there can be little doubt; they are, in Duncan's words, "to project power into an area historically dominated by the United States" (see his chapter in Wesson, p. 4). Over the longer term this strategy is intended to yield very concrete economic, maritime, and geostrategic advantages. But the Soviets, writes Duncan, are in no particular hurry, and certainly not desirous of doing anything that might provoke a direct military confrontation with the United States.

What of Soviet tactics in the meanwhile? Jiri Valenta, in an exhaustive and carefully nuanced chapter in the Erisman and Martz collection, explains that ever since the Cuban missile crisis (but especially since the Nicaraguan revolution), these have become increasingly "refined and subtle," allowing for either violent methods or the "peaceful road"—that is, a prolonged political process during which the anti-American "progressive forces" build national coalitions to challenge US hegemony.[6] Indeed, as Antonio Jorge points out in his contribution to *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean*, over the last decade there has been something of a convergence in Cuban and Soviet tactical thinking; so that if the "violent road" sometimes looks better to Moscow than it formerly did, the Cubans have learned to appreciate the advantages of "peaceful coexistence" and gradual infiltration through aid missions and educational and cultural "exchanges."[7]

How this works in practice is explained in this volume in another chapter written by Robert Pastor, a former US National Security Council official in the Carter Administration. While

the Cubans do make tactical foreign policy decisions, ... strategic decisions such as those that involve Cuban troops require Soviet consent. Scholars or policymakers are hard-pressed ... to find an area in which Cuban and Soviet policies have diverged since 1968—certainly not in Angola, Ethiopia, Central America, the Caribbean, or the Non-Aligned Movement. In areas where Cuban interests might lead them in a different direction—like Afghanistan, Poland, or China—the Cubans have dutifully supported the Soviet position....

That does not mean that the Soviet Union gives instructions—it generally does not have to, as was shown, for example, by the vote on Afghanistan. Soviet instructions are not necessary because Cuba is pursuing a set of interests that coincide with those of the Soviet Union.[8]

Thanks to the Cubans, the Soviets can have it all ways—they can effectively probe the region for revolutionary opportunities, reserving the option to withdraw or engage as the situation warrants. And even in the worst of cases they need not fear direct confrontation with the United States.

This is the real significance of the Cuban Revolution—indeed, it is difficult to see what else it could be. Twenty-five years after Castro's triumphal entry into Havana, even some authors who consider themselves socialists are not anxious to point to Cuba as a model for Caribbean development;[9] one supposes that by now the record of dismal economic and political performance is just a bit too complete. This is most definitely not the case with Nicaragua, whose revolution occurred just in time to provide certain Western intellectuals with a new focus for their innocence.

BEFORE THE BAR are three examples. Bernard Diederich, author of *Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America*, is a native of New Zealand who settled in Haiti in the 1950's and for some years edited that country's English-language weekly; he subsequently wrote (with Al Burt) an amusing and highly informative biography of the dictator François Duvalier, *Papa Doc*.[10] For the last two decades he has been *Time*'s bureau chief in Mexico City, traveling constantly throughout Central America and the Caribbean. He spent long periods in Nicaragua during the civil war and personally witnessed many of the episodes he describes.

Presumably this is just the man to write a biography of Anastasio

[6] Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Policy and the Crisis in the Caribbean," in Erisman and Martz, pp. 47–82.

[7] Antonio Jorge, "How Exportable Is the Cuban Model? Cultural Contact in a Modern Context," in the Levine volume reviewed here, pp. 211–34. For some particularly revealing examples of this process, see Anthony P. Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean: Playing the Cuban Card," in ibid., pp. 19–42.

[8] Robert Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does Cuba Act Alone?" in ibid., pp. 191–210, at p. 207.

[9] See, for example, Gordon K. Lewis, "On the Limits of the New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean," in ibid., pp. 235–40.

[10] *Papa Doc: The Truth About Haiti Today*. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1969.

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Somoza. Unfortunately, the book itself is simply awful. First of all—and this is the part most difficult to believe—it is actually *dull*, relieved only by snatches of salacious gossip about the dictator's personal life that do not come often enough to keep one's attention steadily focused on the pages. Second, this account appears to have been written at enormous speed, and as a result, it suffers from a lack of focus and organization. Too many events that could be described in summary form are strung out in long and tedious narrative. Third, so much has happened since the book went to press in early 1981 that its central theme—that Somoza alienated all sectors of Nicaraguan society and that the United States was criminal in its failure to recognize this earlier than it did—is simply no longer relevant. In fact, were Diederich to write his book today from the same perspective, many of his "heroes" would presumably be "villains": Eden Pastora ("Comandante Zero"), Alfonso Robelo, Adolfo Calero, Msgr. Miguel Obando y Bravo, and Arturo Cruz, among others, have all crossed over to the opposition, some even to the "infamous" *Contras*. These are the Nicaraguan moderates whose judgment of Sandinista intentions Diederich rated so much higher than that of Washington; subsequent events have not been very kind to them—or to him.

Fourth and finally, Diederich suffers from a peevish, single-minded anti-Americanism that nearly succeeds in its apparent objective—to obscure the purely Nicaraguan elements leading to the rise and rule of the Somozas. To treat these adequately would require a book apart, or perhaps several. For neither corruption nor personalistic rule was new to Nicaragua when the elder Somoza seized power in 1934. What *was* new was the methodology introduced to consolidate a patrimonial police state: the perversion of a professional military establishment created by the United States with a very different objective in mind, namely, to stop a cycle of civil wars among "private" armies. Once the Somoza system was fully fleshed out and securely in place, Washington was confronted with serious policy dilemmas that it never successfully resolved.[11] But that is a very different story from the one told by Diederich, in which the United States is unfailingly malevolent and invariably wrong.

Of the other two books about Nicaragua reviewed here, *Nicaragua in Revolution* is a compendium of short studies by academics and para-academics on the social and human aspects of the new regime; *The End and the Beginning* attempts a full-dress history of Nicaragua and the Sandinista movement, carrying the story up through mid-1981. Both books are examples of the kind of "committed" scholarship that characterizes so much of Latin American studies in the United States today, in which vulgar Marxism is combined with Latin American nationalism in irregular (and sometimes inconsistent) amounts.

Nicaragua in Revolution is full of material on health, housing, education, and social services in what the authors persist in calling the "new Nicaragua." The record looks very impressive—partly, of course, because that is exactly what the authors intended it to be. However, one major caveat should be borne in mind. Most regimes of this type generally go through two phases: an initial burst of generosity and euphoria, in which services are brought to the people at apparently little or no expense; and a second period of retrenchment when the ordinary laws of arithmetic reassert themselves. The latter phase is normally accompanied by a burst of repression that never quite manages to go away. This book was quite clearly prepared in 1980–81, when the Sandinistas were still receiving massive amounts of aid and credit from an astonishing variety of sources, including the United States. Since then, the general economic picture has changed, and it would be surprising indeed if a survey of this sort would produce so sunny a picture today.

The End and the Beginning is the most ambitious of these three books, and just because of that the most disappointing. Part of the problem is stylistic. John Booth is a remarkably humorless writer, deadly earnest from first page to last, without the slightest sense of the unexpected in human affairs. This gives the narrative a strangely unilinear, two-dimensional quality; every event in Nicaraguan history inevitably leads to the victory of the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN). Further, too much information, too densely packed, often makes it difficult for the reader to see the forest for the trees.

But the real problem is a deeper, almost methodological one. Booth is so indignant over the malefactions of the old regime that he simply cannot bring himself to see the disturbing features of the new. Is it wishful thinking or deliberate deception that leads him to omit all mention of Cuban arms shipments? To gloss over (p. 184) the real reasons for the resignation of Violeta Chamorro, the independently minded owner of *La Prensa*,

[11] See, for example, Mark Falcoff, "Somoza, Sandino, and the United States: What the Past Teaches—and Doesn't," *This World* (New York), No. 6, 1983, pp. 51–70.

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from the revolutionary Junta of National Reconstruction? To claim (p. 198) that "the revolution generally respected human rights, both rhetorically and in fact"? To misrepresent entirely (p. 203) the position of the Church toward the Sandinista movement, and to omit altogether any mention of the latter's attempt to create a schismatic "Church of the Poor" that they could control? To attempt to excuse (p. 201) the new regime's treatment of the Miskito Indians? To assert (pp. 209–11) that the Sandinistas created a large army only in response to the policies of the Reagan Administration, when in fact Nicaraguan mobilization and massive acquisition of weaponry (on a scale utterly unheard-of in Central America) began even before the present US administration took office? One could go on endlessly with such examples.

Even more disturbing are the author's Orwellian political concepts. For example, he comments approvingly that

by democracy ... the Sandinistas did not mean liberal, representative constitutionalism, but a broader corporatistic participation in political and economic areas (including the workplace) in addition to elections. The transition to electoral democracy would have to await the establishment of national institutions capable of defending the revolution. (p. 184)

One could be forgiven for translating this passage to read: "The Sandinistas have no intention of allowing the kind of political participation that would endanger their control of the state, and they certainly have no intention of holding elections until they are certain they can control the results." If this is not Marxism-Leninism, it is something almost equally sinister: the ideology of a Central American police state with left-wing trimmings. While such an eventuality may be less serious for the United States than some in Washington now suppose, for Nicaraguans it is surely no cause for celebration—nor should it be for an author so outraged (and properly so) by the depredations of the Somoza regime.

IF THERE IS one theme that emerges from all these books, it is the *diversity* of forces for change at work in Central America and the Caribbean: peasant unions, professional associations, industrialists, and various organizations of the Roman Catholic church (as well as Protestant missionary groups). The issue is not whether the forces of change will prevail in the end, but *which* forces, to whose benefit, at what cost.

Some months ago, *New York Times* columnist Tom Wicker took the US government to task once again for allegedly attempting to foist its own economic and political institutions on the allegedly unwilling and helpless nations of this region. What was needed, he wrote, was a respect for Central American realities and a willingness to work through them.[12] Unfortunately, Wicker did not say what those "realities" might be. Was the "authentic" Central American paradigm democratic Costa Rica? Or was it right-wing Guatemala? Or "revolutionary" Nicaragua? Perhaps Wicker would prefer Washington to choose the latter, but all three represent different facets of the same environment. The ferment in the region does not surge in any single direction, and holds out a number of different political possibilities.

Moreover, the Central American drama must be played out in the context of international tensions and the quest for spheres of influence. To deplore such outside influence is one thing; but to pretend it is not a reality is merely to shut one's eyes to an irreversible fact—namely, that impersonal factors like international commodity trading or the invention of jet planes have drawn these tiny countries into the mainstream of world affairs. Their struggle for progress and order thus becomes, perforce, part of our own.

[12] *The New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1984.

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Unlikely Conspiracy

By William Hood

PAUL HENZE. *The Plot to Kill the Pope.* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983.

CLAIRE STERLING. *The Time of the Assassins: Anatomy of an Investigation.* New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983.

COULD IT BE that the KGB and the highest Soviet authorities agreed that Pope John Paul II should be assassinated, and gave the Bulgarian intelligence service the contract? Two well-documented books, published almost back to back, strive to prove that on May 13, 1981, when a 23-year-old Turk pumped two bullets into the Pope, he was acting on behalf of Bulgarian intelligence, a KGB surrogate.

Perhaps. But when the attempted assassination is examined as a secret operation, the scheme has few of the characteristics that might plausibly mark one of the most potentially explosive covert operations in recent history.

To be sure, both of our authors are well qualified to investigate this sensitive and murky subject. Paul Henze's credentials are impeccable. He is a veteran of 30 years in US government and government-related organizations ranging from Radio Free Europe, to the US embassies in Ethiopia and Turkey, to the National Security Council under Zbigniew Brzezinski. He knows Turkey well and speaks its language fluently. His book is crammed with facts.

Claire Sterling, an American foreign correspondent, has published extensively on international terrorism. She is a lively writer and an aggressive journalist. In reading this nimble account of her investigation, one can almost see the police and security officials gritting their teeth when faced with the prospect of interrogation by her.

The research for both books was underwritten by the publishers of *The Reader's Digest* magazine, headquartered in Pleasantville, NY. Sterling was told to "take as long as you like, go wherever you please, spend as much as you must to get as close to the truth as you can." Doubtless Henze was given a similar brief. Both writers returned from their months of travel and scores of interviews with the same opinion: When Mehmet Ali Agça shot Pope John Paul II, he *was* acting for the KGB through its Bulgarian proxy.

AGÇA FIRST attracted public attention in 1979, when he was arrested for the murder of Abdi Ipekçi, a well-known Turkish editor. Immediately after his arrest, recalls Henze (p. 145), Agça said: *I am against the present system and I killed Ipekçi because he was a defender of this system. I have no connection with any organization. I killed him just to cause terror....*

Later, Agça, speaking "as casually," Sterling reports (p. 48), "as if he were discussing the weather," confessed on Turkish national television once again that he had killed the editor. But as he was to do with subsequent confessions and statements, Agça later withdrew this admission.

In November 1979, before his trial was over, Agça escaped from a Turkish maximum-security prison. To make his getaway, the young murderer had to pass through a series of guarded gates. It was an escape that could only have been engineered by a well-funded and politically powerful group. Although Agça's supporters have never been firmly identified, his only apparent political affiliation in Turkey was with the neo-fascist paramilitary organization known as the Gray Wolves.

After his escape, Agça *may* have murdered a student possibly responsible for his arrest, and he *may* have been smuggled across the border into Iran in early 1980. From that point on, Agça's trail becomes even more obscure. He *may* have spent some time in Iran, he *might* have slipped into the

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USSR, and he *may* have attended a PLO terrorist training school. It does seem certain that by the spring of 1980 he had arrived in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia.

On form, Agça was something less than an ideal choice for any secret mission—let alone that of murdering the world's most prominent religious leader. Agça was scarcely four years away from the Turkish town where he grew up. He was a poor linguist, and spoke only Turkish and some English. Worse yet, Agça's mug shots, fingerprints, a physical description, and even a psychological assessment were on file with the Turkish police and with Interpol. Other photographs of him had been splashed across the Turkish press; he had confessed to murder on national television; and for 18 months after his escape from prison, he was on an Interpol arrest circular.

On the evidence uncovered in these books, it does seem clear that Bulgaria's intelligence service was in contact with Agça while he was in that country. There is no possibility that a well-publicized murderer under sentence of death in Turkey could disport himself in Sofia for several weeks without the express consent of the local security authorities. Though in Bulgaria under an alias and with a doctored passport, Agça lived openly in a good hotel, one that is much used by Bulgarian intelligence and its favored agents and friends.

But this is not the way any intelligence service might be expected to handle an agent being prepped for a really secret mission, especially for the murder of one of the most famous men on earth. (A slightly more professional approach would have been to keep the young fellow out of sight, perhaps even in a rural safe house.) Rather, it may be that whoever sponsored Agça's stay in Bulgaria envisioned a role for him in the more "routine" rough-and-tumble activity of destabilizing neighboring Turkey. Illicit traffic across the border between Turkey and Bulgaria is well organized and extensive. Turkish smugglers, in a Levantine version of the "mafia," run money, heroin, guns, explosives, and agents across the border so baldly that the traffic could flourish only with the connivance of Bulgarian authorities. Indeed, Henze himself asserts (p. 54) that the USSR may have spent more money over the years in its attempt to destabilize Turkey than in any other effort abroad since the Vietnam war.

IN A SENSE, too, Henze argues against his own case in observing that "the dominant characteristic of all Soviet covert operations has always been careful preparation, patience, perseverance and effort in depth" (p. 80). Add a few words about the Soviets' passion for absolute secrecy and their expert ability to compartmentalize secret operations, and many intelligence professionals would agree with Henze's observation. Yet, as described in these books, Agça's activities show no evidence of careful preparation, secrecy, or compartmentation. In fact, the Bulgarian association with Agça was so ill-concealed that even the notorious cinematic bungler Inspector Clouseau might have detected it!

By contrast—had Moscow in fact decided that Pope John Paul II was such a threat to the USSR and its relations with Poland that he must be murdered—the international implications would surely have been seen as great enough to require approval by the very highest authority. And, once such a decision was taken, knowledge of the operation would be as closely guarded as any conceivable state secret and restricted to the minimum number of persons necessary to supervise and carry out the job.

Why then would the KGB, with generations of experience in secret operations, turn an activity of this magnitude over to its Bulgarian friends? The moment an intelligence mission is thrust upon a friendly—even a client—intelligence service, the number of persons who know about that mission is obviously multiplied. Each time the circle of knowledge is expanded, the possibility of a leak rises exponentially; any Western intelligence service might have an agent in place somewhere along the line, or someone with knowledge of the operation might opt to defect. And there is the ever-present possibility of a technical leak: a compromised cipher, or something as simple as an undetected "bugging" operation.

True, the *Darzhavna Sigurnost* (DS), the Bulgarian intelligence service, is known to have been active in Italy; both of our writers supply data to support this assertion. But is it likely the Bulgarians would be better equipped than the KGB to undertake an extremely sensitive operation in Italy? It seems not. In fact, Agça's Bulgarian contacts in Rome were so casual as to invite him to their apartments. The most rudimentary street surveillance might have blown the game at any point.

IT IS ALSO TRUE, as Henze points out, that the KGB and its various predecessor organizations have engaged in murder and kidnapping. (The East German, Hungarian, and Polish services are also known to have conducted similar operations.) There is a large body of evidence to support this claim, too. Trotsky was brained with an ice axe in Mexico in 1940. In 1954, Nikolay Khokhlov was dispatched from Moscow to kill a Rus-

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sian émigré in Frankfurt, but the agent chose to defect rather than carry out the murder. Three years later Khokhlov himself nearly died of poison that was apparently slipped into his coffee. The Ukrainian émigré leader Stefan Bandera and his deputy were both murdered in Munich by an assassin sent from the Soviet Union.

But these, and many other such operations, were directed against *Soviet* defectors, troublesome émigrés, or renegade agents. Aside from John Barron's report on the KGB's attempted poisoning and subsequent commando-style murder of Afghanistan's President Hafizollah Amin in late 1979,[1] I recall no published evidence that the KGB or any of its East European counterparts has engaged in the murder of prominent *foreign* leaders. Surely in the years since World War II there have been some foreign political figures who presented at least as much of a threat to the objectives of the USSR as has the incumbent Pope. Yet even in the immediate postwar years—when many intelligence services conducted operations with a brio unknown in today's more quiet times—no attempts appear to have been made against the life of targets as obvious as Josip Tito or Konrad Adenauer, a man whose death might have destabilized West Germany.

The DS, for its part, has likewise been charged with two well-publicized attacks on Bulgarian émigrés. In 1978, Vladimir Kostov, a former television commentator in Sofia, was jostled and jabbed with an umbrella in Paris. He fell ill, but recovered. In London, a few days later, Georgi Markov, a prominent Bulgarian writer and defector, died after a street incident in which he too was jabbed with an umbrella. Doctors found a skin puncture and extracted a tiny platinum pellet with openings through which a lethal poison had seeped out. When the news of Markov's death reached Kostov, he had X-rays taken. A similar pellet was removed from his leg; Kostov lived only because the poison had not yet leaked out (Henze, pp. 99–100).

In comparison with the alleged DS role in the attempted assassination of the Pope, these two vicious incidents were near models of clandestine murder. The perpetrator was never identified; one victim died; and for some time Kostov was not even aware of the attempt on his life. If through some inexplicable lapse of judgment the KGB did instruct the DS to kill the Pope, how could it have been that the operation was conducted with so little attention to what might happen if things came unglued? It also does not seem likely that, after having taken a decision to kill the Pope and to have the Bulgarian service handle the operation, the KGB would have stepped aside and let its Bulgarian colleagues blunder along on their own. A more plausible scenario would have the entire operation directed by the most competent officers in the Bulgarian *and* Soviet services.

IN FACT, the more one examines Agça's itinerary from mid-1980 through the attempted assassination a year later, the more doubts arise about DS or KGB involvement in that incident. Agça appears to have spent the summer of 1980 in Sofia, and he probably entered West Germany in early September. From that point on, he is known to have traveled widely: West Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Tunisia, and Austria. He signed up and paid for a course in Italian for foreigners in Perugia, but attended only one class. Agça took a holiday in Majorca, after which he returned to Rome in early May 1981. Throughout this travel, he appears to have been alone.

Agça's travel is estimated by police to have cost some $50,000. Most intelligence services are adequately funded but, James Bond notwithstanding, few have money to burn. It is difficult to see what operational purpose could be served by all this travel—one that might have offset the obvious risks involved in having such a well-known fugitive circulating so freely, with no apparent control. If not spotted by the police, Agça might have been recognized by any of the tens of thousands of Turks throughout Europe.

Is it possible, instead, that these trips were underwritten by the so-called Turkish mafia, that powerful combine of drug merchants and all-around smugglers? Could Agça have been working as some kind of an "enforcer," perhaps even a hit man for organized Turkish crime? This seems at least as likely as the possibility that he was on an expensive DS excursion.

Nevertheless, upon his return to Rome, Agça apparently did associate with three Bulgarians, all allegedly intelligence operatives: Sergei Antonov, deputy chief of the Rome office of the Bulgarian airline; Todor Ayvazov, a cashier at the Bulgarian embassy; and Major Zelio Vasilev, an assistant military attaché. On May 11 and 12, Agça has said, Antonov and Ayvazov took him to St. Peter's Square. There they reconnoitered the area and established the "best approach for the shooting." Again, it is difficult to imagine *two* intelligence officers escorting an ostensibly secret agent to the spot where he was supposed to kill the Pope. If the two Bulgarians were associ-

[1] John Barron, *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*, New York, Reader's Digest Press, 1983, pp. 15–16.

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ated with their nation's intelligence agency, had they no fear of surveillance? Had they no concern about such open association with a notorious killer who would attract worldwide attention within a matter of hours? Apparently not.

According to one of Agça's confessions, on May 13, the day of the assassination attempt, Antonov and Ayvazov called for him, drove him to a spot near St. Peter's Square, and parked in front of the Canadian embassy. Why would *two* alleged intelligence men find it necessary to deliver the murderer to the scene?

There are still other obvious problems in the alleged planning of this operation. While it would have been convenient for Agça's sponsors to have him killed on the spot, plans would certainly have been made to cover the mischance of his survival. Common sense mignt suggest that when a 23-year-old murderer is faced with the prospect of life in an Italian prison, he will sooner or later make a deal with his captors and tell what he knows. Indeed, the likelihood of a captured agent spilling the beans is the reason secret agents are handled at arm's length, not given the names of their handlers, and certainly not invited—as Agça is said to have claimed he was—for tea in a sponsor's apartment.

When Agça was taken alive, the three Bulgarians he could identify remained quietly in Rome. Only one of these carefree operatives had diplomatic immunity; the others were subject to arrest and trial as accomplices to an attempted murder. The moment Agça was known to have survived, prudence would have dictated that the two compromised operatives hustle out of Italy to the safety of Sofia. The fact that they did not suggests the probability that no one in the command lines in Rome, Sofia, or Moscow had any notion that the operatives might be linked to the crime. Of course, the flight of Agça's Bulgarian friends might have been considered by Italian authorities to substantiate their suspect's story. But this would scarcely outweigh the risk of having two agents with full knowledge of the crime arrested.

There has been speculation that a second murderer was at the scene, with instructions to kill Agça as soon as he had murdered the Pope. This sounds plausible enough—in for a nickel, in for a dime. But even if one assumes that such a hit man was available, he would have had to be shown a photograph of Agça—even better, given the opportunity to observe him—told approximately where in St. Peter's Square Agça was going to stand to shoot the Pope on the afternoon of May 13. A briefing of this sort would expose the operation to yet another person, who would then also be in a position to peddle the story to any interested intelligence service (or newspaper) either before or after the shooting. Even if we further assume that the DS does have a stockpile of relatively selfless murderers, it is difficult to see why any service would think that the second murderer, if apprehended, could be counted on to keep his pucker and glide silently off to prison for life.

THERE REMAIN, in sum, endless questions to be answered. Who sponsored Agça in Turkey, in Bulgaria, in Italy? More specifically, who got Agça out of prison in Turkey? Who arranged for his passage into Bulgaria? Why was he in open contact with presumed Bulgarian intelligence agents in Rome? Were his European travels sponsored by the Turkish "mafia"? And is Agça, as this reader suspects, merely a psychopathic free-lance terrorist who stumbled into relatively innocent contact with Bulgarian intelligence, and who while marking time between more mundane tasks decided independently to fulfill his earlier threat to kill the Pope? Small wonder, at any rate, that some of the very same security and intelligence people with whom both our authors spoke remained skeptical about the notion that the KGB was behind the plot to kill the Pope.

Henze suggests that we will learn the true story when a defector appears from Sofia or Moscow. Maybe so. Yet, curiously, neither Sterling nor Henze adequately credits the possibility that Western intelligence already has even some slight access to Bulgarian or Soviet secrets. Perhaps there is no such inside line. Still, in view of the skepticism and apparent lack of interest in the attempted assassination expressed by various Western intelligence services, it is not out of the question to suggest that the real (and rather unsensational) story may actually be known—but cannot be disclosed because the sources must be protected.

As of this writing, the Italian judge investigating the background of Agça's crime has not filed his report. No matter how many more of Agça's confessions may be leaked, further speculation about the Bulgarian connection might best be postponed at least until the judge's report has been released.

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THE SED AND THE VOLKSKAMMER

TO THE EDITORS: In connection with the entry on the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the German Democratic Republic presented in the "Checklist of Communist Parties" (*Problems of Communism*, March–April 1983 [and March–April 1984—**Eds.**]), we would like to elaborate a bit on the role of that party in East Germany's legislature, the Volkskammer.

More than 17 percent of the *certified voters* in the GDR belong to the SED. This is comparable in organizational strength to the 17.14 percent share of the voting-age population that belonged to the Nazi party in 1945. (See Wolfgang Schaefer, *NSDAP: Entwicklung und Struktur der Staatspartei des Dritten Reiches* [The National Socialist German Workers Party: The Development and Structure of the State Party of the Third Reich], Hannover, Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt O. Goedel, 1957).

As in the other East European countries, a people's front was established in the former Soviet occupation zone in Germany, in which all authorized parties and organizations were to work together; from the outset, however, this collaboration was under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist SED. From 1945 to 1947 this front was known as the Anti-Fascist Democratic Bloc; from 1947 to 1949, German People's Congress Movement; from 1949 to 1972, the National Front of Democratic Germany; and since 1972, the National Front of the German Democratic Republic.

The hegemony of the SED was uniformly acknowledged in the statutes and programs of the other groups (see *Statuten und Satzungen der Blockparteien in der DDR* [Statutes and Charters of the Member Parties of the Block in the GDR], Bonn, Gesamtdeutsche Institut, 1978). For the most part this occurred under pressure. Indeed, the Soviet Military Administration for Germany (SMAD) had the final say in the formation of all parties, and several came into existence as a result of direct orders from SMAD. In order of formation, the East German parties were the German Communist Party (KPD), June 11, 1945; the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), June 15, 1945; the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), July 10, 1945; the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD), July 10, 1945; the Anti-Fascist Democratic Bloc, July 14, 1945; the Socialist Unity Party (SED), formed by the forcible integration of the SPD with the KPD on April 21–22, 1946; German National Democratic Party (NDPD), June 16, 1948; and the Democratic Peasants Party of Germany (DBD), June 16, 1948. On these developments, see Siegfried Mampel, *Die sozialistische Verfassung der DDR* (The Socialist Constitution of the GDR), Frankfurt-am-Main, A. Metzner, 1983, pp. 176ff; Martin McCauley, "East-West German Relations: A Turning Point?" *Conflict Studies* (London), No. 155, 1983, pp. 12ff; Untersuchungsausschuss freiheitlicher Juristen, Comp., *Unrecht als System: Dokumente über planmässige Rechtsverletzungen in der Sowjetzone Deutschlands, zusammengestellt vom* (Injustice as a System: Documents on the Deliberate Abuses of Law in the Soviet Zone of Germany), Vol. 2, Bonn, Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1955; Hermann Weber, Ed., *Parteiensystem zwischen Demokratie und Volksdemokratie. Dokumente und Materialien zum Funktionswandel der Parteien und Massenorganisationen in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1950* (The Party System Between Democracy and People's Democracy. Documents and Materials Concerning the Change in Function of Parties and Mass Organizations in the Soviet Military Zone/German Democratic Republic 1945–1950), Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1982; Eberhard Schneider, Editor, *SED: Programm und Statut von 1976* (The SED: Program and Statutes of 1976), Opladen, Leske und Budrich, 1977; and David Pike, "Germany–German Democratic Republic," in Robert Wesson, Ed., *1983 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983, pp. 270ff.

In the GDR's current 500-member Volkskammer—elected for a five-year term on June 14, 1981—the SED constitutes the strongest single political party, with 127 representatives (25.4 percent of the total). The remaining four parties—the NDPD, the DBD, the CDU, and the LDPD—have 52 representatives (10.4 percent) each, as they have invariably had since 1963, when the total number of representatives in the Volkskammer was increased from 400 to 500 (see *Handbuch der Volkskammer der DDR, 4. Wahlperiode* [Handbook of the GDR Volkskammer, 4th Term], East Berlin, 1964, and subsequent issues of the *Handbuch*).

On the surface of things it might appear that these last four parties, with 41.6 percent of the seats, constitute a significant counterbalance to the SED in the Volkskammer. However, even were these four parties not under the hegemony of the SED, there is the matter of the representation of four authorized social groups in the Volkskammer. Thus, the Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB) regularly holds 68 seats (13.7 percent); the Free German Youth (FDJ), 40 seats (8 percent); the Democratic Women's League (DFD), 35 seats (7 percent); and the Cultural League (KB), 22 seats (4.4 percent). And what is more important, most of the members of these groups are simultaneously also members of the SED. This is the case for 62 of the 68 representatives from the FDGB, 37 of 40 from the FDJ, 32 of 35 from the DFD, and 18 of 22 from the KB. Every "comrade" is obliged by party rules to comply strictly with the directives of the party leadership. Consequently, the SED actually commands 55 percent of all representatives in the Volkskammer (for the program and statute of

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the SED of May 22, 1976, see *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IX. Parteitages der SED* [Minutes of the Proceedings of the 9th Party Congress of the SED], East Berlin, Vol. 2, pp. 140, 145, 209ff, and 267ff).

Thus, the supremacy of the SED is guaranteed not only by Article 1 of the constitution, but also by the concrete facts of party affiliation of Volkskammer members. For a text of the constitution of October 7, 1974, see *Gesetzblatt der DDR* (East Berlin), No. 1, 1974, pp. 432ff.

Moreover, the propaganda image of the four smaller parties' constituting a counterbalance to the SED does not reflect political reality. Since 1949 all Volkskammer votes—with one exception—have been unanimous. The sole exception occurred on March 9, 1972, when 14 CDU representatives voted against and another 8 abstained from voting on a law dealing with abortion (see *Stenografische Berichte, Volkskammer der DDR, 6. Wahlperiode, 4. Sitzung* [Stenographic Report of the GDR Volkskammer, 6th Term, 4th Session], East Berlin, 1972, pp. 77ff.). To put this event in context, it is important to recall that a somewhat similar legislative proposal was at the time under consideration in the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, the GDR law did not conform with the actual birth-control policies in operation in East Germany, which were intended to increase the birthrate. Thus, one might conclude that the token opposition actually was desired by the SED leadership for demonstrative purposes and should be accorded no larger political significance.

One may rest assured that East Germany's non-Marxist-Leninist parties lost their independence by 1950 at the latest. Since then, none has developed any alternate political conceptions to the SED's. Their organizational work in the populace proceeds under SED supervision. Genuine discussions regarding possible policy lines (reform, modernization, nationalistic leanings) occur exclusively *inside* the SED. As a result, the authority of the SED has been uncertain only when the wishes of Moscow were not clear or had not previously been spelled out (as in communist power struggles following the death of Stalin in 1953—which also affected the SED—or in the post-1969 Soviet policy of détente, of which Walter Ulbricht disapproved but to which Erich Honecker has adjusted SED positions).

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